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ABSTRACT 
Eight selective surveillance methods were assessed for 
their effectiveness in detecting hospital infection and 
the time required for data collection. The methods were 
compared with a reference method which was designed to 
identify all patients and infections in the study 
population (patients occupying 122 beds of a district 
general hospital). The selective methods were: 
- laboratory based ward surveillance 
- laboratory based telephone surveillance 
- ward liaison surveillance 
- laboratory based ward liaison surveillance 
- risk factor surveillance 
- temperature chart surveillance 
- treatment chart surveillance 
- temperature and treatment chart surveillance. 
The proportions of community acquired infection (CAI) and 
hospital acquired infection (HAI) detected by the 
selective surveillance methods varied; the highest 
proportion of CAI (70%) was identified by treatment chart 
surveillance, and temperature and treatment chart 
surveillance, and of HAI (71%), detected by laboratory 
based ward liaison surveillance. The time for data 
collection ranged from 1.5 hours/122 beds/week for 
laboratory based telephone surveillance to almost 8 hours 
for temperature and treatment chart surveillance. The time 
for the reference method was 22.1 hours/122 beds/week. 
Using the proportion of patients with HAI detected and 
time required for data collection to assess the methods, 
laboratory based ward liaison surveillance was the most 
effective and an efficient method. This method was revised 
minimally and introduced into six district general 
hospitals by infection control nurses. The time for data 
collection ranged from 4 to almost 8 hours/120 beds/week. 
The revision did not affect the proportion of HAI 
detected, however, the proportion of CAI identified was 
significantly reduced. The reproducibility of laboratory 
based ward liaison surveillance was good. 
The results will enable infection control teams to make an 
objective and rational choice of methods for the 
surveillance of hospital infection. 
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PREFACE 
Hospital infection continues to be a problem and much 
nursing and medical care is directed towards its control 
and prevention. The efficacy of many practices is unknown, 
since infection rates have not been frequently produced. 
The surveillance of hospital infection can be used to 
evaluate practice, however, considerable resources are 
required for data collection, the most time consuming 
element of a surveillance programme. To reduce this time, 
some hospitals have developed selective surveillance 
methods. These aim to detect a subset of the population 
who are likely to have, or develop infection. The 
effectiveness of such methods has not been rigorously 
assessed, nor the time for data collection determined. 
Therefore infection control teams are unable to make an 
informed choice of methods to adopt. With the management 
changes occurring in the National Health Service, the 
surveillance of hospital infection is becoming 
increasingly important in health authorities. This thesis 
records the assessment of eight different selective 
surveillance methods and the implementation of the most 
effective method into six district general hospitals. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE HISTORY OF HOSPITAL INFECTION 
This thesis is concerned with the concept of surveillance 
and its relevance to hospital infection. Therefore, the 
first two chapters will address both the history of 
hospital infection and surveillance. The history of 
hospital infection is considered chronologically 
emphasising the problem, and measures introduced for its 
control and prevention. 
2500 B. C. - 1400 A. D. 
The advent of the hospital dates back to 2250 B. C., when 
the Babylonians brought their sick to the market place and 
passers-by gave advice about treatment (Garrison, 1929), 
However, evidence from hieroglyphics in Egypt (2500 B. C. ) 
suggest that surgery and infection occurred before this 
time (Fraser Moodie, 1970). The next reference to a 
hospital is in 293 B. C. when the temple to Aesculapius was 
built for sick slaves (Guthrie, 1945). This was after 
Hippocrates (460-370 B. C. ) had observed and grouped signs 
and symptoms of certain infectious diseases and proposed 
the "miasmal' theory for the spread of infection. He taught 
that air was laden with poisons and products of 
putrefaction, many centuries before the germ theory of 
disease was demonstrated (Winslow, 1944; Chadwick and 
Mann, 1950). 
The main era of hospital building occurred in the middle 
ages (1096-1438), when the Christian Church became 
prominent and the virtue of compassion towards the sick 
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existed. Hospitals were attached to monasteries and 
staffed by monks and women associated with religious 
orders (Seymer, 1949). Two famous London hospitals built 
at the time were St. Bartholomew's (1123) and St. Thomas's 
(1215) (Poynter and Keele, 1961). 
Between the 14th and 18th centuries Europe suffered 
numerous epidemics of bubonic plague, smallpox, syphilis, 
dysentery, typhoid and cholera (Sigerist, 1944; Winslow, 
1944; Shrewsbury, 1970; Gottfried 1978). The transmission 
of disease was assisted by crowded conditions, poor 
sanitation, immorality, and the superstition, ignorance 
and uncleanliness of the masses (Garrison, 1929). These 
same diseases also were rife in hospitals, where the 
dying, aged, convalescent, infectious and surgical 
patients were crowded together in immense wards (Top, 
1970). 
Suppuration following surgery was common and the term 
"laudable" pus was coined. This was considered an 
essential part of the healing process (Bishop, 1959). 
However, during the 13th century, Theodorico Borgognoni 
(1205-1296), and Henri de Mondeville (1260-1320), Italian 
and French surgeons, suggested that the exudation of pus 
hindered healing (Singer and Underwood, 1962), but ways of 
preventing suppuration were not described. 
1401 - 1800 
During the Renaissance (1453-1600) the introduction of 
gunpowder and the development of printing contributed to 
the history of hospital infection. Gunshot wounds provided 
a challenge to surgeons and printing enabled the wider 
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dissemination of findings. 
Ambroise Pare (1510-90) made one of the first attempts to 
control and prevent infection by his treatment of gunshot 
wounds. Before this time, irritant dressings had been used 
' had to encourage the formation of pus. In 1536-7 Pare 
insufficient supplies of oil and therefore used a 
digestive dressing of "yolks of eggs,, oil of roses and 
turpentine". To his surprise, the wounds healed without 
inflammation or swelling (Bishop, 1959). Also, at this 
time, the first reference to the prevention of infection 
was made. Two German surgeons, Aureolus Paracelsus (1493- 
1541) and Felix Wurtz (1518-75) spoke of the dangers of 
exposing wounds to the air and recommended that they 
should be covered (Garrison, 1929). 
Further advances in the prevention of infection now 
depended on the existence of micro-organisms being 
demonstrated. In the great epidemics of the middle ages, 
the spread of infection was noted. In 1546, Girolamo 
Fracastoro (1484-1553) postulated the existence of "seeds" 
of disease, and defined three types of contagion: 1) 
contagion by contact, 2) contagion by fomites (i. e. 
inanimate objects) and 3) contagion at a distance (Brock, 
1961). 
Further support for Fracastoro's theories came in the mid- 
seventeenth century from Athanasius Kircher (1602-1680) 
who examined the blood of patients suffering from plague 
and reported seeing "countless masses of small worms, 
invisible to the naked eye" (Guthrie, 1945). It is 
unlikely that Yersinia pestis, the plague bacillus was 
observed, as the lenses used were of insufficient power. 
Yet, his inference that "contagious diseases were conveyed 
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by minute living organisms" was correct. 
The invention of the microscope followed. Anthony van 
Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723) described many different 
morphological types of bacteria. However, others such as 
Linnaeus (1707-78) failed to confirm Leeuwenhoek's 
observations (Dobell, 1932). Leeuwenhoek's work was an 
important step in the germ theory of disease, but the 
association of particular micro-organisms with specific 
diseases remained undiscovered until the work of Robert 
Koch (1843-1910). 
The continuing problem of hospital infection during the 
18th century prompted some suggestions for improved design 
and planning. John Pringle (1707-1782), a military 
physician, advised that wards should be warmed by 
chimneys, which acted as ventilators. He also observed 
that air became "corrupted" in "thronged" and closed 
areas, and that wards were "the most healthful when by 
broken windows and other wants of repair, the air could 
not be excluded" (Pringle, 1752). According to Selwyn 
(1966), James Lind (1716-94), a naval surgeon impressed by 
Pringle's observations advocated the use of separate wards 
for different infectious diseases to reduce cross 
infection. 
Nursing was performed by women working long hours and 
living in poor conditions on low pay (Seymer, 1949). 
According to Abel-Smith (1960), many were drawn from the 
domestic servant class, illiteracy was high and they 
received little training. Standards of care were low and 
this undoubtedly contributed to widespread hospital 
infection. Nurse training was not recognised until 1860. 
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Infection was not exclusive to hospitals in Britain. In 
1788, Jacques Rene Tenon (1724-1816) published his memoirs 
on the hospitals of Paris, observing that septic fevers 
A 
were common (Tenon, 1788). He described the Hotel Dieu, in 
Paris which housed some 1200 beds, most containing 4-6 
patients. Cases of acute "contagious" disease were often 
in close proximity to mild diseases, vermin and filth 
abounded, and ventilation was so poor that staff would 
only enter with a sponge dipped in vinegar held to their 
faces (Garrison, 1929). 
Tenon's recommendations included: caring for patients in 
separate beds, the establishment of separate wards / rooms 
for cases of contagious fever, and the establishment of 
preparation rooms attached to operating theatres 
(Wangensteen, Wangensteen and Klinger, 1972). John Howard 
(1726-90) also reviewed hospitals both in England and 
abroad and noted dirty floors, "bugs" and the absence of 
fresh air. He recommended that airy eight bedded rooms be 
established, weekly washing of wards and that hospitals 
should be built out of town (Howard, 1789). This followed 
Clare's observation that recovery following surgery was 
more "successful" in hospitals in the country than those 
in London (Clare, 1779). 
All these recommendations were based on observation rather 
than scientific data. The urgent need to alleviate such 
deplorable conditions and a limited knowledge of 
statistics and their importance, obviated the need for 
proper scientific investigations. 
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1801 - 1900 
The first evidence of scientific research to evaluate a 
change in practice occurred in obstetrics. Puerperal 
sepsis had been recognised by Alexander Gordon (1752-99), 
Oliver Holmes (1809-94) and Ignaz Semmelweiss (1818-1865) 
as a prominent cause of mortality on maternity wards. 
Semmelweiss collected, analysed and used data to 
demonstrate a higher mortality amongst women delivered by 
medical students (9.92%) than those delivered by midwives 
(3%) (Garrison, 1929). When a friend, Professor 
Kolletschka, cut himself during a post-mortem examination 
and died of sepsis, Semmelweiss postulated a similar cause 
for both septicaemia and puerperal fever. He suggested 
that the "cause" of puerperal fever was carried on the 
hands of students after their sessions in the post-mortem 
room (Sanford, 1981). 
In 1847, Semmelweiss introduced a policy of hand washing 
with a solution of chlorinated lime, and found that the 
mortality rate on the ward where medical students 
delivered women fell to 3.8% (Garrison, 1929). As he 
initiated two changes simultaneously, the introduction of 
handwashing and the use of an antiseptic, the decrease in 
mortality could be attributed to either. Semmelweiss, like 
others to follow him, used mortality to measure outcome, 
even though his policy aimed to reduce puerperal sepsis. 
Mortality is easier to define than the presence or absence 
of disease which is a changing phenomenon. However, since 
the incidence of mortality following puerperal sepsis was 
high, mortality, in this instance gives an accurate 
estimate of disease burden. Semmelweiss's work was not 
accepted by colleagues and consequently his 
recommendations were not quickly adopted. 
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The germ theory of disease remained undiscovered and the 
"creatures" associated with infection were considered to 
be the product of spontaneous generation. Louis Pasteur 
(1822-95), a chemist, conducted a series of experiments to 
study the causes of putrefaction and fermentation. He 
demonstrated that fermentation was due to micro-organisms 
which could be prevented by heat or "pasteurisation", and 
the existence of germs in the air (Singer, 1928; Guthrie, 
1945). These findings led Lister to apply his antisepsis 
principle to surgery with encouraging results. 
The introduction of anaesthesia in 1846 by William Thomas 
Green Morton (1819-68) allowed more complicated surgery. 
Excessive speed was less important and therefore new 
procedures could be performed. Although the operations 
were often successful, infection frequently complicated 
the outcome (Poynter and Keele, 1961). 
From studying Pasteur's work, Joseph Lister (1827-1912) 
deduced that infection in wounds must be analogous to 
putrefaction in wine. His antiseptic system of surgery was 
based on these observations. He applied dressings soaked 
with carbolic acid to wounds (Lister, 1867a, b, c) and later 
used an antiseptic spray to eliminate micro-organisms from 
the site of incision during surgery. Controlled 
experiments were not conducted but since the case studies 
were so convincing, his techniques were widely adopted 
(Larson, 1988). 
Further developments occurred in the design and planning 
of hospitals in the 19th century. In 1863, Florence 
Nightingale (1820-1910) attributed infection to: defects 
in hospital design, the agglomeration of a large number of 
sick people under one roof, and deficiencies in space, 
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ventilation and light (Woodham-Smith, 1950). Noting the 
excess mortality associated with puerperal sepsis in 
hospitals with large wards, led Nightingale to advise the 
use of smaller rooms with fewer patients (Smith, 1982). 
James Simpson (1811-70) conducted a series of studies 
which examined post-amputation mortality. He noted that 
the mortality rate in the newly built Edinburgh Infirmary 
was 8% in 1740 and greater than 33% in 1860 (Simpson, 
1869a). He used the term "hospitalism" to describe factors 
which produced and propagated septic disease, and after 
considering the findings of his studies urged that 
hospitals should be small and rebuilt every few years. 
Simpson also surveyed 400 practitioners throughout Britain 
using a postal questionnaire about amputations. He 
demonstrated that mortality was lowest in the country 
practices and highest in the large hospitals (Simpson, 
1869b). 
Although these studies were thorough, care in 
interpretation of the data is necessary since the 
populations and practices of each group were possibly 
different. For example, the advent of anaesthesia in 1846 
allowed more complex operations to be performed which 
could account for the increase in mortality in 1860. Also 
the reliability of the data was not assessed. However, 
given these limitations, the studies provided some 
information on mortality following amputation. 
SN. impson also demonstrated remarkable foresight by 
advocating that patients' pre-operative stay should be 
minimised to prevent their exposure "to the vitiated air 
of an hospital" (Selwyn, 1965). In recent years prolonged 
pre-operative stay has been associated with an increased 
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risk of surgical wound infection (Cruse, 1970; Cruse and 
Foord, 1973; Haley et al, 1981). 
The debate over large (20-25 beds) or small (12 beds) 
hospital wards received considerable attention. Although 
Nightingale originally recommended small wards, the low 
number of nurses available made it difficult to care for 
patients in this way and therefore large "Nightingale" 
wards were frequently seen (Duncan, 1964). 
Nursing up until this time had been performed by untrained 
workers who were "too old, too weak, too drunken, too 
dirty, too stolid, or too bad to do anything else" 
(Nightingale cited by Abel-Smith, 1960). If medicine was 
to progress, the quality of nursing care needed to be 
improved. Florence Nightingale recognised this, and 
established the first hospital based training school at St 
Thomas's in 1860. The first probationers were taught 
skills of bandaging and observing the patient for symptoms 
and signs of disease (Seymer, 1949). They also received 
lectures from physicians in anatomy, physiology and 
gynaecology, but probably no instruction was given about 
the control and prevention of infection. 
A major development in the history of hospital infection 
was the demonstration by Robert Koch (1843-1901) that 
specific micro-organisms caused particular diseases. 
Between 1876-1884, he showed that the tubercle bacillus 
caused tuberculosis, presented a method for isolating pure 
bacterial cultures, and described a set of principles to 
prove a cause and effect relationship between a specific 
micro-organism and a specific disease - Koch's postulates 
(Brock, 1961; Hackney and Linn, 1979). Alexander Ogston 
(1844-1929) used these principles to demonstrate that 
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micrococci observed in chains caused different diseases to 
those observed in groups (Ogston, 1881). These were later 
identified as "Streptococcus" and "Staphylococcus". 
Following Koch's work a number of micro-organisms were 
identified. 
In addition to advances in bacteriology, hospital 
practices began to change to prevent the development of 
infection. The concept of asepsis (i. e. preventing micro- 
organisms from contaminating sites) was introduced by 
Ernst von Bergmann (1836-1907) (Walter, 1948). With Carl 
Schimmelbusch (1860-95), he developed the packaging and 
steam sterilisation of dressings, solutions, nail brushes 
and operating equipment (von Bergmann, 1882). Although it 
is likely that these changes affected the incidence of 
hospital infection, no documented studies were undertaken. 
Further developments were the introduction of rubber 
gloves and face masks. The former were introduced by 
William Halsted (1852-1922) to prevent nursing staff 
developing dermatitis from mercuric chloride (Halsted, 
1913). They were subsequently used by Halsted's house- 
surgeon, Bloodgood (1867-1935), when operating to prevent 
contamination of the wound (Morton, 1959). Halsted (1913) 
states that in 1899, Bloodgood reported that the sepsis 
rates of herniorrhaphy wounds were 20% and 1% pre and post 
the wearing of gloves. 
The wearing of face masks during operations was suggested 
by Carl Flilgge (1847-1923) and Johann von Mikulicz-Radecki 
(1850-1905) in 1896 (Morton, 1959). Three years later Paul 
Berger (1845-1908) reported infection rates in 
herniorrhaphy wounds to be 20% before, and 1.7% after, 
masks were worn (Berger, 1899). 
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These two studies are the first examples of surveillance 
of hospital infections being used to evaluate a change in 
practice. In these studies the direct outcome measure, 
surgical wound infection was used rather than mortality. 
Although the analysis does not consider population 
structure, and full details of data collection and 
definitions for infection were not included, a logical 
approach to surveillance had been taken. Both gloves and 
face masks were widely adopted, however, subsequent 
studies have failed to confirm the advantages of the 
latter (Orr, 1981). 
1901 Onwards 
During the 20th century, a number of developments occurred 
concurrently to prevent and control hospital infection. To 
assist discussion these will be described under separate 
headings. 
The Changing Pa tt ern of 
Mic. robiological Developments 
Hospital Infection and 
By the 20th century antisepsis and asepsis had been 
introduced and trained nurses were caring for patients. 
Hospital infection was undoubtly occurring but there are 
few documented reports during the first thirty years. 
Reports did appear during the 1914-1918 war when soldiers 
were admitted with trench foot and war wounds (Morton, 
1959). Stokes and Tytler (1918) found that 90.3% of 215 
war wounds were "infected" and the micro-organisms 
frequently isolated were anaerobes and streptococci. This 
high rate was probably a reflection of a lack of 
differentiation between colonised and infected wounds. 
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From 1900-1930 the haemolytic streptococcus was associated 
with approximately 85% of the deaths related to puerperal 
sepsis in England and Wales (Ministry of Health, 1932). A 
retrospective study undertaken in the United States 
reported that the pneumococcus and the haemolytic 
streptococcus were most frequently associated with 
bacterial illness in 1935 (Finland, Jones and Barnes, 
1959; Finland 1970). However, some caution needs to be 
taken in interpreting this data, as laboratory methods may 
have been limited at this time, thus, some micro-organsims 
may not have been cultured and identified. 
To assist in the study of cross infection, methods of 
differentiating between strains of micro-organisms were 
required. In 1903, Schottmuller observed the differential 
haemolysis by streptococci, and in 1928, Gunn and 
Griffiths developed a serological method for typing 
streptococci (Gunn and Griffiths, 1928). This system was 
used to demonstrate the relationship of carriage of 
streptococci in healthy persons and hospital environmental 
reservoirs (Colebrook, 1935). 
Studies of antimicrobial agents which were to profoundly 
affect hospital infection were pioneered by Paul Ehrlich 
(1854-1915). In 1909, his 606th arsenic related compound 
was found to be effective in treating syphilis in 
experimental rabbits (Baldry, 1976). Using Ehrlich's 
methods, Gerard Domagk (1895-1964) discovered that dyes 
containing sulphonamide were effective in treating mice 
infected with streptococci. In 1936, Colebrook and Kenny 
reported a reduction in mortality associated with 
puerperal sepsis from 22% to 8% following a controlled 
sequential clinical trial of sulphonamide. With the 
introduction of sulphonamide, and what appears to be a 
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reduction in virulence (Selwyn, 1972), the number of 
infections caused by streptococci then decreased. 
During the second world war (1939-45) further studies 
considered cross infection. In two papers, Miles and 
colleagues (Miles et al., 1940a; Miles et al., 1940b) 
described the problem of hospital infection in war wounds 
and used serological typing to demonstrate patient to 
patient transmission of micro-organisms. By swabbing 
wounds on admission and subsequently, Miles and colleagues 
found that haemolytic streptococci, micrococci, 
Staphylococcus aureus, and coliform bacilli predominated 
on admission, whereas, Streptococcus pyrogenes, S. aureus 
and Pseudomonas aeruginosa were more frequently isolated 
after several days of hospitalisation. The recognition 
that these latter micro-organisms were "added" to the 
wounds some time after their infliction was one of first 
observations to differentiate between hospital and 
community acquired infection. 
During the early 1940' s, before the introduction of 
penicillin, S. aureus and the pneumococcus were most 
frequently associated with infection (Finland, et al, 
1959; Williams, 1971)). Although Alexander Fleming (1881- 
1955) had observed that Penicillin notatum inhibited the 
growth of S. aureus in 1929, penicillin was not produced 
until 1940 (Chain et al, 1940). After penicillin had been 
introduced to clinical practice, resistance in S. aureus 
was observed within a few years (Rammelkamp and Maxon, 
1942; Barber and Whitehead, 1949). This same process 
occurred for other antimicrobial agents such as 
streptomycin, chloramphenicol, erythromycin, bacitracin, 
neomycin and carbomycin (Wise, et al, 1989). 
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Staphylococcal infections varied in severity from pustules 
of the skin, and surgical wound infection to septicaemia, 
pneumonia with empyema, endocarditis and metastatic 
abscesses in bones and other tissues (Wise, et al, 1989). 
Staphylococcal infection particularly affected maternity 
departments (Cooke, 1975): the newborn suffered a serious 
skin infection, scalded skin syndrome, and mothers 
developed mastitis and breast abscess. 
To determine whether cross infection was occurring, a 
method for typing strains of S. aureus using 
bacteriophages was developed (Fisk, 1942a, b) and 
standardised (Williams and Rippon, 1952). Most infections 
were caused by types 52/52A/80/81 or 47/53/77 or 83A 
(Selwyn, 1972). Type 80/81 was responsible for outbreaks 
in Australia (Rountree and Freeman, 1955), the Netherlands 
(Ruys et all 1958), Uganda (Hennessey and Miles, 1958), 
United States (Fekety and Bennett, 1959) and Canada (Bynoe 
et al, 1956) and became known as the "hospital" or 
"epidemic" staphylococcus (Parker and ievons, 1963). 
Whether these outbreaks were due to an increase in 
virulence, or poor practice is difficult to determine. 
More recently methicillin resistant S. au-reus (MRSA) and 
in particular, the epidemic MRSA have been causing 
problems in hospitals (Marples et al, 1985). 
The increase in staphylococcal infection prompted a number 
of studies which investigated the role of air in the 
transmission of infection. These considered the frequency 
with which carriers liberated staphylococci into the 
environment (Hare and Ridley, 1958; Lidwell et al, 1959; 
White, 1961; White et al, 1964), mechanisms of dispersal 
(Hare and Cooke, 1961; Davies and Noble, 1962,1963; Hare, 
1964; White, et al, 1964), factors influencing dispersal 
14 
including protective clothing (Ehrenkranz, 1964; Blowers 
and McClusky, 1965), and the use of special rooms with 
ventilation for dressing burns (Bourdillon and Colebrook, 
1946; Lowbury, 1954). These studies were helpful in 
elucidating routes of transmission but few considered 
infection rates. The relative importance of aerial 
transmission in the aetiology of hospital infection was 
yet to be determined. 
During the 1950's and 1960's Gram-negative bacilli assumed 
a higher level of importance in hospital infection. 
Finland (1970) reported an increase in isolations from 
bacteraemic patients, from 12% in 1935 to 50% in 1965 at 
Johns Hopkins Hospital, United States. In two surveys 
undertaken by the Public Health Laboratory Service in the 
1960s, coliforms were the organisms second most frequently 
associated with infection, following S. aureus (Public 
Health Laboratory Service, 1960; 1965). 
Several reasons for this changing pattern can be 
postulated. The loss of virulence of Gram-positive 
bacteria and the advent of certain antimicrobial agents 
could have contributed. Also, the patient population could 
have become more vulnerable to infections caused by Gram- 
negative bacilli. Changes in nursing and medical practice, 
with the use of sophisticated instruments and apparatus, 
which were difficult or impossible to clean or sterilise 
may have contributed. Respiratory equipment, cystoscopy 
equipment and urinary tract pressure equipment were 
frequently identified as a reservoir for Gram-negative 
bacilli (Bassett et al, 1965; Phillips and Spencer, 1965; 
Mitchell and Hayward, 1966; Moore and Forman, 1966; 
Tinn, et al, 1967; Glenister, et al 1985). 
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A number of studies investigated the role of hands in the 
transmission of Gram-negative bacilli. These considered 
contamination of hands with pathogenic micro-organisms 
(Casewell and Phillips 1977; Larson, 1981; Glenister, 
1983; Noble, 1986), survival of micro-organisms on hands 
(Casewell and Desai, 1983), and the transfer of micro- 
organisms between the patient and the hands of health care 
personnel (Kominos, et al, 1972; Knittle Eitzman and Baer, 
1975). Handwashing was also studied by examining the 
effectiveness of antiseptics and soaps (Mackenzie, 1970; 
Cruse and Foord, 1973; Ayliffe, 1984) and practices (Fox, 
1974; Taylor, 1978; Glenister, 1983; Kaplan and McGuckin, 
1986). However, few considered the effects of changes in 
handwashing on infection rates. In a review of the 
literature (1879-1986) Larson (1988) found that only 
14/423 (3.3%) of publications had investigated handwashing 
in relation to infection rates. 
Although the nature of hospital infection has changed with 
time, it has not disappeared. Anaerobes (Finegold, et al, 
1971), fungi (Louria, 1971), viruses (Klein, 1971) and 
coagulase-negative staphylococci (Hamory and Parisi, 1987) 
have increasingly been associated with infection. This may 
be due to patients being more vulnerable to these micro- 
organisms. However, this trend in aetiological agents may 
be due to sophisticated laboratory techniques. 
The national prevalence survey of 1980 indicated the 
extent of hospital infection in England and Wales. Of the 
18,163 hospital patients studied, 19.1% were infected and 
almost half of the infections were acquired during 
hospitalisation (Meers, et al, 1981). Lower respiratory 
tract infection, skin infection and urinary tract 
infection were the most common community acquired 
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infection, whereas urinary tract infection followed by 
surgical wound and lower respiratory tract infection were 
the predominant hospital acquired infections observed. The 
micro-organisms most frequently associated with hospital 
acquired infection were the Gram-negative bacilli. Similar 
findings also have been reported in the United States 
(Haley et al, 1981; Haley et al, 1985a). 
Developments 
Infection 
in the Cont-rol and Prevention of Hospital 
Isolation and Barrier Nursing 
Isolation and barrier nursing were introduced in the first 
two decades of the 20th century. Since Tenon's 
recommendations in 1788, the isolation of infected cases 
had been advocated; however, there were insufficient 
places in fever hospitals or cubicles in general hospitals 
for all the cases. To overcome this, two concepts, bed 
isolation and barrier nursing were introduced (Williams, 
1956). Bed isolation involved segregating the bed of an 
infected patient to one area of the ward. Barrier nursing 
involved special practices e. g. donning gowns and gloves 
prior to patient contact, to prevent spread of micro- 
organisms to others (Pearce, 1943). 
Bed isolation was first introduced in Paris by Grancher in 
1900, who surrounded an infected child by a wire netting 
cage. Meanwhile in England, Colebrook in 1907, Gordon in 
1909, Crookshank in 1910 and Rundle and Burton in 1912 
introduced bed isolation (Williams, 1956). Ways of 
creating a "barrier" varied and included the introduction 
of partitions 2.5-3m in height (Caiger, 1911), fabric 
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screens (sometimes soaked with disinfectant) and tapes 
(Williams, 1956). Unfortunately controlled experiments to 
assess the effectiveness of these measures were not 
undertaken. 
During the last thirty years different types of isolation 
have been introduced and include disease-specific 
isolation (Shooter, O'Grady and Williams, 1963; Garner and 
Simmons, 1983) and category-specific isolation (Bagshaw, 
Blowers and Lidwell, 1978; Garner and Simmons, 1983). In 
the former, barrier nursing techniques are introduced 
after considering the transmission routes of the specific 
micro-organism. The latter method assumes that the 
transmission of micro-organisms is prevented by 
introducing one of four categories of isolation. A problem 
with both methods is that they are "diagnosis-driven". 
Precautions are only initiated once a diagnosis (or 
suspected diagnosis) of infection is made, yet the patient 
may be infectious before this time. 
To overcome this anomaly universal precautions have been 
advocated in the United States (Centers for Disease 
Control, 1987) and used in some hospitals in the United 
Kingdom (Wilson and Breedon, 1990). These involve taking 
certain precautions with all patients to reduce the risk 
of hospital acquired infection, and to protect the health- 
care worker from blood-borne viruses and pathogenic micro- 
organisms in other body fluids. Many of the elements have 
previously been advocated as part of good infection 
control practice, for example, handwashing and the correct 
disposal of excreta and waste. A more controversial aspect 
is the use of protective clothing such as gloves, aprons 
and eye protection which has cost implications. 
18 
The effectiveness of the different types of isolation and 
precautions has not been assessed, consequently 
recommendations supported by scientific data cannot be 
made. 
Ward Cleaning and Design 
The importance of ward cleaning in preventing hospital 
acquired infection was realised by Miles and colleagues 
(1940b), who sampled the ward environment and isolated 
haemolytic streptococci from bed clothes, the outside of 
dressings, baths and dust. They concluded that high ward 
dust levels contributed to cross infection. Measures to 
control dust dispersal were developed and included 
applying spindle oil to floors (Thomas, 1941), and 
treating bed clothes with medicinal liquid paraffin (van 
den Ende and Spooner, 1941). Although Thomas and van den 
Ende (1941) reported that such measures reduced the number 
of bacterial containing particles in the air, again 
infection rates were not assessed. Since the 1940's, 
various practices have been recommended and include the 
use of oil impregnated cotton mops, damp dusting, vacuum 
cleaners with filters and a system of colour coding for 
cleaning equipment (Williams, et al, 1966; Lowbury, et al, 
1981; Maurer, 1985). The effectiveness of these practices 
in reducing infection rates has not been assessed. 
In the 19601s. the "race-track" ward was introduced. This 
consisted of a central service area surrounded by bays 
with 4-6 beds and single bedded rooms (Duncan, 1964). This 
change in ward design was assessed by comparing the 
"Nightingale" ward with the "race-track" ward (Lidwell et 
al, 1966; Whyte, et al, 1969; Smylie et al. 1971; Smith 
et al, 1974). Studies considering nasal acquisition of S. 
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aureus and the incidence of surgical wound infection were 
performed consecutively before and after a change to the 
newly designed ward. Although definitions for infection 
and methods of data collection were included, the 
interstudy methodology varied considerably and 
consequently it is difficult to make comparisons. 
Nursing Practice 
During the first half of the century, nursing practice was 
performed as a series of tasks for the whole ward (Duncan, 
1964; Maggs, 1983). There is no evidence that the order of 
the tasks reflected infection risk, and it is possible 
that some "clean" procedures (e. g dressing rounds) 
followed "dirty" tasks (e. g. emptying bedpans or urinals). 
In 1941, McKissock and colleagues recommended several 
practices to prevent infection. These were adopted and 
included the wearing of masks for performing dressings; a 
non-touch aseptic dressing technique; dressings to be 
performed half an hour after ward sweeping and bed making; 
the use of sterile equipment; the cleaning of baths after 
use, and individual bedding for patients (McKissock et al. 
1941). 
Many of the practices were evaluated by two controlled 
sequential trials. In the first, the rate of streptococcal 
infection in patients with head wounds on a neurosurgical 
unit was observed over a four month period. The 
preventative practices were subsequently introduced and 
infection rates monitored for a further four months. 
Throughout the eight months, chemotherapeutic regimes, the 
staff and the proportion of patients undergoing clean 
surgery remained the same. The infection rate reduced from 
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15.4% to 1.1% in the second period (McKissock et al, 
1941). The other trial was undertaken by Williams and co- 
workers in 1944 who studied a 28 bedded ward used for 
treating hand wounds. They reported a decrease in 
haemolytic streptococcal infection rate from 13.9% to 
0.75% after implementing the same changes in practice 
(Williams et al, 1944). 
These well controlled studies were useful in assessing all 
the recommendations but did not consider any single change 
in practice. At the time the findings were so conclusive 
that the practices were incorporated into official advice 
(Medical Research Council 1941; Ministry of Health 1951b) 
and some are still observed today, however, their 
effectiveness in preventing hospital acquired infection 
remains undetermined. 
The importance of nursing practice in the control and 
prevention of hospital infection was recognised by the 
Ministry of Health. Hospitals and nurse training schools 
were advised to keep manuals for nursing procedures 
distributed as memoranda from central Government. 
Memoranda numbers 1 to 6 addressed bed isolation, the 
prevention of infection in surgical cases, the wearing of 
masks, disinfection, patient equipment in hospitals and 
the isolation of patients suffering from tuberculosis 
(Ministry of Health 1951a, b, c, d, e, f, ). These procedures 
were not based on established research and consequently 
their effectiveness remained unproven. 
The nursing procedure book is still present in hospitals 
and includes details of practices specifically designed to 
control and prevent infection. The efficacy of many 
practices has not been assessed, for example, Roe and 
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colleagues (1986) reported that procedures for emptying 
urinary catheter drainage bags and meatal cleansing were 
not supported by research evidence. One of the major 
impediments for studies to evaluate practice is the lack 
of a method for collecting data on infection which is both 
feasible and efficient. 
During the 1960's and 1970's major changes in the 
organisation of nursing could have influenced hospital 
infection rates. Nurses were now responsible for the total 
care of a small number of patients; consequently, the ward 
rounds of the first decades no longer occurred, thus, the 
potential for cross infection may have diminished. 
Unfortunately, no studies were undertaken to assess 
whether this change reduced infection rates. 
The introduction of the nursing process (McFarlane and 
Castledine, 1982) could also have affected the incidence 
of hospital infection. This is a "systematic approach to 
planning nursing care" and involves 1) assessing patient 
needs, 2) planning nursing care, 3) implementing nursing 
care and 4) evaluating the care given (Kratz, 1979). The 
nurse assesses the patient for actual, potential and 
possible problems. The observation for symptoms and signs 
of infection is undertaken in the assessment stage. No 
research has been undertaken to determine either the 
effectiveness of the nursing "diagnosis" or the 
reliability and validity of nursing records as a source of 
information. This has important implications if this 
information source is used to identify infections. 
Recently, primary nursing has been introduced into some 
hospitals in England (Wright, 1987; Campen, 1988; Tutton, 
1988; Bowman and Carter, 1990). This involves designating 
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24 hour responsibility for each patient's care to one 
individual nurse (Manthey, 1988). This approach to nursing 
is yet to be evaluated in terms of improving the quality 
of care. The surveillance of infections is one parameter 
which could be used to assess this. 
Organisation of Infection Control Services 
The organisation of services to control hospital infection 
was first recommended in war memoranda. These advised the 
appointment of full-time special medical officers to 
supervise the control of infection (Medical Research 
Council, 1941) and that every hospital should have a 
committee (to represent doctors, nurses, laboratory 
workers and administrators) to control infection (Medical 
Research Council, 1944). The implementation of these 
memoranda was not monitored and the re-issue of this 
official advice suggests that the recommendations were not 
readily adopted. 
In 1951., additional advice recommended that hospitals 
should have control of infection committees (Ministry of 
Health 1951g) and Colebrook (1955) proposed the 
appointment of a full-time officer to direct infection 
control activities. Further advice in 1959 combined the 
earlier recommendations by suggesting every hospital 
should appoint a control of infection committee as well as 
a control of infection officer (Ministry of Health, 1959). 
Also in 1959 the first infection control nurse was 
appointed in England (Gardner, et al 1962). Although it is 
often considered that this was the first appointment in 
the world, a recent paper (Wise et al, 1989) suggests that 
the first infection control nurse was appointed in 1956 at 
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the Jefferson Hospital, in the United States. Her role was 
similar to her colleague in England viz: - 1) Collection 
and preparation of infection records, 2) Prompt 
recognition and isolation of infected patients, 3) 
Improvement of liaison between matron and ward sisters, 4) 
Checking the performance of ward techniques, 5) 
Supervision of infection records kept on the ward, 6) 
Routine checks of staphylococcal carrier-rates in 
operating theatre staff, assessment of environmental 
contamination, and the "efficiency" of preventive measures 
(Gardner, et al, 1962). 
The first comprehensive survey of infection control nurses 
was not undertaken in England until 1979 by which time 65% 
of acute hospitals had an infection control nurse 
(Knappett, 1981). By 1986,89% of health authorities had 
appointed at least one infection control nurse who was 
responsible for on average 1300 beds (Howard, 1988). 
Two major outbreaks of hospital infection, salmonella food 
poisoning (Department of Health and Social Security, 
1986a) and legionnaires disease (Department of Health and 
Social Security, 1986b) led to further advice regarding 
the organisation of services to control hospital 
infection. A joint Department of Health and Social 
Security and Public Health Laboratory Service working 
group recommended that health authorities establish an 
infection control committee and appoint an infection 
control team to carry out the day to day work in hospital 
infection control (Department of Health and Social 
Security, 1988). 
The team consists of an infection control doctor, 
infection control nurse, the consultant microbiologist (if 
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not the infection control doctor) and either the unit 
general manager, district general manager or a 
representative. The responsibilities of the infection 
control team has been described by Lowbury and colleagues 
(1981) and Department of Health and Social Security (1988) 
and can be summarised as the prevention, control, 
surveillance and investigation of infection in hospital. 
The team reports to an infection control committee who 
commissions and approves policies in relation to hospital 
infection and reviews their implementation. The committee 
also advises management of funds necessary for 
implementation and contingency requirements, and the most 
effective use of resources (Department of Health and 
Social Security, 1988). 
The infection control team develops programmes for 
infection control and prevention, and surveillance. The 
control and prevention programmes include the education of 
hospital staff on all aspects of infection control, 
development and updating procedures and policies concerned 
with infection, identifying potential hazards, reviewing 
new equipment, acting as a specialist to all grades of 
hospital staff on matters pertaining to infection control 
and investigating outbreaks. The effectiveness of the 
prevention and control programmes is unknown as an 
evaluation is rarely undertaken. A contributing factor for 
this is that a valid, reliable and feasible method of 
recording infections has not been identified in the United 
Kingdom. 
Surveillance of Hospital Infections 
The surveillance of hospital infections is one of the most 
recent developments in infection control. Surveillance 
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consists of data collection, analysis and interpretation, 
and dissemination of the findings. The concept will be 
discussed in the following chapter. Although data 
collection was considered in 1959 (Ministry of Health, 
1959), the other components of surveillance were not 
discussed. Nor did this paper consider the accuracy of 
data collection methods or include definitions for 
infection. In England, the surveillance of hospital 
infections has been mentioned only in recent official 
advice (Department of Health and Social Security, 1988). 
However, in the United States, such surveillance has been 
undertaken since 1970. Various approaches to, and methods 
of, data collection have been developed and considerable 
resources utilised in the collection of infection data. 
The SENIC (Study on the Efficacy of Nosocomial Infection 
Control) project was designed to examine the value of such 
activities in an infection control programme. The origins 
of surveillance, the surveillance of hospital infection 
and the results of the SENIC project will be considered in 
the ensuing chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE SURVEILLANCE OF HOSPITAL INFECTION 
Although the surveillance of hospital infection was only 
officially recommended in England in 1988 (Department of 
Health and Social Security, 1988), the collection and 
analysis of data concerning some other communicable 
diseases has occurred intermittently since the 17th 
century. As the surveillance of hospital infection uses 
the concepts first introduced for the surveillance of 
communicable disease, the latter will be considered before 
the different approaches to the surveillance of hospital 
infection. 
The Origins of Surveillance 
Observing, recording, collecting and analysing facts in 
order to direct action dates back to Hippocrates (460-370 
B. C. ) (Last,, 1988). Further developments were hampered 
until a system of classifying the symptoms and signs of 
disease, and a more sophisticated approach to measuring, 
counting and summing of events (i. e. statistics) occurred. 
Thomas Sydenham (1624-1689) was the first t 
symptoms and signs. He hypothesised that 
developed over time and ran a regular course, 
unique natural history. He postulated that each 
belonged to a definite "species" which could be 
and classified (Garrison, 1929). 
0 group 
diseases 
with a 
disease 
described 
Statistics probably originated with Aristotle (384-322 
B. C. ) and techniques were cultivated and refined by the 
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Italians and Germans in the 17th and 18th centuries 
(Westergaard, 1932; Wenzel and Streed, 1989). John Graunt 
(1620-1674) was the first to use statistics to study 
the distribution of disease. He analysed the Bills of 
Mortality (created in 1532 to inform King Henry VIII when 
plague had arrived), and compared the number of deaths 
"one year, season, parish or other division of the city, 
with another" (Graunt, 1662 cited by Moro and McCormick, 
1988). 
William Farr (1807-1883), an English Physician, was one of 
the first to recognise the importance of disseminating 
analyses. He produced statistical analyses of communicable 
and occupational diseases, disseminated them to public 
health reformers, for example John Snow (1813-58) and 
Edwin Chadwick (1800-90), who used this information to 
achieve effective reforms (Garrison, 1929; Langmuir, 
1976). At this time the term "surveillance" had not been 
used to describe the activities of collecting and 
analysing data for dissemination to others. 
The concept of surveillance was developed in the mid 20th 
century by Langmuir (Thacker et al, 1988). He defined 
surveillance as the "continued watchfulness over the 
distribution and trends of incidence through the 
systematic collection, consolidation and evaluation of 
morbidity and mortality reports and other relevant data. 
Intrinsic in the concept is the regular dissemination of 
basic data and interpretation, to all who have contributed 
and to all others who need to know" (Langmuir, 1963). 
Since there is some confusion in the terminology 
surrounding "surveillance" the various elements will be 
briefly discussed. 
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Eylenbosch and Noah (1988) assert there are three 
fundamental elements of any surveillance programme: data 
collection, analysis and dissemination. However, of equal 
importance is the agreement of objectives, and the 
production of definitions for the events to be surveyed. 
The rigour of the definitions will vary. Some definitions, 
where considerable knowledge is available, will be 
specific requiring objective and pre-determined signs and 
symptoms; others will be less specific for example, a 
clinical diagnosis which is open to interpretation. Haley, 
Aber and Bennett (1986) stress the importance of ensuring 
that key people agree with definitions to prevent 
criticism once results are distributed. 
Data collection is the most costly and difficult element 
of surveillance (Foege et al, 1976; Eylenbosch and Noah, 
1988) and involves observing a population for the event or 
disease being surveyed (i. e. identifying cases of 
disease). Some methods aim to identify a subset of the 
population who are likely to have, or develop disease. 
People not detected are assumed to not have disease. Data 
collection methods are either passive or active. In the 
former an event is identified while performing some other 
activity. Passive methods assume that definitions (when 
utilised) are understood, and that personnel are willing 
to complete forms. Active data collection methods involve 
independent personnel visiting areas to trace cases with 
defined conditions. 
The choice of data collection methods should take into 
consideration validity and reproducibility. The former is 
the extent a method measures or detects what it claims to 
measure (Barker, 1982). Usually the parameters sensitivity 
and specificity are calculated. Reproducibility or 
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repeatability is the level of agreement between replicate 
measurements (Barker, 1982; Rose and Barker, 1986). 
Analysis and interpretation of data, and the dissemination 
of results are the other elements of surveillance. 
Although absolute numbers of cases may be helpful for 
highlighting potential problems, the inclusion of a 
denominator produces more useful analyses. As for all 
epidemiological studies, it is essential that the 
structure of populations and other confounding factors are 
taken into account when comparing one study with another. 
The results should then be presented in a manner useful to 
decision makers. 
Surveillance of Communicable Disease 
Information for the surveillance of communicable disease 
is collected from a number of sources and the advantages 
and limitations of these will be discussed. 
Under the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984, a 
registered medical practitioner is required to notify all 
patients he suspects of suffering from a notifiable 
communicable disease,, to the "proper officer" (Medical 
Officer in Environmental Health) of the local authority. 
The information is forwarded to the Office of Population 
Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) who analyse the data and 
publish weekly and quarterly reports. If the "proper 
officer" suspects an outbreak, the details are reported to 
the Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre (CDSC) of the 
Public Health Laboratory Service. Also outbreaks of some 
non-notifiable communicable diseases are reported to CDSC 
(Moro and McCormick, 1988). 
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The accuracy of the "notification" system has been 
assessed by two studies in the United Kingdom and both 
reported that the system underestimates the incidence of 
disease (Goldacre and Miller 1976; Clarkson and Fine 
1985). Similar conclusions have been drawn in the United 
States (Marier, 1977; Kimball et al, 1980; Vogt et al. 
1983; Thacker et al, 1986). The degree of underestimation 
is difficult to determine as none of the studies compared 
the passive notification system with a reference method 
which aimed to survey all patients within a population; 
therefore, cases with disease could have been missed. For 
example, the study by Vogt and colleagues (1983) compared 
the reporting of measles, rubella, salmonellosis and 
hepatitis by primary care officers with data collection by 
routine telephone calls to health care centres. 
Another limitation of the notification system is the lack 
of case definitions; diagnosis is often based on 
subjective clinical judgement. Reporting practice may also 
vary from one region to another (Report of the Committee 
on the Microbiological Safety of Food, 1990). However, an 
advantage of the system is that notifications are reported 
by districts for which population estimates are known, 
therefore rates can be calculated and comparisons made. 
Death certifications are also used to provide information 
about communicable disease. This information is available 
quickly and can be used for example, to assess the impact 
of influenza each winter (Tillett and Spencer, 1982). one 
of the problems with using mortality data is that many 
communicable diseases rarely cause death, therefore the 
data collected does not accurately reflect incidence of 
disease. Also, the identification of disease is dependent 
31 
upon the correct diagnosis being entered on the 
certificate. As any member of the public may obtain copies 
of death certificates, this may deter some doctors from 
entering the correct diagnosis (Moro and McCormick, 1988; 
Galbraith and Palmer, 1990). 
Another source of information is the reporting of 
positive isolates from hospital and public health 
microbiology laboratories (including reference 
laboratories) to CDSC (Galbraith and Palmer, 1990). This 
is undertaken weekly and provides data on infections with 
personal, clinical and epidemiological details. A 
limitation of this system is that infections which are not 
swabbed or produce positive microbiology reports are 
excluded. Also, the selection of patients from whom 
specimens are taken may vary in different parts of the 
country, and in some instances, give rise to a false 
impression of the incidence of disease. 
Reports of communicable disease are also made via the 
Royal College of General Practitioners Sentinel Practice 
Scheme initiated in 1966. In this scheme a wide range of 
diagnoses including some communicable diseases are 
reported from 60 general practices representing 425,000 
patients each week (Report of the Committee on the 
Microbiological Safety of Food, 1990). An advantage of 
this system is that rates can be calculated, however, 
definitions for cases are not used and the accuracy of 
reporting has yet to be determined. 
Hospital in-patient and out- patient data also provides a 
source of information about communicable disease. Acute 
hospitals in the United Kingdom record data on every 
patient who dies in or is discharged from hospital; these 
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data include diagnoses of communicable disease. A ten per 
cent sample is analysed for England and Wales (Moro and 
McCormick, 1988; Galbraith and Palmer, 1990). Also chest 
clinics and genito-urinary medicine out-patient 
departments report cases of communicable disease. One 
problem with using hospital data is that not all cases of 
communicable disease are admitted to hospital or treated 
in clinics, and the accuracy of this information in 
reflecting the incidence of disease has not yet been 
determined. 
Surveillance of Hospital Infection 
The first reference to the recording of hospital infection 
data was the advice from the Ministry of Health in 1959 
suggesting that hospitals should initiate a "satisfactory 
system for ascertaining and recording the clinical 
evidence of all staphylococcal infections". The 
recommended system consisted of a control of infection 
register, which was the responsibility of the nursing 
sister in charge of the ward or department concerned. 
Individual ward registers were to be reviewed by the 
clinicians, and the Control of Infection Officer was 
responsible for reviewing infection records of the entire 
hospital. Definitions for infections, the accuracy of data 
collection methods or methods of analysis were not 
included. Since 1959 various approaches to the 
surveillance of hospital infections have been adopted. 
App-roaches to Suzveillance of Hospital Infection 
In the United Kingdom, although some studies have reported 
the incidence and prevalence of infection in surgical 
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patients (Public Health Laboratory Service, 1960; Ayliffe 
et al. 1977; Davies and Cottingham, 1979; Leigh, 1981; 
Misriki et al, 1990; Taylor et al, 1990), medical patients 
(Public Health Laboratory Service, 1965) and obstetric 
patients (Moir-Bussy, et al,, 1984; Leigh et al, 1990), 
data have predominantly been collected to identify 
potential cross infection hazards. 
A survey of thirty infection control nurses chosen at 
random indicated that 26 (87%) teams collected data for 
"alert organism" surveillance. This involves the follow-up 
of certain micro-organisms (which are considered to be a 
potential cross infection problem) by a ward visit, when 
precautions are initiated to prevent transmission of the 
micro-organism to others. Only 17% of teams produced 
infection rates (Glenister et al, 1990). These data needs 
to be interpreted with caution, as the sample size, (which 
represented 10% of the full membership of Infection 
Control Nurses's Association in 1987) is small, however, 
it gives an indication of the data collection methods 
being used. This was the first study in the United Kingdom 
to determine the extent of surveillance activities. 
In the United States data are collected to produce 
infection rates. In 1970, the Centers for Disease Control 
advocated total continuous surveillance involving the 
daily review of bacteriology laboratory reports, ward 
rounds to identify patients in isolation, with fever, 
prescribed antibiotics or receiving "special" treatments 
and liaison with nursing staff. Case records (nursing and 
medical notes) are then reviewed of all selected patients 
to determine if they have an infection. Definitions for 
infection, ways of analysing the data and dissemination of 
the results were published (Centers for Disease Control, 
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1972) . 
The objectives of total continuous surveillance were to 
determine the frequency and types of hospital acquired 
infection (HAI), and to identify deviations from the 
"base-line". This information was then to be used to 
direct and evaluate infection control activities., and 
provide the medical and nursing staff with data on the 
incidence of HAI in their work areas. It was also 
envisaged that the results of the analysis could be used 
to make comparisons between services and hospitals (Garner 
et al, 1971). 
Total continuous surveillance is the most comprehensive 
method of data collection and is usually undertaken to 
detect infections throughout a hospital; however, the 
accuracy of the method has not been assessed. The method 
is labour intensive (Abrutyn and Talbot, 1987), therefore, 
some hospitals with limited resources have targeted the 
method to specific types of infection (for example 
surgical wound infection), or units of the hospital. The 
unit(s) under surveillance may be periodically and 
systematically changed to allow all areas to be surveyed 
during a given period i. e. rotating surveillance (Haley, 
1985). Also, total continuous surveillance has been 
undertaken for limited time periods (Chelgren and LaForce, 
1978). 
The Centers for Disease Control (1972) suggested that 
incidence rates should be produced using the number of 
infections as the numerator and discharges as the 
denominator. For example, the number of hospital acquired 
urinary tract infections in gynaecology patients for 
January could be divided by the number of discharges from 
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the gynaecology service for the same month. As Rhame 
(1987) has observed, the numerator and denominator are not 
drawn from the same population; the patient who develops 
an infection in January may not be discharged until 
February, therefore the rates will not be accurate. 
A variety of denominators have been used for calculating 
rates; for example HAI per 100 admissions (Silberg et al, 
1974; Haley et al, 1985a), HAI per 100 discharges 
(Groschel and Bradley 1971) and HAI per 100 patient days 
(Silberg et al, 1974). Rates have also been reported using 
the number of patients who develop at least one HAI as the 
numerator (Haley et al, 1981; Public Health Laboratory 
Service, 1965). Instead of incidence rates, some studies 
have reported prevalence rates (Kislak et al, 1964; 
Barrett et al, 1968; Adler and Shulman, 1970; Adler, et 
al, 1971; French et al, 1989). The prevalence rate 
measures the number of cases that are present at, or 
during, a specified period of time (Lilienfeld and 
Lilienfeld,, 1980). Unlike incidence data, prevalence does 
not provide a direct measure of the rate an individual 
develops disease in a population during a specified period 
of time. Prevalence rates may vary with availability of 
medical services and other policy changes which affect 
duration of disease and length of stay in hospital. Thus, 
a high prevalence rate does not necessarily reflect an 
increased probability of developing disease. 
Reported infection rates vary for a number of reasons. 
Different studies use different data collection methods, 
definitions and denominators for calculating rates. The 
structure and case-mix of the population is another 
important aspect which has been given little 
consideration. Some patients are at greater risk of 
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developing infection than others. For example, the risk of 
developing HAI has been reported as significantly related 
to age, sex, service, the presence of another infection 
and types of underlying illnesses (Haley et al, 1981). The 
importance of such factors in developing HAI is yet to be 
fully established and therefore infection rates have not 
been weighted to reflect population structure. The 
development of severity of illness/case mix categorisation 
schemes will facilitate the classification of patients 
into risk groups. Until data collection methods and the 
criteria for defining infections are standardised, and 
analyses take into account population structure, 
comparisons between studies and hospitals should be 
undertaken with extreme caution. 
Since 1974 hospitals in the United States have been 
required to collect infection data and produce rates for 
accreditation. The value of surveillance in reducing HAI 
has been questioned (Eickhoff, 1975) and to address this 
the SENIC (Study on the Efficacy of Nosocomial Infection 
Control) project was established. 
SENIC Project 
The SENIC project was undertaken by the Centers for 
Disease Control to evaluate the effectiveness of hospital 
infection prevention and control programmes in reducing 
the incidence of HAI. A particular objective was to 
determine the importance of infection surveillance and 
control functions in reducing infection rates. The study 
involved 338 hospitals, some of which had introduced 
infection control and surveillance programmes between 1970 
and 1975. Infections were identified by retrospective 
chart review, and rates calculated for 1970 and 1975-6. To 
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measure the "surveillance" and "control,, functions, 
indices were developed (Haley et al, 1985b) 
The accuracy of a retrospective chart review in 
identifying infections was examined by comparison with a 
prospective chart review in four hospitals. The mean 
sensitivity and specificity of 0.74 and 0.96 were 
considered to be acceptable (Haley et al, 1980b). 
Similarly, a study was undertaken to establish whether the 
introduction of an infection control surveillance 
programme itself altered the sensitivity of a 
retrospective chart review. In one hospital the latter was 
compared with a prospective chart review before and after 
the introduction of an infection control and surveillance 
programme. The difference observed in sensitivity was not 
found to be significant (Haley et al, 1980a). 
The influence of confounding factors in the production of 
rates was also considered. Factors such as patient risk 
for infection and hospital case mix, hospital staffing 
differences and changes in medical practice were examined. 
A limitation to this study was that the infection 
"control" index did not include the psychosocial factors 
that relate to motivating or altering human behaviour. 
The overall results indicated that hospitals with 
infection control and surveillance programmes reduced the 
incidence of HAI by 32% whereas, those hospitals without 
such programmes had an increased rate of 18% (Haley, et 
al, 1985b). This increase was postulated as being due to 
changing patterns of medical practice. Surveillance was 
concluded to be an important component of an infection 
control programme for preventing particular HAI, for 
example, surgical wound infection and urinary tract 
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infection. Other studies (Cruse and Foord 1980; Condon et 
al, 1983; Olson et al, 1984) have also reported that 
producing wound infection rates and disseminating them to 
surgeons resulted in decreased rates. However, the 
findings of these studies should be interpreted cautiously 
as surveillance was introduced within a milieu of other 
changes (for example, antibiotic prescribing) which could 
have also influenced infection rates. 
Although the results of the SENIC study suggested that 
surveillance was important in an infection control 
programme, the study did not consider the accuracy of data 
collection methods for identifying infections. Some 
hospitals in the United States and many hospitals in other 
countries do not have the resources to undertake hospital- 
wide total continuous surveillance and have developed 
alternative methods of data collection. These are "short- 
cut" or "selective" surveillance methods which aim to 
identify a subset of patients within a population; either 
those at risk or who have developed infection. only 
records of selected patients are reviewed and patients not 
identified are assumed to be uninfected. These methods may 
also be targeted to specific types of infection or areas 
of a hospital. 
Selective Surveillance Methods 
Active and passive selective surveillance methods have 
been described. To assist discussion the methods have been 
given names and include: ward notification surveillance, 
laboratory based surveillance, risk factor surveillance, 
ward liaison surveillance, temperature chart surveillance 
and treatment chart surveillance. 
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Wa. rd Notification Surveillance 
Ward notification surveillance is a passive method as the 
ward nursing or medical staff complete a register or card 
for each patient who develops at least one infection. The 
method has been used for collecting data on all infections 
in hospitalised patients (Kim, et al, 1969; Hoffmann, et 
al, 1990) and for particular types of infection (Ministry 
of Health, 1959; Minchew and Cluff, 1961). A modified 
method has been described (Eickhoff et al, 1969; Birnbaum 
and King, 1981) where completed cards or forms are sent to 
the infection control practitioner/physician who reviews 
medical and nursing notes to confirm that the infection 
meets standard criteria. In the latter method, a form of 
checking occurs which was not mentioned in the early 
descriptions of this method. 
Three studies have considered the effectiveness of this 
method. The first compared ward report/notification 
surveillance for coagulase-positive staphylococcal 
infections with the follow-up of positive microbiology 
reports by a ward visit to review case records (Cohen et 
al, 1962). The former method identified 64% of the 
infections recognised by the latter method. However, 
standard definitions for infection were not recorded and 
it was assumed that all infections would be identified by 
the follow-up of positive microbiology reports. Reporting 
compliance was high (almost 100%) at the outset, but was 
as low as 25% during some months in the study period, 
which suggests that a reminder programme was required. 
In the second study (undertaken in six hospitals), 
,, standard" surveillance was compared with a series of 
prevalence surveys (Eickhoff et al, 1969). The standard 
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surveillance consisted of the continuous reporting of HAI 
by the nurse in charge of a ward to a "surveillance 
nurse", ward visits and follow-up of positive microbiology 
reports. The effectiveness of the "standard" surveillance 
in identifying HAI ranged from 14.6% to 49.5% in the 
different hospitals. Unfortunately no information was 
given regarding the distribution of infection or the 
population structure when the assessments occurred. An 
atypical population with a predominance of one site of 
infection could have biased the results. 
The third study (Birnbaum and King, 1981) compared ward 
notification with a retrospective chart review (August 
1979-April 1980). The median sensitivity of the former was 
62%, however, almost 50% of infections were missed by the 
retrospective chart review. This study demonstrates that 
the latter may not a reliable standard to assess 
surveillance methods. 
Labo-ratory Based Su-rveillance 
Laboratory based surveillance is an active method since it 
involves the follow-up of patients from whom positive 
microbiology cultures have been isolated. Medical and 
nursing notes and other hospital charts are reviewed to 
determine if the cultures are associated with infection 
(Kessner and Lepper, 1967; McNamara et al, 1967; Gross et 
al, 1980). This is necessary as full details of clinical 
symptoms and signs of infection are not documented on the 
pathology request form. Laboratory based surveillance has 
usually involved the follow-up of reports with named 
micro-organisms. The question of whether certain micro- 
organisms are significant to the patient has not been 
addressed. 
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Laboratory based surveillance is dependent upon 
practitioners taking specimens correctly before treatment 
is commenced; rapid and accurate processing by the 
laboratory and efficient screening of reports. Hambraeus 
and Malmborg (1977) have investigated the frequency of 
ward staff taking swabs from wound infections. They 
compared the number of swabs taken by ward staff with the 
number initiated by investigators who inspected wounds. 
Two-thirds of the patients with post-operative wounds and 
a half of the patients with other types of wounds had been 
swabbed by the ward staff as compared with the 
investigators. This study suggested that the frequency of 
ward staff taking specimens for culture was high in 
Sweden. Studies have not been undertaken to consider the 
frequency with which other types of specimen are taken. 
Two studies have considered the effectiveness of 
laboratory based surveillance in identifying HAI. Gross 
and colleagues (1980) compared the method with a 
prevalence survey and found that positive microbiology 
cultures were the initial source for detecting 65% of HAI. 
Wenzel and colleagues (1976) found that laboratory based 
surveillance detected 77% of HAI identified by another 
selective method (risk factor surveillance). 
A limitation of both studies is that the proportion of 
positive microbiology reports associated with infection 
was not considered. If the proportion is low, considerable 
time could be spent following up reports to identify few 
infections. Also, during the study by Wenzel and 
colleagues (1976), some infections could have been missed 
by both methods, as one selective surveillance method was 
compared with another. 
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The time to perform data collection for laboratory based 
surveillance was reported as 4.7 hours/100 beds/week 
(Wenzel et al, 1976). However, it should be noted that 
this assessment was undertaken near the start of the study 
when the method had just been introduced, therefore 
familiarisation with the method would probably lead to 
reduced time. 
Several studies have reported the percentage of clinical 
infections with an accompanying positive microbiology 
report (Barrett et al, 1968; Moody and Burke, 1972; Laxson 
et al, 1984; Scheckler and Peterson 1986). These are 
infections where an appropriate specimen has been taken 
and micro-organisms isolated. Only one study has 
considered the percentage of positive microbiology reports 
associated with infection. Laxson and colleagues (1984) 
randomly selected 100 positive microbiology reports, and 
reviewed charts of affected patients; forty-eight per cent 
of reports were associated with clinical infection. This 
percentage could have been higher if the positive 
microbiology reports considered to be significant for the 
management of the patient had been selected for follow-up. 
Risk Factor Surveillance 
Risk factor surveillance has been described by Wenzel and 
colleagues (1976) and Sharbaugh (1981) and involves 
identifying patients with "clues" or risks for infection. 
Case records of selected patients are then reviewed 
regularly to determine if infection subsequently develops. 
Some risk factors are associated with underlying medical 
conditions (for example leukaemia, diabetes), others with 
invasive procedures (for example bladder catheterisation). 
The rationale for choosing particular risk factors is not 
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given by either Wenzel and colleagues (1976) or Sharbaugh 
(1981). 
One group of workers have assessed the effectiveness of 
risk factor surveillance. They compared the method with 
three selective surveillance methods (temperature chart 
surveillance, treatment chart surveillance and laboratory 
based surveillance), a daily prospective chart review (1 
week) and a retrospective chart review (4 weeks) (Wenzel 
et al, 1976). Risk factor surveillance identified 82% of 
HAI identified by prospective chart review and 75% of HAI 
detected by retrospective chart review. Infections 
identified by risk factor surveillance which were missed 
by the chart reviews were added to the denominator in 
these comparisons. Risk factor surveillance also 
identified more infections than the other selective 
surveillance methods. 
This study has some limitations as none of the methods was 
a reference method which aimed to identify all patients 
and infections within the population. Both chart reviews 
excluded verbal communication with nursing and medical 
staff which could be a valuable source of information for 
identifying infections. Also, all the comparisons with the 
selective surveillance methods occurred for one week 
periods, and no information is given regarding the 
population and distribution of infection which could have 
influenced the results. The time to perform data 
collection for risk factor surveillance was reported as 
2.9-4.5 hours / 100 beds/ week. 
wa-rd Liaison Sux-veillance 
Ward liaison surveillance is an active method where the 
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surveyor visits the ward at regular intervals and enquires 
of the nursing or medical staff whether any patients have 
infections. The surveyor reviews case records of ward 
"reported" infections to determine if they meet standard 
definitions. Since ward nurses are the only members of 
health care staff present twenty-four hours of the day, 
they are usually consulted. This method has been used 
frequently with other selective methods, for example ward 
notification surveillance and temperature chart 
surveillance (Eickhoff et al, 1969; Scheckler et al, 
1986), but has not been assessed for its effectiveness by 
comparison with a reference method or another selective 
surveillance method. The time required for data collection 
has not established. 
Tempe-ratu-re and Treatment Chart Su-rveillance 
Temperature chart surveillance and treatment chart 
surveillance have been performed alone, and together with 
other methods (Wenzel et al, 1976; Chelgren and LaForce, 
1978; Magnussen an Robb, 1980; Scheckler and Peterson, 
1986). Temperature chart surveillance requires the review 
of temperature charts for readings above an agreed limit 
(>/= 37.80C has been used, although this level is not 
substantiated by empirical research). Treatment chart 
surveillance involves the review of charts for the 
prescription of antibiotics. Case records of selected 
patients (i. e. nursing and medical records) are then 
scrutinised for evidence to suggest that the presence of 
an infection. 
These selective surveillance methods have only been 
compared with risk factor surveillance; Wenzel and 
colleagues (1976) reported that temperature chart 
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surveillance identified 56% of HAI, treatment chart 
surveillance 57% and a combination of both methods 
identified 70%. The percentage of temperatures >/= 37.80C, 
or the frequency with which the prescription of 
antibiotics were associated with infection was not 
considered. The time to perform data collection was also 
assessed: temperature chart surveillance required 1.6 
hours /100 beds/week, treatment chart surveillance 2.9 
hours /100 beds/ week and temperature and treatment chart 
surveillance 2.7 hours /100 beds/ week. The assessment of 
a combination of temperature and treatment chart 
surveillance occurred in the second year of study; this 
may account for the time being less than treatment chart 
surveillance, however, this observation is not discussed. 
Sununaxy 
Although some studies have considered the effectiveness of 
surveillance methods in detecting HAI, none have 
undertaken a continuous prospective study which compares 
the selective methods with a reference method (a standard 
designed to detect all patients and infections within a 
population). Furthermore, only one study (Wenzel et al, 
1976) has examined the time to perform data collection. 
Some of the results of the studies have been combined in 
meta-analysis and compared with a standard (Freeman and 
McGowan, 1981). The standard consisted of identifying 
infections by a prevalence survey where all patients and 
their charts were examined by physicians (Kislak, et al, 
1964). Unfortunately this study did not include specific 
definitions for infection. 
There are limitations associated with the meta-analysis of 
these studies. Besides definitions for infection being 
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absent or different, the studies were undertaken in 
different hospitals in different years and the 
distribution of the populations and infections are 
frequently not described. An unusual distribution of the 
population with a predominance of one type of infection 
could have biased the results. Furthermore, there was 
insufficient information available to assess the 
sensitivity and specificity of the methods. 
The lack of reliable information concerning the different 
selective surveillance methods has implications for 
infection control teams. If selective surveillance methods 
are adopted before their effectiveness in detecting 
infections is determined, the data collected may not be a 
"true" reflection of the incidence of infection. Resources 
could be directed to prevent infections found to be 
frequent by the surveillance method, when in reality other 
infections relegated as unimportant may be affecting more 
patients. 
The review of the history of hospital infection suggests 
that a number of practices have been introduced to prevent 
and control infection, however, their efficacy has not 
been determined. If infection control teams are to 
evaluate infection prevention and control programmes and 
be responsible for surveillance strategies of hospital 
infection, they need to be able to make an objective and 
rational choice of methods. To do this they require 
information regarding the effectiveness of methods in 
detecting hospital infections and the time required for 
data collection - the most time consuming element of 
surveillance. It would also be helpful to determine the 
usefulness of various information sources for identifying 
infections. The aim of the present study was to provide 
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reliable and comparative information so that infection 
control teams could make a choice of surveillance 
strategies. The design and objectives of the study will be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DESIGN AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
Introduction 
The study aimed to examine selective surveillance methods 
for their ability to detect infections and to determine 
the time required for collecting infection data. The 
methods were chosen after considering a literature review 
of various surveillance methods. All the active methods 
identified were assessed, except total continuous 
surveillance which consists of a combination of various 
methods. The passive method, ward notification 
surveillance was excluded since this requires nursing and 
medical staff to complete forms and this could have 
influenced the assessment of the other methods. 
The research was undertaken in two stages. The first was 
of experimental design where eight selective surveillance 
methods were compared separately with a reference method 
designed to identify all patients and infections within a 
population. Data were collected for 11 months (March 1988- 
January 1989) in a district general hospital. The 
usefulness of various sources of information to identify 
infections was also assessed. 
The results of the first stage were then utilised to 
develop an effective and efficient method of surveillance 
which was introduced and used by ICNs in six district 
general hospitals. The practicality of implementing the 
chosen strategy was then determined. The time to perform 
the collection of infection data was determined, and in 
one hospital, the surveillance method was compared with 
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the reference method and assessed for reproducibility. 
This stage lasted for approximately 16 weeks (May-August 
1989). Before data collection commenced definitions for 
infections were developed. 
Developing DefinitionB for Infections 
An infection has been defined as "the deposition and 
multiplication of bacteria and other micro-organisms in 
tissues or on surfaces of the body where they can cause 
adverse effects" (Lowbury et al, 1981). The adverse 
effects include the pathological processes which result in 
the clinical evidence of infection. A literature review 
revealed that various criteria for defining infections 
have been suggested (Centers for Disease Control, 1972; 
Wenzel et al, 1976; Latham, et al, 1981; Meers et al, 
1981; Garner et al, 1988). Some definitions are 
complicated and difficult to interpret, others are limited 
in their criteria and miss infections recognised by 
practising clinicians. A group consisting of a consultant 
epidemiologist, consultant medical microbiologists and 
infection control nurses was constituted to discuss the 
definitions. It was concluded that definitions should be 
developed for the present study. These were discussed 
until a consensus was reached and are shown in Appendix A. 
Stage 1- An Assessment of Selective Surveillance Methods 
Objectives 
The objectives of this stage of the study were to 
determine: 
50 
the effectiveness of a number of selective surveillance 
methods in detecting infections. 
2. the time required to perform the collection of 
infection data and analyses for each surveillance 
method. 
3. whether particular types of infection are more likely 
to be identified by certain selective surveillance 
methods. 
4. the usefulness of various sources of information in the 
identification of infections. 
Sux-vey Hospital and Wards 
The study was undertaken in a district health authority 
which served a population of 268,000 in the Oxford 
Regional Health Authority. The acute service was divided 
between two district general hospitals: Hospital X had 349 
beds and Hospital Y, 247 beds. Figures for mean length of 
stay and occupancy were the only useful data available for 
making comparisons with other hospitals. Hospital X was 
classified as a type 1 hospital, where less than 15% of 
beds were used for non-acute services and the mean length 
of stay and occupancy were 5.8 days and 71% in 1986 
(Edmundson, 1987). This is similar to other type 1 
hospitals within the region. Hospital Y is a type 2 
hospital where between 15% and 40% of beds are used for 
non-acute services. The mean length of stay and occupancy 
were 10.5 days and 81.2% (Edmundson, 1987). This is also 
similar to other type 2 hospitals within the region. 
The study was undertaken on patients occupying 122 beds of 
Hospital X. This number was chosen after considering the 
number of occupied beds that could be surveyed using the 
reference method during one working day. The wards 
51 
consisted of one medical (including coronary care unit), 
two surgical, one gynaecological, one orthopaedic and an 
intensive therapy unit. All had 20 beds except for the 
gynaecological ward which had 33 beds. The coronary care 
unit contained 4 beds and intensive therapy unit 5 beds. 
Data Collection 
Surveillance data 
The reference method was performed for 11 months and each 
selective surveillance method was assessed for 
approximately 8 weeks. This time period was chosen after 
estimating the number of patients that would need to be 
surveyed for a selective surveillance method to achieve a 
sensitivity (patients with HAI) of 50% within a 95% 
confidence interval of +/- 15%. The latter two values were 
chosen arbitrarily but were considered to be acceptable by 
statisticians. The estimate was based on published 
information. 
Figure 3.1 summarises the different selective surveillance 
methods and Figure 3.2. gives the time framework for 
undertaking the first stage of the study. The selective 
surveillance methods and reference method will be 
described in detail in the following chapters. 
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Figure 3.1. Summary of Selective Surveillance Methods 
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Protocols and data collection forms (shown in Appendix B) 
were developed for the reference method and each selective 
surveillance method. The surveyor performing each 
selective surveillance method, was taught the method by 
the author during one week, and performed the method in 
the second week under supervision before commencing data 
collection. During the second week, a pilot study was 
undertaken to consider the use of the definitions, 
adherence to the protocol, the design and content of the 
data collection form for the surveillance method being 
assessed. As there were no disagreements between the 
author and the surveyor, the definitions and data 
collection forms were used for the main study. 
In most methods of surveillance, various sources of 
information were reviewed to determine if patients had 
infections. These consisted of the nursing notes, medical 
notes, temperature charts, treatment charts and laboratory 
information. Ward nursing and medical staff were also 
consulted when necessary. A coding schedule was developed 
to assist in the computerisation of data (Appendix C). All 
infections identified were noted on tally sheets to enable 
the surveyor to undertake analyses at the end of four 
weeks. 
Timing Surveillance Methods 
The methods were sub-divided into elements 
breakpoints for assessing the time to perform 
collection of infection data, denominator data 
analyses. In this context, an element is defined 
distinct part of a job, selected for convenience of 
(Glassey, 1966) and a breakpoint marks the beginning 
end of an element (Fields, 1969). The elements 
with 
the 
and 
as a 
study 
and 
and 
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breakpoints for the different surveillance methods are 
shown in Appendix D. All timing protocols were divided 
into two sections. The first consisted of the collection 
of infection data. Over a period of several weeks, the 
surveyor timed the review of the different sources of 
information (for example medical notes were timed one 
week, nursing notes the next etc. ) for a period of one 
week using a digital stopwatch. The second section was the 
time to collect denominator data (numbers of discharges 
and operations during a four week period) and undertake 
analyses. 
Stage Two- Introduction of Laboratory Based Ward Liaison 
Surveillance into Six District General Hospitals 
The findings of the first stage were used to develop an 
effective and efficient method of surveillance. The method 
chosen was revised laboratory based ward liaison 
surveillance. This was used by ICNs in six district 
general hospitals. 
Objectives 
The objectives of this stage were to determine: 
1. whether revised laboratory based ward liaison 
surveillance could be implemented and the 
practicalities of using the method. 
2. the time required for ICNs to perform the collection of 
infection and denominator data, and analyses. 
3. the effectiveness of revised laboratory based ward 
liaison surveillance in detecting infections in 
comparison with the original method. 
4. the reproducibility of revised laboratory based ward 
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liaison surveillance. 
Su. rvey Hospitals and Wards 
The study was undertaken in six district general hospitals 
situated in five Regional Health Authorities (East 
Anglian, North West Thames, Northern, West Midlands and 
Yorkshire). The study was undertaken on approximately 120 
beds per hospital, distributed among services similar to 
those used during stage 1. In two hospitals without a 
gynaecological ward, an urology ward was included. 
The reproducibility study and assessment of revised 
laboratory based ward liaison surveillance was performed 
in Hospital D, located in North West Thames Regional 
Health Authority. This hospital has 614 beds and serves a 
population of 279,000. During 1986, the mean length of 
stay (7.0 days) and occupancy (73%) were consistent with 
other acute hospitals in the regional health authority 
(North West Thames Regional Information Officer "Personal 
Communication"). 
Data Collection 
Protocols and data collection forms used in the first 
stage were modified for the second stage and data were 
collected for 16 weeks. From experiences in the first 
stage, this study period was judged to be sufficient for 
ICNs to become familiar with the method, before assessing 
the time required to perform laboratory based ward liaison 
surveillance. This assessment was made using the methods 
in the first stage. 
Data were collected for comparing revised laboratory based 
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ward liaison surveillance with the reference method for 
eight weeks; this was the same time period as that chosen 
in the first stage. The reproducibility study required two 
ICNs to perform data concurrently and the time available 
was 5 weeks. 
Data Computerisation and Analyses 
The data were computerised using Fox-Base and EPIINFO, 
version 3 (produced by Centers for Disease Control, 
Atlanta) software packages and an Apricot Xen-i computer. 
The data were double entered for verification of patient 
identification and infection data. The consistency of the 
data was checked using logical and range checks. Any 
inconsistencies were corrected by using the original data 
collection forms. Statistical analyses were performed 
using EPIINFO, SPSS/PC+ (Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences) and GLIM (Generalised Linear Interactive 
Modelling) statistical software packages. 
Before the selective surveillance methods were compared 
with the reference method, analyses were undertaken to 
examine whether there were any significant differences in 
the distribution of the population, and infections in the 
reference method during different time periods. An unusual 
distribution could have introduced bias when assessing the 
methods. Each population identified by the reference 
method, during the assessment of the selective 
surveillance methods was compared with the remaining 
population and nonparametric techniques (Seigel and 
Castellan, 1988) such as Chi-square tests were used to 
examine whether the differences observed were 
statistically significant, 
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In the comparison of the selective surveillance methods 
with the reference method, any patients and infections 
missed by the reference method but detected by the 
selective surveillance methods were added to the reference 
method to form reference method "plus". The infections had 
to fulfil the criteria of the definitions. 
Sensitivity and specificity of the selective surveillance 
methods were calculated using the methods summarised in 
Figure 3.3. Values were calculated for identifying 
firstly, all infected patients and secondly, patients with 
hospital acquired infection. Ninety-five 
, per cent 
confidence intervals were calculated for these values 
using the quadratic approximation to the normal 
distribution (Fleiss, 1981). 
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Figure 3.3. Methods for Assessing Sensitivity and Specificity of 
Selective Surveillance Methods 
Reference Method 
Selective Surveillance 
Method (SSM) Infected No Infection 
Detected 
Identified - Infected a, b, 
- No Infection Detected a2 
b2 
Not Identified cd 
Sensitivity and specificity were calculated as follows: 
Number of patients identified as infected by SSM and 
Sensitivity 
found to be infected by Reference Method 
Total number of patients identified as infected by 
Reference Method 
a, /(a, +a2+C) 
Number of patients not identified by SSM or identified 
as without infection by SSM and found to be without 
infection by Reference Method 
Specificity = 
Total number of patients identified without infection 
by Reference Method 
(d+b2)1 (b, +b2+d) 
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For examining the important "clues" for predicting 
patients with infections in risk factor surveillance a 
multiple logistic regression analysis (McCullagh and 
Nelder, 1983) was undertaken. Only those "clues" whose 
exclusion from the full model produced an increase in 
deviance significant at the 10% level were regarded as 
important. The sensitivity and specificity of risk factor 
surveillance using the "clues" found to be significant 
were then calculated. To compare the observations made by 
two observers, the mean pair agreement and Kappa statistic 
(Fleiss, 1981) were calculated. 
Patient Confidentiality 
To maintain patient confidentiality, data collection forms 
were computerised by a designated secretary in Division of 
Hospital Infection, Central Public Health Laboratory. 
Access to the computer occurred by a password known only 
by the researcher, secretary and computer programmer. The 
data were transferred as ASCII (American Standard Code for 
Information Interchange) files to a computer in 
Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre for some 
analyses. Both the Division of Hospital Infection and 
Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre are registered 
under the Data Protection Act of 1984 for storing data 
which relates to a living individual in relation to 
research and statistical analyses and surveillance. 
Ethical Committee Approval 
Before data collection commenced the relevant ethical 
committees were given information about the nature of, and 
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reasons for, the study and gave their approval for the 
study to be undertaken. 
Administrative Permission 
The relevant management, medical and nursing committees 
were given information about the study and gave their 
permission for the study to be undertaken. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REFERENCE METHOD 
Introduction 
The reference method was designed to identify all 
infections and patients in the population being studied 
and formed the standard with which the selective 
surveillance methods were compared. A method which 
identifies all patients in a population has not been 
described previously. Although total continuous 
surveillance as described by Centers for Disease Control 
(1972) is considered to be a comprehensive method, it does 
not aim to identify all patients in the survey population. 
Therefore the reference method had to be developed for the 
present study. It consisted of the review of various 
sources of information (for all patients in the study 
population) used in previous studies to identify 
infections and included nursing and medical notes,, 
temperature charts, drug prescription charts, microbiology 
laboratory reports and consulting with ward nursing and 
medical staff (Centers for Disease Control, 1972). All 
sources were included because their usefulness for 
identifying infections had not been established. 
The methodology for the reference method will be described 
before the findings are discussed and compared with other 
studies. 
Methods 
During the reference method, the surveyor reviewed all 
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microbiology laboratory reports from the survey areas. The 
wards were then visited and case records (nursing notes, 
medical notes, temperature charts, treatment charts) for 
all patients were reviewed for documented evidence to 
indicate the presence of an infection. In addition, ward 
nursing and medical staff were consulted when necessary. A 
coding schedule was developed to indicate the usefulness 
of the information sources for detecting infections. 
Code 
0= source of information unavailable for review. 
1= source of information reviewed, no information to 
indicate the presence of an infection. 
2= source of information reviewed, some information 
to indicate the presence of infection. 
5= source of information reviewed, sufficient 
information to identify an infection. 
Data collection occurred three times a week. This 
frequency was chosen after considering the average length 
of hospital stay (6.28 days) of patients on the services 
being studied (District Information officer "Personal 
Communication"). The median length of stay would have been 
more useful, but this was unavailable. The information was 
reviewed from the date when data collection was last 
undertaken. The location of patients who were no longer on 
the ward was established by reviewing the admission book, 
the patients' care plan or by consulting with the nursing 
staff. No attempts were made to follow-up the records of 
discharged patients unless the date of discharge was more 
that one day since data collection was last undertaken. 
The time to perform data collection and analyses was 
assessed using the methodology shown in Appendix D. 
63 
Results 
Cha. racte. ristics of the Population 
During the period of study, 3326 patients were discharged. 
Of these, 51% were male and 34% were aged greater than 64 
years (Table 4.1. ). Thirty-seven per cent of patients were 
from the surgical service, 28% from the medical service 
and 22% from the gynaecological service (Table 4.2. ). 
Table 4.1. Distribution of patients by age and sex in 
Reference Method 
Age Sex 
Male Female Total 
No. No. (%) No. 
<18 33 45 78 (2) 
18-34 254 451 705 (21) 
35-49 238 346 584 (18) 
50-64 497 297 794 (24) 
65-74 320 192 512 (15) 
75-84 290 205 495 (15) 
85; 61 72 133 (4) 
NK 13 12 25 (1) 
Total 1706 (51) 1620 (49) 3326 (100) 
* =Not known 
Table 4.2. Hospital Acquired Infection Rates by Service 
Service No. of No. of Rate/100 No. of Rate/100 
HAI disch. (% disch. patient patient 
of total) days days 
Gen. Surg. 108 1236 (37) 8.7 10355 1.0 
Gynaecol. 68 734 (22) 9.3 4588 1.5 
Gen. Med. 67 933 (28) 7.2 8332 0.8 
Orthopaed. 54 397 (12) 13.6 5147 1.0 
Other 9 26 (1) 34.6 268 3.4 
Total 306 3326 (100) 9.2 28690 1.1 
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Dist-ribution of Infection 
There were 668 infections of which 338 (51%) were 
community acquired (CAI) and 330 (49%) hospital acquired 
(HAI). Twenty-four of the HAI were acquired in other 
hospitals or wards on previous admissions and therefore 
will be excluded from further consideration. The HAI rate 
was 9.2 per 100 discharges and ranged from 7.2 for the 
medical service to 13.6 for the orthopaedic service. The 
rate per 100 patient days was 1.1 and ranged from 0.8 for 
the general medical to 1.5 for the gynaecological service. 
(Table 4.2. ). 
Two hundred and thirty-four patients developed one or more 
HAI. This gives a hospital acquired patient infection rate 
of 7.0 per 100 discharges. 
Types of Community and Hospital Acquired Infection Z. r- 
Of the 338 CAI, pneumonia (21%),, "other abdominal" 
infection (17%) and urinary tract infection (16%) were 
most frequently identified. Forty-five percent of the CAI 
had a positive microbiology report. Infections with a 
positive microbiology report were those where an 
appropriate specimen had been taken, and micro-organisms 
isolated following laboratory processing. Micro-organisms 
not considered to be important were reported as "no 
significant growth". Nineteen per cent of CAI had a 
negative culture and for 36%, appropriate specimens were 
not taken (Table 4.3. ). Of the 306 HAI, urinary tract 
infection (27%) surgical wound infection (23%) and 
pneumonia (15%) were most frequently identified. Sixty- 
five percent of the HAI had a positive microbiology 
report, 10% negative microbiology and for 24% of the HAI, 
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k 
appropriate specimens were not taken (Table 4-4. ). 
Table 4.3. Distribution of Conmunity Acquired Infection 
(CAI) in the Reference Method 
CAI Culture 
Positive 
No. 
undertaken 
Negative 
No. 
No culture 
No. 
Total 
No. 
Pneumonia 17 26 29 72 (21) 
Oth. abdom. 26 11 20 57 (17) 
Urin. tract 21 14 20 55 (16) 
Skin 14 4 16 34 (10) 
Oth. gen. tract 13 5 10 28 (8) 
Rectal abscess 11 1 2 14 (4) 
Septicaemia 13 0 0 13 (4) 
Asymp, bacter. 10 0 0 10 (3) 
, Other 27 3 25 55 (16) 
Total 152 (45) 64 (19) 122 (36) 338 
* CAI with five or less infections during the period of 
study. 
Table 4.4. Distribution of Hospital Acquired Infection 
(HAI) in the Reference Method 
HAI Culture undertaken No culture Total 
Positive Negative 
No. (%) No. (%) No. No. 
Urinary tract 56 10 17 83 (27) 
Surgical wound 51 9 11 71 (23) 
Pneumonia 15 7 23 45 (15) 
Asymp. bacter. 33 0 0 33 (11) 
Septicaemia 17 0 0 17 (6) 
Skin 3 4 4 11 (4) 
Oth. gen. tract 6 0 4 10 (3) 
Oral thrush 3 1 4 8 (3) 
Gastrý-intest. 3 1 3 7 (2) 
Other 13 0 8 21 (7) 
Total 200 (65) 32 (10) 74 (24) 306 
* HAI with five or less infections during the period of 
study. 
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Variation of the Reference Method Population Over Time 
Each population identified by the the reference method 
during the assessment of the selective surveillance 
methods was compared with the remaining population to 
determine whether there were any significant differences 
in the distribution of patients and infection. The factors 
considered were age, sex, service and types of infection 
(HAI and CAI). In view of the large number of comparisons 
involved, a significance level of p=0.01 was used and no 
significant differences (p>/=0.01) were found (Tables 4-5. 
and 4.6. ). 
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Table 4.5. Distribution of Population in Reference Method for each 
Selective Surveillance Method Assessment Period Compared 
with the Remaining Population. 
Number of Discharges 
LBWS LBTS WLS LBWLS RFS TeCs, TrCS, 
Factor TeTrCS+ 
In Out In Out In Out In Out In Out In Out 
Sex 
Male 406 1300 365 1341 309 1397 300 1406 324 1382 215 1491 
Females 419 1201 367 1253 283 1337 258 1362 263 1357 192 1428 
x2 
p value 
Age 
<18 
18-34 
35-49 
50-64 
65-74 
75-84 
>84 
Other* 
1.8 0.70 0.19 1.52 4.16 0.37 
0.18 0.40 0.66 0.22 0.04 0.54 
17 61 15 63 21 57 13 65 15 63 8 70 
163 542 143 562 125 580 135 570 122 583 97 608 
159 425 140 444 102 482 95 489 99 485 62 522 
196 598 174 620 145 649 136 658 139 655 105 689 
138 374 122 390 92 420 74 438 93 419 57 455 
119 376 107 388 81 414 78 417 96 399 56 439 
21 112 20 113 25 108 26 107 20 113 21 112 
12 13 11 14 1 24 1 24 3 22 1 24 
x2 10.51 7.67 5.35 6.05 2.14 6.45 
p value 0.10 0.26 0.50 0.42 0.91 0.37 
Service 
Gen. Surg. 297 939 261 975 217 1019 201 1035 247 989 156 1080 
Gen. Med. 240 693 221 712 155 778 169 764 160 773 117 816 
Gynaceol. 183 551 158 576 142 592 123 611 108 626 87 647 
Orthopaed. 97 300 86 311 75 322 58 339 71 326 41 356 
Other* 8 18 6 20 3 23 7 19 1 25 6 20 
x2 0.85 2.23 2.46 2.76 9.09 1.69 
p value 0.84 0.53 0.48 0.43 0.03 0.64 
Key In identified during assessment period 
Out not identified during assessment period 
LBWS laboratory based ward surveillance 
LBTS laboratory based telephone surveillance 
WLS ward liaison surveillance 
LBWLS laboratory based ward liaison surveillance 
RFS risk factor surveillance 
TeCS temperature chart surveillance+ 
TrCS treatment chart surveillance+ 
TeTrCS temperature and treatment chart surveillance+ 
+ All methods assessed concurrently. 
The "other" category was excluded in the X2 calculation. 
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Table 4.6. Distribution of Infection Identified in Reference Method 
during Selective Surveillance Assessment Periods Compared 
with Remainder. 
Number of Infections 
LBWS LBTS WLS LBWLS RFS TeCS, TrCS, 
Infection TrCS+ 
In Out In Out In Out In Out In Out In Out 
CAI 
HAI 
x2 
p value 
CAI 
Urinary tract 
Other abdom. 
Skin 
Pneumonia 
Oth. gen. tract 
Asym. bacter. 
Septicaemia 
Cent. nerv. sys. ] 
Rectal abcess 
Other* 
x 2** 
p value 
81 257 71 267 44 294 50 288 63 275 33 305 
71 235 53 253 40 266 43 263 45 261 20 286 
0.02 1.18 0. 01 0.02 1.51 1.81 
0.89 0.28 0. 92 0.88 0.22 0.18 
13 42 13 42 11 44 8 47 13 42 7 48 
18 39 17 40 6 51 9 48 11 46 5 52 
8 26 6 28 5 29 5 29 11 23 1 33 
17 55 12 60 7 65 10 62 8 64 9 63 
9 19 8 20 3 25 6 22 3 25 2 26 
8 34 
8 42 
2.99 
0.70 
8 34 
7 43 
4.57 
0.47 
6 36 8 34 
44 4 46 
3.60 1.28 
0.61 0.94 
33 
8 42 
9.00 
0.11 
7 35 
2 48 
4.75 
0.45 
HAI 
Urinary tract 13 70 8 75 16 67 13 70 16 67 4 79 
Surgical wound 18 53 16 55 10 61 13- 58 10 61 3 68 
Asym. bact. 9 24 8 25 1 32 6 27 4 29 2 31 
Pneumonia 10 35 7 38 2 43 5 40 4 41 3 42 
Oth. gen. tract 
Oral thrush 
Septicaemia 14 39 9 44 9 44 4 49 8 45 6 47 
Skin 
Gastro-intest. ] 
Other* 7 14 5 16 2 19 2 19 3 18 2 19 
x2** 3.46 6.06 9.29 3.79 2.80 3.10 
p value 0.48 0.19 0.05 0.44 0.59 0.54 
Key: In identified during assessment period 
Out not identif ied during assessment period 
LBWS laboratory based ward surveillance 
LBTS laboratory based telephone surveillance 
WLS ward liaiso n surveillance 
LBWLS laboratory based ward liaison surveillan ce 
RFS risk factor surveillance 
TeCS temperature chart surveillance+ 
TrCS treatment c hart surveillance+ 
TeTrCS temperature and treatment chart surveill ance+ 
+ All methods assessed concurrently. 
The "other" category was excluded in the x2 calculation. 
The bracket ed categories were combined i n the X2 calculation. 
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Infections Missed by the Reference Method 
The patients and infections identified by the reference 
method were compared with those detected by the selective 
surveillance methods. The selective surveillance methods 
identified 6 patients who were missed by the reference 
method. This represented 0.2% of the total population 
(reference method and selective surveillance methods). 
None of the patients were found to be infected. The 
selective surveillance methods identified 14 infections 
which were not detected by the reference method. Of these 
9 fulfilled the criteria of the definitions. The reference 
method therefore missed 9/677 (1.3%) of the total number 
of infections (detected by the reference method and 
selective surveillance methods) which met the criteria of 
the definitions. Three were CAI and 6 HAI. 
Time to Perform Refe-rence method 
The collection of infection data required 22 hours and 4 
minutes/122 beds/week. For details of the time required 
for different work elements see Table 4.7. The collection 
of denominator data required 2 hours 15 minutes/4 weeks 
and analyses, 1 hour 38 minutes/4 weeks. The total time 
was 23 hours 2 minutes/122 beds/week. 
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Table 4.7. Time for Collecting 
Reference Method 
Work Element 
Infection Data for 
Segregate microbiology reports 
Liaise with nurse in charge 
Review of nursing history sheets 
Review of nursing care plans 
Review of medical notes 
Review of temperature charts 
Review of treatment charts 
Travel time to locate information 
Review of laboratory information 
Travel time between wards and laboratory 
Follow-up of patients no longer resident 
on ward 
Follow-up discharged patients 
Document infections on ward tally sheets 
Total 
Infarmation used to Identify Infection 
Time (per week) 
Hrs: Mins 
0: 08 
0: 14 
3: 21 
2: 42 
5 : 14 
047 
0 41 
041 
3 : 12 
0: 52 
1: 02 
3: 05 
0: 05 
22: 04 
Infections were most frequently identified using the 
medical notes (63%) (Table 4.8. ). Using these, 87% of the 
CAI and 35% of HAI were identified. Liaison with ward 
nursing staff identified 31% of infections. This included 
15% of CAI and 43% of HAI. Twelve percent of all 
infections were identified using laboratory information 
alone and 9% identified using the nursing notes. 
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Table 4.8. Sources of Information used to Identify 
Infections 
Infection No. % of infections identified using 
Nursing Medical ward Laboratory 
Notes Notes Liaison Information 
CAI 338 5 87 15 8 
HAI 306 15 35 43 16 
All 
Infection 668 9 63 31 12 
* Includes 24 HAI acquired from other wards or hospitals 
Discussion 
The findings of the reference method with attention to the 
distribution of community and hospital acquired infection, 
the proportion of infections cultured and with positive 
microbiology, variation of the population in the reference 
method with time, and sources of information used to 
identify infections are discussed. Comparisons are made 
with other studies as unusual results in the present study 
could bias the assessment of the selective surveillance 
methods. 
The proportion of infections which were community and 
hospital acquired (51% and 49%) were similar to those (52% 
and 48%) reported in the national prevalence survey (Meers 
et al. 1981). In the present study, the predominant types 
of CAI were pneumonia, "other abdominal" infection and 
urinary tract infection. In the national prevalence 
survey, the most common CAI were lower respiratory tract 
infection, skin and urinary tract infection. The 
difference in types of CAI observed between the two 
studies is likely to be due to variation in the 
populations studied. In the national prevalence survey, 
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the highest proportion of patients was on the medical 
service, whereas in the present study, the majority of 
patients were on the surgical services. Different types of 
infection will be associated with particular services, and 
an example of this is shown in the present study, where 
"other abdominal" infection was primarily observed on the 
surgical service. 
Few studies in the United States have considered the 
distribution of CAI, however, the types reported also 
predominated (Barrett et al, 1968; Moody and Burke 1972). 
The types of HAI, with the pre-eminence of urinary tract 
infection observed in the present study, are similar to 
the findings of other workers in the United Kingdom and 
United States (Meers, et al, 1981; Haley, et al, 1981; 
Haley, et al, 1985a). 
The hospital acquired patient infection rate (7.0/100 
discharges) and HAI incidence rate (9.2/100 discharges) 
observed in the present study is slightly higher than the 
rates reported previously in United States and United 
Kingdom (Public Health Laboratory Service 1965; McNamara 
et al, 1967; Gro'schel and Bradley, 1971; Silberg et al, 
1974; Haley et al, 1981; Haley et al, 1985b). In addition 
to variation in practice to prevent infection, the higher 
rates in the present study could be due to differences in 
the denominator, methods of data collection, criteria for 
defining infections and the structure of the population. 
This serves to illustrate the issues discussed in Chapter 
2 that it is difficult to make comparisons between 
studies. 
The proportion of infections which were cultured and 
produced positive microbiology is important when 
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considering laboratory based surveillance. In the present 
study, 64% of CAI and 75% of HAI were cultured. The 
proportions of CAI and HAI with positive microbiology were 
45% and 65%. These figures can be compared with the 
findings of studies undertaken in the United States (Table 
4.9. ). 
Table 4.9. Reports of the Proportion of CAI and RAI 
Cultured in Previous Studies 
Study Percentage of Infections 
Cultured With +ve Microbiology 
CAI HAI CAI HAI 
Barrett et al, 1968 77 90 57 44 
Moody et al, 1972 68 86 50 53 
Laxson et al. 1984 71 
Scheckler and 
Peterson 1986 80 
Present 64 75 45 65 
+ve = Positive 
= Percentages not reported 
The proportions of CAI and HAI cultured in the present 
study was lower than figures reported in the other 
studies. The proportion of CAI with positive microbiology 
was also low, however, the percentage of HAI was higher 
than two reported studies. There are no studies in the 
United Kingdom with which these results can be compared. 
The differences observed between the various studies could 
be due to variation in practices concerning specimen 
collection, laboratory processing and reporting. Medical 
and nursing practices may result in specimens being taken 
more frequently on some services, and in some hospitals 
than others. The efficiency of specimen collection and 
transportation will also affect the results. 
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The assessment of selective surveillance methods occurred 
at different time periods and each population identified 
by the reference method was compared with the remaining 
population. No significant differences were found, and 
this suggests that populations were similar with respect 
to the factors considered. 
Few patients (0.2%) and infections (1.3%) were missed by 
the reference method when compared with the total 
population (selective surveillance methods and reference 
method). This suggests that the reference method was a 
reliable method for identifying patients and infections in 
the study population. The patients missed were discharged 
before data collection was undertaken and all were found 
to be uninfected by the selective surveillance methods. 
The infections were missed due to information being 
unavailable for review at the time of data collection. 
This omission might have been prevented if records had 
been computerised, thus, allowing access at all times. 
One of the objectives of the study was to determine the 
usefulness of various sources of information in the 
identification of infections. The time for collecting 
infection data could be reduced if the number of 
information sources was reduced. The majority of 
infections (63%) were identified by the review of medical 
notes. Only 12% were identified from laboratory forms and 
9% identified from the nursing notes. Community acquired 
infections were frequently identified from the medical 
notes, whereas HAI were usually identified by liaison with 
ward nursing or medical staff. The stimulus for liaison 
followed a "clue" in the medical or nursing records to 
indicate the presence of infection, for example, the 
nursing records documented that a wound was oozing, 
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however, the type of discharge was not described. 
One reason for the majority of CAI being identified from 
the medical notes, is that the documentation of symptoms 
and signs and full physical examination forms an integral 
part of the diagnostic process, which is fundamental for 
the initiation of appropriate treatment. In the case of 
HAI., as a diagnosis has already been made, the 
documentation of symptoms and signs assumes a lower level 
of importance. 
The nursing notes rarely documented all the symptoms and 
signs of infection, however, when consulted, the nursing 
staff were able to indicate that additional symptoms were 
present. This suggests that nursing staff do not associate 
particular symptoms and signs with the development of 
infection. There may also be inaccuracies in record 
keeping. 
The findings raise issues concerning the evaluation of 
nursing care. Much care is directed towards preventing 
infection, therefore, assessing the patient for symptoms 
and signs provides a means for evaluating care. If new 
symptoms and signs are not documented, there is no written 
evidence to suggest that care is evaluated, or that 
further problems experienced by the patient are detected 
which is necessary for planning appropriate care. Ways of 
improving the assessment and documentation of symptoms and 
signs are areas for further study. 
During the collection of infection data, considerable time 
was spent locating records, which often contained 
duplicated information. An integrated record would solve 
some of these problems. Such a record has been described 
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by Baumann (1979) in the United States and suggested by 
Cruickshank (1988) in the United Kingdom. The integrated 
record contains information from the various health care 
disciplines, thus, avoiding repeated entries and providing 
a single clinical profile to promote efficient planning of 
care. The present study supports the use of such records 
for two reasons. Firstly, no single source of information 
is sufficient to identify all cases of infection, 
therefore all sources need to be reviewed. Secondly, the 
volume of information to be reviewed would decrease, 
therefore time would be saved in reviewing the records. 
The development of such records is in its infancy and 
their use will need to be assessed. 
In summary, the reference method identified similar types 
of hospital and community acquired infection to those 
reported in other studies. However, it should be 
emphasised that it is difficult to make comparisons 
between studies as different populations were surveyed, 
different methods used for data collection and differing 
criteria used for defining infections. The population of 
the reference method did not vary considerably with time 
and therefore it provided a satisfactory standard to 
assess the selective surveillance methods. it was 
necessary to review all the sources of information to 
identify infections as no one source was adequate. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LABORATORY BASED SURVEILLANCE 
Introduction 
Chapters 5 to 9 discuss the assessment of 
selective surveillance methods. The methods were 
in the same manner, therefore the structure 
chapters are similar. 
various 
analysed 
of the 
Laboratory based surveillance involves the follow-up of 
patients from whom positive microbiology cultures have 
been isolated. Medical and nursing notes and other 
hospital charts are often reviewed to determine if the 
cultures are associated with infection (Kessner and 
Lepper, 1967; McNamara et al, 1967; Gross et al. 1980). 
This is considered necessary as full details of the 
clinical symptoms and signs of infection are not 
documented on the pathology request form. The follow-up of 
positive microbiology reports by the review of records and 
charts will be termed as laboratory based ward 
surveillance. 
A form of laboratory based surveillance, the follow-up of 
"alert" micro-organisms was the method most frequently 
reported in a telephone survey undertaken to determine the 
extent of surveillance activities in the United Kingdom 
(Glenister et al, 1990). This involves the follow-up of 
certain micro-organisms considered to be a cross-infection 
hazard. The effectiveness of this method in detecting 
infections has not been determined. 
In the present study, two laboratory based methods were 
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assessed; laboratory based ward surveillance and 
laboratory based telephone surveillance. The former has 
been described above, the latter has not been reported 
previously and involved the follow-up Of certain positive 
microbiology reports by a telephone call- A protocol was 
developed to enable the method to be assessed. The 
proportion of infections associated with "alerts" was also 
determined. The methods of data collection and the results 
for the two methods will be described separately before 
the findings of both methods are discussed together. 
Methods 
Labo. ratoxy Based Ward Su-rveillance 
During laboratory based ward surveillance, the medical 
microbiologist signing outgoing laboratory reports 
segregated positive reports of the survey wards from the 
remainder. Positive reports were those where a named 
micro-organism was reported. Micro-organisms not 
considered to be significant were reported as "No 
significant growth" at the study hospital. Data collection 
forms were completed for all patients with one or more 
positive microbiology reports. The surveyor noted whether 
the report was new or different. A new report was one that 
had not been previously associated with an infection. A 
different report was a change in the micro-organism 
isolated for a given patient. The surveyor referred to 
tally sheets which listed infections identified during the 
period of study. All new or different positive reports 
were followed-up by a ward visit, where the case records 
were reviewed for the period commencing from 48 hours 
prior to specimen collection. While reviewing the various 
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sources of information, the surveyor noted other 
infections not related to the positive microbiology report 
being followed up. 
The surveyor also kept a record of "alert" micro- 
organisms, these are listed in Appendix E. The time for 
collecting infection data was assessed for one week using 
the methodology shown in Appendix D and the proportion of 
positive microbiology reports associated with infection 
was determined. 
Labo. ratoxy Based Telephone Suzveillance 
During laboratory based telephone surveillance, the 
medical microbiologist contacted ward nursing and medical 
staff by telephone if a positive microbiology report 
fulfilled the criteria shown in Appendix E. These reports 
were considered to be either a potential cross infection 
problem or of significance to the management of patient 
care. During the telephone call, the medical 
microbiologist discussed the patient's symptoms and signs 
to establish whether the patient had an infection. Details 
of the patient, positive microbiology report and infection 
were noted on the surveillance form. While making the 
telephone call, the surveyor noted any infections reported 
which were not associated with the positive microbiology 
report. The time to collect infection data was assessed 
for one week using the methodology shown in Appendix D. 
Results 
The total number of 
infections identified 
patients, infected 
by the selective 
patients and 
surveillance 
80 
methods were compared with reference method "plus": this 
consisted of all patients and infections (which fulfilled 
the criteria of the definitions) identified by the 
reference method and selective surveillance methods during 
the period of study. 
Labo. ratoxy Based Ward Surveillance 
Patients and Infections Missed by the Reference Method 
Laboratory based ward surveillance identified 5 patients, 
1 community acquired infection (skin) and 6 hospital 
acquired infections (skin, urinary tract x2, surgical 
wound x 2, and pressure sore) which were not detected by 
the reference method. All infections except one hospital 
acquired urinary tract infection and pressure sore 
infection met the criteria of the definitions and were 
added to reference method to form reference method "plus". 
Proportion of Patients and Infections Identified 
Laboratory based ward surveillance identified 132 (16%) of 
the 830 patients in reference method "plus". Eighteen 
(22%) of the 82 CAI, and 36 (48%) of the 75 HAI were 
detected by laboratory based ward surveillance. The 
proportion of the different types of CAI and HAI are shown 
in Tables 5.1. and 5.2. 
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Table 5.1. Community Acquired Infection (CAI) Identified 
by Laboratory Based Ward Surveillance (LBWS) 
CAI Number of CAI 
LBWS Reference Method 
M llplusll M 
Urinary tract 2 13 
Other abdominal 0 18 
Skin 4 9 
Pneumonia 2 17 
Asymptomatic bacteriuria 0 1 
Other genital tract 4 9 
Septicaemia 3 3 
Gastro-intestinal 1 1 
Rectal abscess 2 4 
Other 0 7 
Total 18 (22) 82 (100) 
* Only one CAI in Reference Method "Plus" 
Table 5.2. Hospital Acquired Infection (HAI) identified by 
Laboratory Based Ward Surveillance (LBWS) 
HAI Numbir of HAI 
LBWS Reference Method 
M liplusll M 
Urinary tract 9 14 
Surgical wound 8 20 
Asymptomatic bacteriuria 7 9 
Pneumonia 5 10 
Oral thrush 1 4 
Septicaemia 2 4 
Skin 1 4 
Gastro-intestinal 2 2 
Pressure sore 1 2 
Other abdominal 0 2 * Other 0 4 
Total 36 (48) 75 (100) 
#Excludes HAI not found to meet criteria of definitions * Only one HAI in Reference Method "Plus" 
Laboratory based ward surveillance identified 48 of the 
134 infected (HAI and CAI) patients, thus the sensitivity 
was 36%. The specificity was approximately 100% (Table 
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5.3. ). Fifty-five (8%) of the 696 uninfected patients were 
identified. 
Table 5.3. Values for 
Specificity 
Surveillance 
(CAI and HAI) 
Laboratory Based Ward 
Surveillance 
Calculating Sensitivity and 
of Laboratory Based Ward 
for Identifying Infected 
Patients 
Reference Method "Plus" 
Infected Not Infected 
(CAI and RAI) 
Identified - Infected 48 1 
- Not Infected 29 54 
Not Identified 57 641 
Total 134 696 
Sensitivity = 48/134 x 100 = 36% (95% CI = 28-44%) 
Specificity = 695/696 x 100 = 100% (95% CI = 99-100%) 
Laboratory based ward surveillance identified 30 of the 59 
patients with HAI, thus the sensitivity was 51%. The 
specificity was approximately 100% (Table 5.4. ). Eighty- 
six (11%) of the 771 patients without HAI were identified. 
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Table 5.4. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Laboratory Based Ward 
Surveillance for Identifying Patients with 
HAI 
Laboratory Based Ward Reference Method "Plus" 
Surveillance Infected Not Infected 
(HAI) 
Identified - Infected (HAI) 30 1 
- Not Infected 16 85 
Not Identified 13 685 
Total 59 771 
Sensitivity = 30/59 x 100 = 51% (95% CI = 38-64%) 
Specificity = 770/771 x 100 = 100% (95% CI = 99-100%) 
Infections Missed by Laboratory Based Ward Surveillance 
Laboratory based ward surveillance missed 103 (66%) of the 
157 infections. Sixty-four were CAI and 39 HAI. Sixty 
infections were associated with 57 patients not identified 
by laboratory based ward surveillance. Patients with the 
remaining infections were identified, however, the 
infections were missed. This was due to follow-up 
occurring after the patient had been discharged from 
hospital (11), records being unavailable for review during 
data collection (9), swabs not associated with infection 
being followed-up (4) and verbal liaison not indicating 
the presence of infection (1). Eighteen infections were 
missed due to an error; the positive microbiology reports 
had not been segregated for follow-up. 
Time to Perform Data Collection and Analyses 
The collection of infection data required 3 hours 45 
minutes/122 beds/week. Full details of the time required 
for the different work elements are shown in Table 5.5. 
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The collection of denominator data required 2 hours 15 
minutes/4 weeks and analyses, 40 minutes/4 weeks. The 
total time was 4 hours 29 minutes/122 beds/week. 
Table 5.5. Time to Collect Infection Data for Laboratory 
Based Ward Surveillance 
Work Element Time (per week) 
Hrs: Mins 
Segregate microbiology reports 0: 04 
Time to note whether positive 
microbiology reports are different 0: 05 
Time to complete surveillance forms 0: 21 
Liaise with nurse in charge 0: 17 
Review of nursing history sheets 0: 14 
Review of nursing care plans 0: 14 
Review of medical notes 0: 37 
Review of temperature charts 0: 09 
Review of treatment charts 0: 09 
Travel time to locate information 0: 13 
Travel time between wards and laboratory 1: 06 
Document infections on ward tally sheets 0: 04 
Time to establish location of patients 
no longer on the ward 0: 12 
Total 3: 45 
Proportion of the Positive Microbiology Reports Associated 
with Infection 
Sixty-six (20%) of the 338 positive microbiology reports 
were associated with infection (Table 5.6. ). This included 
all the pus specimens. No infections were associated with 
throat swabs, nose swabs, mouth swabs or perianal swabs. 
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Table 5.6. Number of 
Associated 
Based Ward 
Positive Microbiology Reports 
with Infections in Laboratory 
Surveillance 
Type of Positive Reports associated with infection 
Specimen Reports CAI HAI All 
No. No. No. No. 
Wound swab 45 5 12 17 
MSU 36 2 10 12 
CSU 30 2 3 5 
Urine 12 1 3 4 
Higher Vaginal 
swab 30 4 0 4 
Sputum 27 4 5 9 
Throat swab 27 0 0 0 
Nose swab 26 0 0 0 
Perianal swab 22 0 0 0 
Mouth swab 21 0 0 0 
Blood 17 3 2 5 
Faecal 15 1 2 3 
Pus 5 4 1 5 
Other 25 1 1 2 
Total 338 27 (8) 39 (12) 66 (20) 
During laboratory based ward surveillance, 7 (2%) of the 
338 positive microbiology reports met the criteria of 
being an "alert" micro-organism. Of these, only 3 reports 
were associated with infection. 
Labo. ratory Based Telepbone Surveillance 
Patients and Infections Missed by the Reference Method 
Laboratory based telephone surveillance identified 1 
patient and two CAI (other genital tract infection and 
urinary tract infection) which were not detected by the 
reference method. The urinary tract infection did not meet 
the criteria of the definitions and therefore was not 
added to reference method "plus". 
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Proportion of Patients and Infections identified 
Laboratory based telephone surveillance identified 62 
(8%) of the 733 patients in reference method "plus". 
Eleven (15%) of the 72 CAI and 16 (30%) of the 53 HAI were 
detected by laboratory based telephone surveillance. The 
proportion of the different types of CAI and HAI are shown 
in Tables 5.7. and 5.8. 
Table 5.7. Community Acquired Infection (CAI) identified 
by Laboratory Based Telephone Surveillance 
(LBTS) 
CAI Numbir of CAI 
LBTS Reference 
"Plus It M 
Method 
Urinary tract 2 13 
Other abdominal 1 17 
Skin 2 6 
Pneumonia 0 12 
Asymptomatic bacteriuria 0 1 
Other genital 2 9 
Septicaemia 3 3 
Gastro-intestinal 1 1 
Rectal abscess 0 4 
Other 0 6 
Total 11 (15) 72 (100) 
#Excludes CAI that did not meet criteria of the 
lefinitions 
Only one CAI in Reference Method "Plus" 
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Table 5.8. Hospital Acquired Infection (HAI) identified 
by Laboratory Based Telephone Surveillance 
(LBTS) 
HAI Number of HAI 
LBTS Reference Method 
M 11plusli M 
Urinary tract 2 8 
Surgical wound 3 16 
Asymptomatic bacteriuria 2 8 
Pneumonia 4 7 
Septicaemia 2 4 
Gastro-intestinal 2 2 
Oral thrush 0 2 
Other abdominal 1 2 * Other 0 4 
Total 16 (30) 53 
* Only one HAI in Reference Method "Plus" 
(100) 
Laboratory based telephone surveillance identified 26 of 
the 112 infected (HAI and CAI) patients, thus, the 
sensitivity was 23%. The specificity was approximately 
100% (Table 5.9. ) Thirty-two (5%) of the 621 uninfected 
patients were identified. 
Table 5.9. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Laboratory Based Telephone 
Surveillance for Identifying Infected (CAI and 
HAI) Patients 
Laboratory Based Telephone Reference Method "Plus" 
Surveillance Infected Not Infected 
(CAI and HAI) 
Identified - Infected 26 1 
- Not Infected 4 31 
Not Identified 82 589 
Total 112 621 
Sensitivity 26/112 x 100 = 23% (95% CI = 15-31%) 
Specificity 620/621 x 100 = 100% (95% CI = 99-100%) 
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Laboratory based telephone surveillance identified 15 of 
the 42 patients with HAI, thus the sensitivity was 36%. 
The specificity was 100% (Table 5.10. ). Forty-seven (7%) 
of the 691 patients without HAI were identified. 
Table 5.10. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Laboratory Based Telephone 
Surveillance for Identifying Patients with 
HAI 
Laboratory Based Telephone Reference Method "Plus" 
Surveillance Infected Not Infected 
(HAI) 
Identified - Infected (HAI) 15 0 
- Not Infected 0 47 
Not Identified 27 644 
Total 42 691 
Sensitivity 15/42 x 100 = 36% (95% CI = 22-52%) 
Specificity 691/691 x 100 = 100% (95% CI = 99-100%) 
Infections Missed by Laboratory Based Telephone 
Surveillance 
Laboratory based telephone surveillance missed 98 (78%) of 
the 125 infections. Sixty-one were CAI and 37 HAI. Ninety- 
one infections were associated with 82 patients not 
identified by laboratory based telephone surveillance. 
The patients with the remaining infections were 
identified, however, follow-up did not indicate symptoms 
and signs of infection were present to meet the criteria 
of the definitions. Two of these patients had already been 
discharged from hospital. 
Time to Perform Data Collection and Analyses 
The collection of infection data required 1 hour 30 
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minutes/122 beds/week. Full details of the time for the 
different work elements are shown in Table 5.11- The 
collection of denominator data required 2 hours 15 
minutes/4 weeks and analyses, 24 minutes/4 weeks. The 
total time was 2 hours 10 minutes/122 beds/week. 
Table 5.11. Time to Collect Infection Data for Laboratory 
Based Telephone Surveillance 
Work Element Time (per week) 
Hrs: Mins 
Segregate microbiology reports 0: 04 
Time to complete surveillance forms 0: 13 
Time to telephone the nursing/medical staff 1: 09 
Document infections on ward tally sheets 0: 04 
Total 1: 30 
Discussion 
The effectiveness of the laboratory based methods are 
discussed with strategies for improving the efficiency of 
the methods. Efficiency in this context involves 
increasing the number of infections detected and reducing 
the time for data collection. 
Laboratory based surveillance requires the production of a 
positive microbiology report to provide the stimulus to 
select patients for further follow-up to identify 
infections. The methods are therefore dependent upon 
practitioners taking specimens correctly before treatment 
is commenced. The frequency of specimen collection may 
vary from one service and hospital to another. The methods 
also require rapid and accurate processing of specimens by 
the laboratory and efficient screening of reports. Reports 
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of survey areas must be segregated from the remainder for 
follow-up. 
During the present study, both laboratory based ward 
surveillance and laboratory based telephone surveillance 
were more effective in detecting HAI than CAI. This is not 
surprising as a higher proportion of HAI were associated 
with positive microbiology in the reference method 
(Chapter 4). Also the methods varied in their 
effectiveness in identifying particular types of 
infection, for example, laboratory based ward surveillance 
identified 64% of hospital acquired urinary tract 
infection and only 40% of hospital acquired surgical wound 
infection. Again this difference is likely to be due to 
the frequency with which specimens are collected and 
positive microbiology reports produced. 
Only two studies have considered the effectiveness of 
laboratory based methods; Gross and colleagues (1980) 
compared laboratory based ward surveillance with a 
prevalence survey and Wenzel and colleagues (1976) 
compared the method with another selective surveillance 
method (risk factor surveillance). Different definitions 
for infection and methods of data collection were used in 
these studies. Neither of the reported studies was a 
continuous and prospective study where laboratory based 
ward surveillance was compared with a reference method. It 
is therefore difficult to make comparisons with the 
findings of the present study. Laboratory based telephone 
surveillance has not been described previously therefore 
its effectiveness in detecting infections has not been 
assessed. 
Although laboratory based methods detected more HAI than 
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CAI, the proportion identified was not high. The 
effectiveness of the methods could be improved if nursing 
and medical staff were encouraged to take specimens from 
patients who develop signs and symptoms of infection. 
During the reference method 36% of CAI and 24% of HAI did 
not have specimens taken for microbiology culture. 
The effectiveness of laboratory based ward surveillance 
could also be improved if the surveyor was able to have 
access to records at all times. Twenty infections were 
missed due to information being unavailable for review 
during data collection; either the patient had been 
discharged or records were not present on the ward. The 
computerisation of records could have prevented some of 
the infections being missed. 
Laboratory based methods are dependent also upon selected 
specimens being segregated from the remainder. The present 
study highlighted just such an administrative error, as 
some positive microbiology reports had not been 
segregated. If the details on the pathology request form 
had been computerised this would not have occurred. 
The most time consuming element of a surveillance 
programme is the collection of infection data which is 
therefore a crucial criterion when selecting a 
surveillance method for everyday use. Laboratory based 
ward surveillance required 3.1 hours/100 beds/week and 
laboratory based telephone surveillance 1.2 hours. These 
times are less than a fifth of the time required for the 
reference method. The time to perform data collection has 
been reported only in one study; Wenzel and colleagues 
(1976) found that laboratory based ward surveillance 
required 4.7 hours/100 beds/week. This time is longer than 
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that observed in the present study and the difference 
could be due to variation in specimen collection 
practices, geography of the hospital and differences in 
record systems. The differences are difficult to interpret 
as details of record systems and specimen collection 
practices are not included in the study by Wenzel and co- 
authors (1976). 
The time for collecting infection data could be reduced by 
certain simple activities: by omitting positive 
microbiology reports not frequently associated with 
infection from surveillance protocols. These consisted of 
perianal swabs, nose swabs, throat swabs and mouth swabs. 
Also, if nursing and medical staff indicated the reason 
for initiating specimen collection, specimens taken for 
screening purposes could be excluded. Both modifications 
could reduce the proportion of uninfected patients 
identified by the method. 
The time required for data collection would also reduce if 
the symptoms and signs of infection were documented on the 
pathology request form, as follow-up visits to review case 
records would not be required. During the reference method 
(chapter 4), only 12% of infections were identified from 
information on the laboratory request form. The design of 
the pathology request form could be modified to encourage 
reporting, for example, boxes could be completed to 
indicate the presence of specific symptoms and signs of 
infection. However, although omitting follow-up visits 
would reduce the time for data collection, the ward 
nursing and medical staff would not be afforded the same 
opportunity of asking infection-related questions which is 
present when the ICN makes a visit. 
93 
The number of patients falsely identified as infected was 
small; one patient for each method. The review of the data 
collection forms indicated that there was insufficient 
information to suggest an infection was present. The 
symptoms and signs had not been documented on the form for 
one patient, and for the other, did not meet the criteria 
of the definitions. A subsequent review of the case 
records indicated that there was insufficient information 
to meet the criteria of the definitions. It is therefore 
likely that the infections had been documented in error, 
although they could have been identified during liaison 
which was unfortunately impossible to check 
retrospectively. This raises issues concerning data 
collection in the service setting and suggests that some 
checking may be required. 
A form of laboratory based surveillance, the follow-up of 
"alert" micro-organisms was the method most frequently 
reported in a telephone survey (Glenister et al, 1990). In 
the present study only 3 (6%) of the 54 infections 
identified during laboratory based ward surveillance were 
associated with "alert" micro-organisms. This method of 
data collection does not identify many infections; 
however, it should be emphasised that the method was 
developed to identify micro-organisms that cause potential 
cross infection problems and not infections. In the above 
telephone survey, the method was reported to be utilised 
for identifying infections; this illustrates that there is 
some confusion concerning the surveillance of hospital 
infection. 
In summary, laboratory based ward surveillance and 
laboratory based telephone surveillance were both more 
effective in detecting HAI than CAI, however, the 
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proportion of HAI detected was less than 50%. Laboratory 
based ward surveillance identified a higher proportion 
than laboratory based telephone surveillance, but also 
required more time for data collection. Laboratory based 
ward surveillance required a fifth and laboratory based 
telephone surveillance a tenth of the time of the 
reference method. Ways of increasing the effectiveness of 
methods in detecting infection and reducing the time for 
data collection have been described. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
WARD LIAISON SURVEILLANCE 
Introduction 
During this method the surveyor visits the ward at regular 
intervals and enquires from the nursing staff whether any 
patients have infections. The surveyor then reviews case 
records of reported patients, and uses the information 
provided by the nursing staff, to determine if the 
infections meet the criteria of agreed definitions. Since 
ward nurses are the only members of health care team 
present twenty-four hours of the day, they are usually 
consulted. Although ward liaison surveillance has been 
used before (Eickhoff et al, 1969; Scheckler et al, 1986), 
usually alongside other surveillance methods, its 
effectiveness and the time required for data collection 
has not been determined. 
Methods 
The surveyor visited the wards twice weekly and discussed 
all the patients with the nursing staff to determine if 
any were considered to have infections. To ensure all 
patients were discussed, the nursing records were used as 
a reference. Case records of patients identified were 
reviewed (from the date of infection onset given by the 
nursing staff) to establish if the infection fulfilled the 
criteria of the definitions. During the following ward 
visit the surveyor noted whether patients previously 
identified had been discharged. The time for collecting 
infection data was assessed for one week using the 
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methodology shown in Appendix D. 
Results 
Patients and Infections Missed by the Reference Method 
All the patients and infections detected by ward liaison 
surveillance were also detected by the reference method. 
Patients and Infections Identified by Ward Liaison 
Suxveillance 
Ward liaison surveillance identified 92 (16%) of the 592 
patients in reference method "plus". Eighteen (41%) of the 
44 CAI and 23 (58%) of the 40 HAI were detected by ward 
liaison surveillance. The different types of CAI and HAI 
are shown in Tables 6.1. and 6.2. 
Table 6.1. Community Acquired Infection (CAI) Identified 
by Ward Liaison Surveillance (WLS) 
CAI Number of CAI 
WLS Reference Method 
M 11plusll M 
Other abdominal 2 6 
Pneumonia 5 7 
Urinary tract 4 11 
Other genital 3 3 
Skin 1 5 
Bone and Joint 1 2 
Central Nervous System 1 2 
Hepatitis A 1 1 
Asymptomatic bacteriuria 0 2 
other * 0 5 
Total 18 (41) 44 (100) 
* Sites with only one CAI in Reference Method "Plus" 
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Table 6.2. Hospital Acquired Infection (HAI) identified by 
Ward Liaison Surveillance 
HAI 
Urinary tract 
Surgical Wound 
Pneumonia 
Skin 
Other genital tract 
Gastro-intestinal 
Upper respiratory 
traýt and ear 
Other 
Number of RAI 
WLS Reference Method 
M "Plusil M 
10 16 
6 10 
0 2 
2 2 
2 3 
2 3 
11 
03 
Total 23 (58) 40 (100) 
* Sites with only one HAI in Reference Method "Plus" 
Ward liaison surveillance identified 41 of the 79 infected 
(HAI and CAI) patients, thus, the sensitivity was 52%. The 
specificity was 100% (Table 6.3. ). Forty-nine (10%) of the 
513 uninfected patients were identified. 
Table 6.3. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Ward Liaison Surveillance for 
Identifying Infected (CAI and RAI) Patients 
Ward Liaison Surveillance 
Identified 
Not Identified 
Infected 
Not Infected 
Total 
Sensitivity = 41/79 x 100 
Specificity = 513/513 x 100 
Reference Method "Plus" 
Infected Not Infected 
(CAI and HAI) 
41 
2 
36 
0 
49 
464 
79 
52% (95% CI 
100% (95% CI 
513 
40-63%) 
99-100%) 
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Ward liaison surveillance identified 23 of the 37 patients 
with HAI, thus the sensitivity was 62%. The specificity 
was 100% (Table 6.4. ). Sixty-nine (12%) of the 555 
patients without HAI were identified. 
Table 6.4. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Ward Liaison Surveillance for 
Identifying Patients with HAI 
Ward Liaison Surveillance Reference Method "Plus" 
Infected Not Infected 
(HAI) 
Identified - Infected (HAI) 23 0 
- Not Infected 0 69 
Not Identified 14 486 
Total 37 555 
Sensitivity 23/37 x 100 = 62% (95% CI = 45-78%) 
Specificity 555/555 x 100 = 100% (95% CI = 99-100%) 
Infections Missed by Ward Liaison Surveillance 
Ward liaison surveillance missed 43 (51%) of the 84 
infections. Twenty-six were CAI and 17 HAI. Thirty-eight 
infections associated with 36 patients were not detected 
during ward liaison surveillance. The remaining 5 
infections were missed due to the appropriate information 
being unavailable for review at the time of data 
collection. 
Time to Perform Data Collection and Analyses 
The collection of infection data required 4 hours 13 
minutes/122 beds/ week. Full details of the time required 
for the different work elements are shown in Table 6.5. 
The collection of denominator data required 2 hours 15 
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total time was 4 hours 58 minutes/122 beds/week. 
Table 6.5. Time to Collect Infection Data for Ward 
Liaison Surveillance 
Work Element Time (per week) 
Hrs: Mins 
Travel between wards and laboratory 0: 56 
Discuss patients with nurse in charge 0: 58 
Review medical notes 0: 35 
Review of nursing history sheets 0: 18 
Review of nursing care plans 0: 14 
Review of temperature charts 0: 07 
Review treatment charts 0: 06 
Travel time to locate information 0: 08 
Document infections on ward tally sheets 0: 06 
Time to establish location of patients 
no longer on the ward 0: 11 
Time to locate nurse and history 
sheet folder 0: 34 
Total 4: 13 
Discussion 
Ward liaison surveillance is an active method where the 
"reporting" of an infection to the surveyor provides the 
stimulus to select patients for further follow-up. The 
method is dependent upon nursing staff assessing patients 
and recognising symptoms and signs of infection. The 
accuracy of this will be influenced by education, training 
and experience. Some hospitals and individuals may define 
infections differently to others. Ward liaison 
surveillance is also dependent upon the surveyor having 
access to nursing staff who know whether patients have the 
symptoms and signs of infection. 
Ward liaison surveillance identified a higher proportion 
of HAI than CAI. The sensitivity for identifying patients 
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with HAI was also higher than that for identifying all 
infected (CAI and HAI) patients. This suggests that 
nursing staff are more likely to detect HAI than CAI. This 
observation is also substantiated by the results reported 
in Chapter 4 which considered the usefulness of 
information sources to identify infections. Liaison with 
ward nursing /medical staff (usually nursing staff) and 
the nursing notes identified 43% and 15% of HAI and only 
15% and 5% of CAI. 
Observing for the symptoms and signs of infection is 
undertaken to identify patient and nursing problems. 
Nurses may place greater emphasis on observing the patient 
for changes in condition (including the development of 
symptoms and signs of infection) during hospitalisation, 
than observing for symptoms and signs of infection on 
admission to hospital. This could explain why nursing 
staff were more aware of HAI than CAI. However, the 
nursing staff should be aware of CAI, as care should be 
planned to assist recovery and prevent transmission of 
micro-organisms to other patients and staff. 
Ward liaison surveillance varied in its effectiveness in 
detecting particular types of HAI, for example, 63% of 
urinary tract infection and 60% of surgical wound 
infection were identified, yet neither of the two cases of 
pneumonia were identified. This could be due to either, an 
incomplete assessment or failure by the nurses to 
associate particular signs and symptoms with infection. 
Previous studies have not considered the effectiveness of 
ward liaison surveillance or the time required for data 
collection, therefore comparisons cannot be made with 
other studies. 
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The effectiveness of the method could be improved if ward 
nursing staff were given additional training to observe 
for specific symptoms and signs associated with infection. 
This should be undertaken during pre and post registration 
education programmes. For specific surveillance 
programmes, the infection control nurse could undertake 
training of ward nursing staff. 
The time to perform the collection of infection data was 4 
hours 13 minutes/122 beds /week. This was approximately a 
fifth of the time of the reference method. Locating the 
appropriate nursing notes and nurse(s) required 34 minutes 
per week and discussing the patients a further 58 minutes. 
Pre-arranged visits could minimise this time. 
In summary, ward liaison surveillance was more effective 
in detecting HAI than CAI. Forty-one per cent of CAI and 
58% of HAI were identified. The time required for data 
collection was approximately a fifth of the time of the 
reference method. The effectiveness and efficiency of the 
method could be improved if firstly, the nursing staff 
were given further training to observe for specific 
symptoms and signs of infection, and secondly, the 
surveyor arranged appointments to meet with nursing staff 
to discuss the patients on the ward. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
LABORATORY BASED WARD LIAISON SURVEILLANCE 
Introduction 
Laboratory based ward liaison surveillance has not been 
described previously and was developed during the present 
study. It consists of laboratory based ward surveillance 
(described in Chapter 5) and ward liaison surveillance 
(described in Chapter 6). The method involves the follow- 
up of positive microbiology reports by reviewing case 
records, and regular ward visiting and consultation with 
nursing staff to determine patients considered to have 
infections. A case record review occurs to examine whether 
the "reported" infection fulfils the criteria of 
definitions. 
This method was developed to overcome one of the 
limitations of laboratory based ward surveillance. The 
latter method is dependent on specimens being taken and 
the production of a positive microbiology report. Some 
nursing and medical staff may take specimens less 
frequently than others, and some infections, even though 
specimens are collected, do not produce a positive 
microbiology report. 
it was postulated that unde 
surveillance with laboratory based 
enable the surveyor to have access 
be missed during laboratory based 
determine the effectiveness of 
liaison surveillance, the method 
reference method. 
rtaking ward liaison 
ward surveillance would 
to infections which may 
ward surveillance. To 
laboratory based ward 
was compared with the 
103 
Methods 
The methodology for collecting data has been described in 
Chapters 5 and 6 and is summarised below- Each weekday new 
or different positive microbiology reports from the survey 
areas were separated from the remainder and data 
collection forms were completed. Case records of patients 
with one or more positive microbiology reports were 
reviewed for the period commencing from 48 hours prior to 
specimen collection. While reviewing the various sources 
of information, the surveyor noted any other infections. 
In addition, the surveyor visited the survey areas twice 
weekly and discussed all patients with the ward nursing 
staff to determine if any were considered to have 
infections. Case records of patients "reported" to have 
infection were reviewed to establish if the symptoms and 
signs met the criteria of the definitions. The records 
were reviewed from the date of infection onset as given by 
the nursing staff. During these visits the surveyor noted 
whether patients previously identified had been 
discharged. 
The time for collecting infection data was also assessed 
for one week using the methodology shown in Appendix D. 
Results 
Patients and Infections Missed by the Refe-rence Method 
All the patients detected by laboratory based ward liaison 
surveillance were identified by the reference method but 
six infections identified by the former method were missed 
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by the latter. These were two community acquired 
infections (pneumonia and other genital tract infection) 
and four hospital acquired infections (minor surgical 
wound infection x 2, urinary tract infection and 
pneumonia). Three infections (community acquired 
pneumonia, and hospital acquired minor surgical wound 
infection x 2) met the criteria of the definitions and 
were added to the reference method to form reference 
method "plus". 
Patients and Infections Identified by Laboratoxy Based 
Wa. rd Liaison Surveillance 
Laboratory based ward liaison surveillance identified 133 
(24%) of the 558 patients in reference method "plus". 
Thirty-two (63%) of the 51 CAI and 32 (71%) of the 45 HAI 
were detected by laboratory based ward liaison 
surveillance. The proportion of the different types of CAI 
and HAI are shown in Tables 7.1. and 7.2. 
105 
Table 7.1. Community Acquired Infection (CAI) Identified 
by Laboratory Based Ward Liaison Surveillance 
(LBWLS) 
CAI Numbei of CAI 
LBWLS Reference Method 
M 11plusel M 
Other abdominal 
Pneumonia 
Urinary tract 
Other genital 
Skin 
Asymptomatic bacteriuria 
Septicaemia 
Rectal abscess 
Upper respiratory tract 
and ear 
GastrT-intestinal 
other 
Total 
7 
1 1 
1 1 
0 2 
32 (63) 51 (100) 
#Excludes CAI not found to meet criteria of definitions * Sites with only one CAI in Reference Method "Plus" 
Table 7.2. Hospital Acquired Infection (HAI) identified by 
Laboratory Based Ward Liaison Surveillance 
(LBWLS) 
HAI 
Urinary tract 
Surgical Wound 
Pneumonia 
Asymptomatic 
bacteriuria 
Septicaemia 
other abdominal 
Oral ýhrush 
Other 
Total 
Numbei of HAI 
LBWLS Reference Method 
M "Plusil M 
13 
15 
5 
5 6 
32 (71) 45 (100) 
#Excludes HAI not found to meet criteria of definitions * Sites with only one HAI in Reference Method "Plus" 
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Laboratory based ward liaison surveillance identified 
55 of the 79 infected (HAI and CAI) patients, thus, the 
sensitivity was 70%. The specificity was 99% (Table 7.3. ). 
Sixty-six (14%) of the 479 uninfected patients were 
identified. 
Table 7.3. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Laboratory Based Ward 
Liaison Surveillance for Identifying 
Infected (CAI and HAI) Patients 
Laboratory Based Ward 
Liaison Surveillance 
Identified - Infected 
- Not Infected 
Not Identified 
Total 
Sensitivity = 55/79 x 100 
Specificity = 476/479 x 100 
Reference Method "Plus" 
Infected Not Infected 
(CAI and HAI) 
55 3 
12 63 
12 413 
79 479 
70% (95% CI = 58-80%) 
99% (95% CI = 98-100%) 
Laboratory based ward liaison surveillance identified 
29 of the 38 patients with HAI, thus the sensitivity was 
76%. The specificity was approximately 100% (Table 7.4. ). 
Ninety-nine (19%) of the 520 patients without HAI were 
identified. 
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Table 7.4. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Laboratory Based Ward Liaison 
Surveillance for Identifying Patients with 
HAI 
Laboratory Based Ward 
Liaison Surveillance 
Reference Method "Plus" 
Infected Not Infected 
(HAI) 
Identified - Infected (HAI) 
- Not Infected 
Not Identified 
29 2 
5 97 
4 421 
Total 38 520 
Sensitivity = 29/38 x 100 = 76% (95% CI = 60-89%) 
Specificity = 518/520 x 100 = 100% (95% CI = 99-100%) 
Infections Hissed by Laboratoxy Based Ward Liaison 
Su. rveillance 
Laboratory based ward liaison surveillance missed 32 (33%) 
of the 96 infections. Nineteen were CAI, 13 HAI. Fifteen 
infections associated with 12 patients were not identified 
during laboratory based ward liaison surveillance. The 
remaining patients with 17 infections were detected, 
however, the infections were missed. This was due to 
information being unavailable for review during data 
collection (7). patients having been discharged before 
follow-up occurred (7), specimens not associated with 
infection being followed up, and liaison providing no 
information to suggest the patient may have an infection 
(3). 
Time to Perfo-rm Data Collection and Analyses 
The collection of infection data required 7 hours 45 
minutes/122 beds/ week. Full details of the time required 
for the different work elements are shown in Table 7.5. 
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The collection of denominator data required 2 hours 15 
minutes/4 weeks and analyses, 55 minutes/ 4 weeks. The 
total time was 8 hours 33 minutes/122 beds/week. 
Table 7.5. Time to Collect Infection Data for 
Based Ward Liaison Surveillance 
Work Element 
Segregate microbiology reports 
Time to note whether positive 
microbiology reports are different 
Time to complete surveillance forms 
Time to discuss patients with nurse in charge 
Time to locate nurse and history folder 
Review of nursing history sheets 
Review of nursing care plans 
Review of medical notes 
Review of temperature charts 
Review of treatment charts 
Travel time to locate information 
Travel time between wards and laboratory 
Document infections on ward tally sheets 
Time to establish location of patients 
no longer on the ward 
Total 
Laboratory 
T-ime (per week) 
Hrs: Mins 
0: 04 
0: 06 
1: 01 
1 17 
036 
0 35 
0 23 
0: 58 
0 12 
0 13 
040 
121 
007 
12 
4 
Discussion 
Laboratory based ward liaison surveillance relies on two 
stimuli to select patients for further follow-up. These 
consist of the production of a positive microbiology 
report, and ward nursing staff reporting that a patient 
has an infection. The method is therefore dependent upon 
specimens being collected, efficient laboratory 
processing, nursing staff being aware of whether patients 
have infection and reporting them to the surveyor. 
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Laboratory based ward liaison surveillance was more 
effective in identifying HAI than CAI although the 
proportions were similar (CAI = 63%, HAI = 71%). Also the 
sensitivity for identifying patients with HAI (76%) was 
higher than that for identifying all infected patients 
(70%). These results are not surprising as both laboratory 
based ward surveillance and ward liaison surveillance 
identified a higher proportion of HAI than CAI. 
Laboratory based ward liaison surveillance varied in its 
effectiveness in detecting particular types of infection. 
Seventy-three per cent of hospital acquired surgical wound 
infection and 54% of hospital acquired urinary tract 
infection were identified. The latter is less than the 
proportions identified by ward liaison surveillance (63%) 
and laboratory based ward surveillance (64%). Closer 
examination of the data collection forms indicated that 
the infections were missed due to various information 
sources being unavailable at the time of review. This 
reflects the realities of undertaking data collection in a 
routine setting and supports the use of a computerised 
record as discussed in Chapter 4. 
Three infections were falsely identified by laboratory 
based ward liaison surveillance. Information on the data 
collection forms suggested that these infections did not 
meet the criteria of the definitions. The review of case 
records indicated that insufficient information was 
available to meet the criteria of the definitions, 
however, the infection could have been diagnosed following 
verbal liaison with ward nursing or medical staff. This 
was impossible to check retrospectively. These 
observations are similar to those mentioned in Chapter 5 
and suggest that a form of checking may be required when 
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data collection is undertaken in the service setting. 
The time to collect infection data was approximately a 
third of that required for the reference method. 
Strategies for improving the effectiveness and efficiency 
of laboratory based ward surveillance (discussed in 
Chapter 5) and ward liaison surveillance (discussed in 
Chapter 6) are also relevant to laboratory based ward 
liaison surveillance. These measures include encouraging 
nursing and medical staff to take specimens from patients 
who develop symptoms and signs of infection, encouraging 
and facilitating the documentation of symptoms and signs 
of infection, omitting positive microbiology reports not 
associated with infection and educating nursing staff with 
respect to the signs and symptoms of infection. The 
rationalisation of the frequency of ward visits could 
reduce the time required for data collection. The 
frequency was reduced and this revision was assessed in 
the second stage of the study. 
In summary, laboratory based ward liaison surveillance 
identified 71% of HAI and 63% of CAI and the time to 
collect infection data was approximately a third of that 
required by the reference method. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
RISK FACTOR SURVEILLANCE 
Introduction 
Risk factor surveillance involves identifying patients 
with "clues" or risk factors for infection. Case records 
of selected patients are then reviewed regularly to 
determine if infection subsequently develops (Wenzel et 
al, 1976; Sharbaugh, 1981). Some risk factors are 
associated with underlying medical conditions (for example 
lymphoma, cancer), others with invasive procedures (for 
example intravenous catheterisation). The rationale for 
choosing certain risk factors is not given by Wenzel and 
colleagues (1976) or Sharbaugh (1981) who have used the 
method for the surveillance of hospital acquired infection 
(HAI). 
A literature review has indicated that many risk factors 
are associated with the development of HAI. These include 
age, sex, hospital service, the presence of another 
infection, length of hospitalisation and types of 
underlying illness (Silberg et al, 1974; Westwood, et al, 
1974; Haley et al, 1981; Gross et al, 1983; Bibby et al, 
1986; Valentine et al, 1986). The importance of such risk 
factors in the development of HAI has not been fully 
determined. Therefore, in the present study all the 
"clues" / risk factors described by Wenzel and colleagues 
(1976) and Sharbaugh (1981) were included in risk factor 
surveillance. In addition to comparing the method with the 
reference method, multiple logistic regression analyses 
were undertaken to determine the combination of "clues" / 
risk factors which were the best predictors for 
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identifying all infected (CAI and HAI) patients and those 
with HAI. 
Methods 
During risk factor surveillance, the surveyor visited each 
ward twice weekly. On arrival, the nursing history sheets, 
care plans and treatment charts of all patients were 
reviewed to select patients with "clues" risk factors 
(shown in Appendix E) for infection. Where clues were 
present the records were reviewed and nursing staff 
consulted to determine whether any selected patients had 
infections. The information was reviewed from the date 
when surveillance was last undertaken. Data collection 
forms were completed and the patients surveyed until 
discharge. The time to collect infection data was assessed 
for one week using the methodology shown in Appendix D. 
Results 
Patients and Infections Missed by the Reference Method 
All patients and infections detected by risk factor 
surveillance were also identified by the reference method. 
Patients and infections Identified by Risk Factor 
Surveillance 
Risk factor surveillance identified 361 (61%) of the 587 
patients in reference method "plus". Thirty-eight (60%) of 
the 63 CAI and 22 (49%) of the 45 HAI were detected by 
risk factor surveillance. The proportion of the different 
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types of CAI and HAI are shown in Tables 8.1. and 8.2. 
Table 8.1. Community Acquired Infection (CAI) Identified 
by Risk Factor Surveillance (RFS) 
CAI Number of 
RFS 
M 
CAI 
Reference Method 
11plusIt M 
Other abdominal 8 11 
Pneumonia 7 8 
Urinary tract 8 13 
Other genital 3 3 
Skin 7 11 
Asymptomatic bacteriuria 1 4 
Rectal abscess 1 2 
Gastro-intestinal 1 1 
Minor accidental wound 1 1 
Central nervous system 0 3 
Bone and joint 1 1 
Oral ýhrush 0 2 
Other 0 3 
Total 38 (60) 63 (100) 
* Sites with only one CAI in Reference Method "Plus" 
Table 8.2. Hospital Acquired Infection (HAI) identified by 
Risk Factor Surveillance (RFS) 
HAI Number 
RFS, 
of HAI 
Reference Method 
11plusle M 
Urinary tract 6 16 
Surgical Wound 7 10 
Pneumonia 1 4 
Asymptomatic bacteruria 1 4 
Septicaemia 0 2 
Skin 1 1 
Other genital tract 4 4 
Otitis externa 1 1 
Pressýre sore 1 1 
Other 0 2 
Total 22 (49) 45 (100) 
Sites with only one HAI in Reference Method "Plus,, 
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Risk factor surveillance identified 53 of the 91 infected 
(HAI and CAI) patients, thus, the sensitivity was 58%. The 
specificity was 100%. Two hundred and eighty-three (57%) 
of the 496 uninfected patients were identified by risk 
factors surveillance (Table 8.3. ). 
Table 8.3. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Risk Factor Surveillance for 
Identifying Infected (CAI and HAI) Patients 
Risk Factor Surveillance Reference Method "Plus" 
Infected Not Infected 
(CAI and HAI) 
Identified - Infected 53 0 
- Not Infected 25 283 
Not Identified 13 213 
Total 91 496 
Sensitivity 53/91 x loo = 58% (95% CI = 47-69%) 
Specificity 496/496 x 100 = 100% (95% CI = 99-100%) 
Risk factor surveillance identified 19 of the 38 patients 
with HAI, thus the sensitivity was 50%. The specificity 
was 100% (Table 8.4. ). Three hundred and twenty-seven 
(60%) of the 549 patients without HAI were detected. 
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Table 8.4. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Risk Factor Surveillance for 
Identifying Patients with HAI 
Risk Factor Surveillance Reference Method "Plus" 
Infected Not Infected 
(HAI) 
Identified - Infected (HAI) 19 0 
- Not Infected 15 327 
Not Identified 4 222 
Total 38 549 
Sensitivity = 19/38 x 100 = 50% (95% CI = 33-67%) 
Specificity = 549/549 x 100 = 100% (95% CI = 99-100%) 
infections Missed by Risk Factor Surveillance 
Risk factor surveillance missed 48 (44%) of the 108 
infections. Twenty-five were CAI and 23 HAI. Seventeen 
infections were associated with 13 patients not identified 
by this method. Patients with the remaining infections 
were detected, but the infections themselves were missed. 
This was due to data collection occurring prior to the 
onset of infection and after the patient had been 
discharged (19), appropriate information being unavailable 
at the time of review (10). and verbal liaison indicating 
insufficient information to indicate the presence of an 
infection (2). 
Pime to Perform Data Collection and Analyses 
The collection of infection data required 7 hours 54 
minutes/122 beds/week. Full details of the time required 
for the different work elements are shown in Table 8.5. 
The collection of denominator data required 2 hours 15 
minutes/4 weeks and analyses, 51 minutes/ 4 weeks. The 
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total time was 8 hours 41 minutes/122 beds/week. 
Table 8.5. Time to Collect Infection Data for Risk Factor 
Surveillance 
Work Element Time (per week) 
Hrs: Mins 
Review of nursing history sheets for "clues" 1: 02 
Review of nursing care plans for "clues" 0: 33 
Review of treatment charts for "clues" 0: 22 
Travel time between wards and laboratory 0: 58 
Review medical notes 1: 01 
Review of nursing care plans (for infection) 1: 17 
Review of temperature charts 0: 24 
Review treatment charts (for infection) 0: 13 
Liaise with nurse in charge 0: 16 
Travel time to locate information 0: 28 
Travel time between wards and laboratory 0: 58 
Document infections on ward tally sheets 0: 04 
Time to establish location of patients 
no longer on the ward 0: 18 
Total 7: 54 
Significant "Clues"Misk Facto-rs fo-r Rredicting Infected 
(CAI and HAI) Patients and Patients with HAI 
During risk factor surveillance, patients were identified 
if they had one or more "clues"/risk factors. Two hundred 
and twenty-six (63%) of the 361 patients had an 
intravenous /intra-arterial catheter and this "clue" was 
most frequently identified (Table 8.6. ). This was followed 
by =/> 2 days or more post surgical procedure requiring 
general anaesthetic and the prescription of antibiotics. 
Thirty-two per cent of patients hospitalised for >/= 3 
weeks developed HAI. 
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Table 8.6. Number and Proportion of Patients with clues 
who developed infections in Risk Factor 
Surveillance 
Clue Number 
Clue 
(%) 
HAI 
of Patients With 
HAI or CAI 
IV/IA catheterisation 226 18 (8) 44 (19) 
=/>2 days post surgical 
procedure requiring G. A. 164 13 (8) 26 (16) 
Antibiotics 137 11 (8) 43 (31) 
Bladder catheterisation 110 12 (11) 25 (23) 
ITU/CCU 46 2 (4) 5 (11) 
Cancer 38 1 (3) 3 (8) 
Diabetes 27 3 (11) 8 (30) 
Hospitalisation >/= 3 weeks 22 7 (32) 7 (32) 
Steroids 18 0 0 
Nasogastric tube 16 2 (13) 5 (31) 
Widespread dermatoses 4 0 0 
Respiratory assistance 3 0 0 
Radiation therapy 2 1 1 
Alcoholism 2 0 0 
Hyperalimentation 1 0 0 
Lymphoma 1 0 0 
Leukaemia 1 0 0 
Others 0 0 0 
Multiple logistic regression analyses was used to 
determine the important " clues"/risk factors for 
predicting patients with infections. In these analyses, 
infected patients in the reference method were the 
dependent variables. The "clues"/risk factors which were 
present in less than five patients were excluded from the 
analyses. All remaining "clues"/risk factors were entered 
into a model and non-significant factors were deleted 
step-wise during the analyses. These analyses were 
undertaken for identifying all infected (CAI and HAI) 
patients and those with HAI. 
The "clues" /risk factors found to be significant for 
predicting infected (CAI and HAI) patients were: 1) 
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prescription of antibiotics and 2) intravenous/intra- 
arterial catheterisation (Table 8.7. ). 
Table 8.7. Logistic Regression Analyses of Risk Factors / 
"Clues" for Predicting Infected (CAI and HAI) 
Patients 
Factors included in Change Deviance Significance 
the model (X Level* 
Antibiotics prescribed 
Intravenous/intra- 
arterial catheterisation 
Other factors 
21.24 P<0.001 
4.89 p=O. 03 
not significant (P>0.1) 
* p-values are based on the asymptotic results and are 
therefore approximate. 
Using this combination of variables, 47 of the 91 infected 
(CAI and HAI) patients were identified, thus the 
sensitivity was 52%. The specificity was 100% (Table 
8.8. ). Two hundred and ten (42%) of the 496 uninfected 
patients were identified. 
Table 8.8. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Risk Factor Surveillance 
Using Significant "Clues" for Identifying 
Infected (CAI and HAI) Patients 
Risk Factor Surveillance Reference Method "Plus" 
Infected Not Infected 
(CAI and HAI) 
Identified - Infected 
- Not Infected 
Not Identified 
Total 
Sensitivity = 47/91 x 
Specificity = 496/496 x 
100 
100 
47 
17 
27 
91 
52% (95% CI 
100% (95% CI 
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0 
210 
286 
496 
41-62%) 
99-100%) 
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The factors found to be significant for predicting 
patients with HAI were 1) diabetes, 2) hospitalisation for 
>/= 3 weeks and 3) intravenous/intra-arterial 
catheterisation (Table 8.9. ). 
Table 8.9. Logistic Regression Analyses of Risk Factors 
"Clues" for Predicting Patients with HAI 
Factors included in Change Deviance Significjnce 
the model (X Level 
Diabetes 
Hospitalisation >, 3 weeks 
Intravenous/intra- 
arterial catheterisation 
Other factors 
4.11 P=O. 04 
9.34 P<O. 001 
3.8 p=O. 05 
not significant (P>0.1) 
* p-values are based on the asymptotic results and are 
therefore approximate. 
Using this combination of variables, 16 of the 38 patients 
with HAI were identified, thus the sensitivity was 42%. 
The specificity was 100% (Table 8.10). Two hundred and 
twenty-two (40%) of the 549 uninfected patients were 
detected. 
Table 8.10. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Risk Factor Surveillance 
Using Significant "Clues" for Identifying 
Patients with RAI 
Risk Factor Surveillance Reference Method "Plus" 
Infected Not Infected 
(HAI) 
Identified - Infected (HAI) 16 0 
- Not Infected 10 222 
Not Identified 12 327 
Total 38 549 
Sensitivity = 16/38 x 
Specificity = 549/549 x 
100 = 42% (95% CI = 26-59%) 
100 = 100% (95% CI = 99-100%) 
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Discussion 
Risk factor surveillance required the identification of 
risk factors Pclues" to select patients for further 
follow-up. The method is dependent upon the nursing staff 
recognising the risk factors Pclues" and documenting them 
in the nursing notes. The accuracy with which this 
assessment occurs and the "clues" are documented has not 
been determined. 
During the present study, risk factor surveillance was 
more effective in detecting CAI than HAI. This is 
surprising as the method was originally developed for the 
surveillance of HAI. The proportion of HAI (49%) detected 
is lower than the 82% reported by Wenzel and co-authors 
(1976) who compared this method with a prospective chart 
review. However, Wenzel's assessment only lasted one week 
and discussion concerning the population was lacking. The 
structure of the population in Wenzel's study may have 
been different with a larger number of patients with 
"clues"/ risk factors than observed in the present study. 
Also the accuracy with which "clues"/risk factors were 
recorded by the nursing staff could contribute to the 
difference observed between the two studies. 
As risk factor surveillance identified a higher proportion 
of CAI than HAI, it becomes questionable whether the 
"clues" described and used by Wenzel and colleagues (1976) 
and Sharbaugh (1981) really are the risk factors for 
detecting patients with HAI. The literature review 
indicated that although some risk factors have been 
studied for particular types of infection, factors for all 
infections have not been scientifically researched. This 
is therefore an area for further study. Of the HAI 
121 
ý'4'k 
detected, risk factor surveillance was particularly 
effective in identifying surgical wound infections; 70% 
were detected, however only 38% of urinary tract 
infections were identified. 
The time for performing risk factor surveillance has been 
reported in only one study and the collection of infection 
data required 2.9-4.5 hours/100 beds/week (Wenzel et al, 
1976). The time in the present study (6.5 hours/100 
beds/week) is longer and this may be due to differences in 
the geography of hospital, population structure, record 
systems and surveyors. The time observed in the present 
study is approximately two fifths of that required for the 
reference method. 
The time for collecting infection data could be reduced 
if the number of uninfected patients identified was 
minimised. In the present study, 57% of the uninfected 
patients were identified; considerable time was spent 
reviewing the case records of these patients. The 
"clues"/risk factors found to be the best predictors for 
identifying infected (CAI and HAI) patients only detected 
42% of the uninfected patients, however, the sensitivity 
decreased from 58% to 52%. 
Using the "clues" found to be significant for predicting 
patients with HAI, the proportion of uninfected patients 
identified was 40%. This was 20% less than when all 
"clues"/risk factors were included, however, the 
sensitivity reduced from 50% to 42%. Although certain 
"clues"/risk factors were found to be significant for 
predicting patients with infection in the present study, 
it should be emphasised that these findings apply for the 
population studied. Further work will need to be 
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undertaken to test the hypothesis that these , clues,, are 
predictors for identifying infected (CAI and HAI) patients 
and patients with HAI. 
Risk factor surveillance missed 19 infections due to data 
collection occurring prior to the onset of infection and 
after the patient had been discharged from hospital. This 
could have been prevented if follow-up had occurred more 
frequently, however, increasing the frequency would also 
increase the time required for data collection. 
In summary, risk factor surveillance identified 58% of the 
infected (CAI and HAI) patients. The method was more 
effective in detecting CAI than HAI and required 
approximately two fifths of the time of the reference 
method. The method could be improved by eliminating non- 
significant "clues"/risk factors. This could reduce the 
number of uninfected patients identified and thereby 
reduce the time for data collection. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
TEMPERATURE AND TREATMENT CHART SURVEILLANCE 
Introduction 
Temperature chart surveillance involves the review of 
temperature charts of all patients to identify those with 
a pyrexia. Pyrexia has been defined as temperature >/= 
37.80C (Wenzel et al, 1976), however, this level is not 
substantiated by empirical research. Treatment chart 
surveillance involves the review of charts of all patients 
to identify patients prescribed antibiotics for treatment. 
Records of selected patients are examined for evidence to 
suggest the presence of an infection. The above methods 
have been performed alone, together, and with other 
methods (Wenzel et al, 1976; Chelgren and Laforce, 1978; 
Magnussen and Robb, 1980; Scheckler and Peterson, 1986). 
Their effectiveness has been considered in only one study 
which compared the methods with risk factor surveillance 
(Wenzel et al, 1976). 
'Methods 
Temperature chart surveillance, treatment chart 
surveillance and a combination of both methods were 
assessed in two stages because practical time constraints 
meant that physical data collection could not be 
undertaken for eight weeks. During the first stage, a 
subset of patients (with pyrexia and/or prescribed 
antibiotics) in the reference method was identified and 
compared with the total patient population for an eight 
week period. The second stage was undertaken to determine 
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the reliability of using the data from the reference 
method to assess the methods. Each selective surveillance 
method was performed for two weeks and patients identified 
were compared with patients with pyrexia and/or prescribed 
antibiotics in the reference method for the same period. 
Details of performing the methods are described below. 
Tempe. ratu. re Chart Surveillance 
During temperature chart surveillance, the surveyor 
visited the survey wards twice weekly and examined the 
temperature charts of all patients. Case records (nursing 
and medical records, drug prescription charts) were 
reviewed of patients with a temperature of >/=37.80C since 
admission or the previous ward visit. The surveyor also 
consulted with ward nursing staff if there were any 
queries. Patients were followed up until the highest 
temperature recording was <37.80C and if patients were 
discharged the date was noted. 
Treatment Chart Surveillance 
During treatment chart surveillance, the surveyor visited 
the survey wards twice weekly and examined treatment 
charts of all patients. Case records were reviewed of 
patients prescribed antibiotics. Patients were followed up 
until they were no longer receiving antibiotics, or the 
patient was discharged when the date was noted. 
Tempe. ratu-re and Treatment Chart Surveillance 
Temperature and treatment surveillance consisted of a 
combination of the above two methods. 
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The time for collecting infection data was 
using the methodology shown in appendix D. 
Results 
determined 
Tempe-ratu. re Chart Surveillance 
Proportion of Patients and Infections Identified 
Temperature chart surveillance identified 111 (27%) of the 
407 patients in reference method "plus". Thirteen (39%) of 
the 33 community acquired infections (CAI) and 9 (45%) of 
the 20 hospital acquired infections (HAI) were detected by 
temperature chart surveillance. The proportion of the 
different types of CAI and HAI are shown in Tables 9.1. 
and 9.2. 
Table 9.1. Community Acquired Infection (CAI) Identified 
by Temperature Chart Surveillance (TeCS) 
CAI Number of CAI 
TeCS Reference Method 
M "Plusto M 
Urinary tract 17 
Other abdominal 25 
Skin 11 
Pneumonia 49 
Other genital tract 12 
Septicaemia 33 
Rectal abscess 04 
Upper respiratory tract 
and ear 11 
Bacteraemia 01 
Total 13 (39) 33 (100) 
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Table 9.2. Hospital Acquired Infection (HAI) identified by 
Temperature Chart Surveillance (TeCS) 
HAI Number of HAI 
TeCS Reference Method 
M "Plus" M 
Urinary tract 2 4 
Surgical wound 0 3 
Asymptomatic bacteriuria 1 2 
Pneumonia 1 3 
Oral thrush 1 1 
Septicaemia 3 3 
Skin 1 2 
Other abdominal 0 1 
Systemic Infection 0 1 
Total 9 (45) 20 (100) 
(25%) of the 361 uninfected patients were identified. 
Temperature chart surveillance identified 19 of the 46 
infected (HAI and CAI) patients, thus the sensitivity was 
41%. The specificity was 100% (Table 9.3. ). Ninety-two 
Table 9.3. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Temperature Chart Surveillance 
for Identifying Infected (CAI and HAI) Patients 
Temperature Chart Surveillance 
Surveillance 
Reference Method "Plus" 
Infected Not Infected 
(CAI and RAI) 
Identified - Infected 19 0 
- Not Infected 0 92 
Not Identified 27 269 
Total 46 361 
Sensitivity = 19/46 x 100 = 41% (95% CI = 27-57%) 
Specificity = 361/361 x 100 = 100% (95% CI = 99-100%) 
Temperature chart surveillance identified 7 of the 17 
patients with HAI, thus the sensitivity was 
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specificity was 100% (Table 9.4. ). One hundred and four 
(27%) of the 390 patients without HAI were identified. 
Table 9.4. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Temperature Chart Surveillance 
for Identifying Patients with HAI 
Temperature Chart Surveillance Reference Method "Plus" 
Infected Not Infected 
(HAI) 
Identified - Infected (HAI) 70 
- Not Infected 0 104 
Not Identified 10 286 
Total 17 390 
Sensitivity 7/17 x 100 = 41% (95% CI = 18-67%) 
Specificity 390/390 x 100 = 100% (95% CI = 99-100%) 
Infections Missed by Temperature Chart Surveillance 
Temperature chart surveillance missed 31 (58%) of 53 
infections. Twenty were CAI and 11 HAI. All were missed 
because patients did not develop a pyrexia. 
Time to Perform Data Collection and Analyses 
The time for the collection of infection data required 4 
hours 21 minutes/122 beds/week. Full details of the time 
required for the different work elements are shown in 
Table 9.5. The collection of denominator data required 2 
hours 15 minutes/4 weeks and analyses, 26 minutes/4 weeks. 
The total time was 5 hours 1 minute/122 beds/ week. 
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Table 9.5. Time to Collect Infection Data for Temperature 
Chart Surveillance 
Work Element Time (per week) 
Hrs: Mins 
Travel between wards and laboratory 0: 40 
Review of charts for temperatures >/=37.80C 0: 33 
Review of medical notes 0: 59 
Review of nursing history sheets 0: 31 
Review of nursing care plans 0: 23 
Review of treatment charts 0: 33 
Liaise with nurse in charge 0: 11 
Travel time to locate information 0: 19 
Document infections on ward tally sheets 0: 02 
Time to establish location of patients 
no longer on the ward 0: 10 
Total 4: 21 
Sensitivity and Proportion of Patients Without HAI 
Identified at Different Temperature Levels 
The sensitivity and proportion of patients without HAI 
identified were determined at different temperature "cut- 
off" levels. Figure 9.1. summarises the results. Both 
proportions decreased as the temperature level increased. 
The graph shows a clear discontinuity between 38. OOC and 
38.10C. 
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Figure 9.1. Sensitivity and Proportion of Patients Without HAI 
Detected by Temperature Chart Surveillance at 
Different Temperature "cut-off " Levels 
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patients without 
HAI detected 
(CAI=6, HAI=4) infections detected in the reference 
method, 8 (CAI=6, HAI=2) were identified by temperature 
chart surveillance. Two infections had been missed due to 
information being unavailable for review during data 
collection. The mean pair agreement and Kappa statistic 
for identifying infected and uninfected patients were 0.96 
and 0.86. The kappa statistic corrects for the agreement 
occurring by chance. Landis and Koch (1977) have 
characterised different range values for Kappa, and 
suggest values >0.80 represent excellent agreement beyond 
those expected by chance. 
Treatment Chart Surveillance 
Proportion of Patients and Infections Identified 
Treatment chart surveillance identified 147 (36%) of the 
407 patients in reference method "plus". Twenty-three 
(70%) of the 33 CAI and 8 (40%) of the 20 HAI were 
detected by treatment chart surveillance. The proportion 
of the different types of CAI and HAI are shown in Tables 
9.6. and 9.7. 
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Table 9.6. Community Acquired Infection (CAI) Identified 
by Treatment Chart Surveillance (TrCS) 
CAI Number of CAI 
TrCS Reference Method 
11plusiv 
Urinary tract 37 
Other abdominal 45 
Skin 11 
Pneumonia 79 
Other genital tract 22 
Septicaemia 33 
Rectal abscess 14 
Upper respiratory tract 
and ear 11 
Bacteraemia 11 
Total 23 (70) 33 (100) 
Table 9.7. Hospital Acquired Infection (HAI) identified by 
Treatment Chart Surveillance (TrCS) 
HAI Number of HAI 
TrCS Reference Method 
Ispluset M (%) 
Urinary tract 1 4 
Surgical wound 0 3 
Asymptomatic bacteriuria 1 2 
Pneumonia 2 3 
Oral thrush 0 1 
Septicaemia 2 3 
Skin 1 2 
Other abdominal 1 1 
Systemic Infection 0 1 
Total 8 (40) 20 (100) 
Treatment chart surveillance identified 28 of the 46 
infected (HAI and CAI) patients, thus, the sensitivity was 
61%. The specificity was 100% (Table 9.8. ). One hundred 
and nineteen (33%) of the 361 uninfected patients were 
identified. 
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Table 9.8. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Treatment Chart Surveillance for 
Identifying Infected (CAI and HAI) Patients 
Treatment Chart Surveillance Reference Method "Plus" 
Infected Not Infected 
(CAI and HAI) 
Identified - Infected 
- Not Infected 
Not Identified 
Total 
Sensitivity = 28/46 x 100 
Specificity = 361/361 x 100 
28 0 
0 119 
18 242 
46 361 
61% (95% CI = 45-75%) 
100% (95% CI = 99-100%) 
Treatment chart surveillance identified 7 of the 17 
patients with HAI, thus the sensitivity was 41%. The 
specificity was 100% (Table 9.9. ). One hundred and forty 
(36%) of the 390 patients without HAI were not detected. 
Table 9.9. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Treatment Chart Surveillance for 
Identifying Patients with HAI 
Treatment Chart Surveillance 
Identified - Infected (HAI) 
- Not Infected 
Not Identified 
Total 
Reference Method "Plus" 
Infected Not Infected 
(HAI) 
70 
0 140 
10 250 
17 390 
Sensitivity = 7/17 x 100 = 41% (95% CI = 18-67%) 
Specificity = 390/390 x 100 = 100% (95% CI = 99-100%) 
Infections missed by Treatment Chart Surveillance 
Treatment chart surveillance missed 22 (42%) of 
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infections. Ten were CAI and 12 HAI. All were missed 
because patients were not prescribed antibiotics. 
Time to Perform Data Collection and Analyses 
The collection of infection data required 5 hours 20 
minutes/122 beds/week. Full details of the time required 
for the different work elements are shown in Table 9.10. 
The collection of denominator data required 2 hours 15 
minutes/ 4 weeks and analyses, 29 minutes/ 4 weeks. The 
total time was 6 hours 1 minute/ 122 beds/week. 
Table 9.10. Time to Collect Infection Data for Treatment 
Chart Surveillance 
Work Element Time (per week) 
Hrs: Mins 
Travel between wards and laboratory 
Review of charts for prescription 
of antibiotics 
Review of medical notes 
Review of nursing history sheets 
Review of nursing care plans 
Liaise with nurse in charge 
Travel time to locate information 
Document infections on ward tally sheets 
Time to establish location of patients 
no longer on the ward 
Total 
42 
0: 57 
1: 27 
0: 45 
0: 37 
007 
0 24 
006 
0: 15 
5: 20 
Comparison of Patients Detected by Treatment Chart 
Surveillance versus Patients Prescribed Antibiotics 
Identified in the Reference Method 
Sixty-four patients were detected by treatment chart 
surveillance, of which 63 were identified in the reference 
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method. One patient was missed by the reference method; 
this was due to the patient being discharged immediately 
after being prescribed antibiotics. The patient was not 
identified as infected. Fifteen infected (CAI and HAI) 
patients were identified by the reference method, of which 
13 were detected by treatment chart surveillance. Of the 
15 (CAI=8, HAI=7) infections detected in the reference 
method, 13 (CAI=6, HAI=7) were identified by treatment 
chart surveillance. Two infections had been missed due to 
information being unavailable for review during data 
collection. The mean pair agreement and Kappa statistic 
for identifying infected and uninfected patients were 0.97 
and 0.91. 
Temperature and Treatment Chart Surveillance 
Proportion of Patients and Infections Identified 
Temperature and treatment chart surveillance identified 
197 (48%) of the 407 patients in reference method "plus". 
Twenty-three (70%) of the 33 CAI and 12 (60%) of the 20 
HAI were detected by temperature and treatment chart 
surveillance. The proportion of the different types of CAI 
and HAI are shown in Tables 9.11. and 9.12. 
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Table 9.11. Community Acquired Infection (CAI) Identified 
by Temperature and Treatment Chart 
Surveillance (TeTrCS) 
CAI Number of CAI 
TeTrCS Reference Method 
M IspluslI M 
Urinary tract 37 
Other abdominal 45 
Skin 11 
Pneumonia 79 
Other genital tract 22 
Septicaemia 33 
Rectal abscess 14 
Upper respiratory tract 
and ear 11 
Bacteraemia 11 
Total 23 (70) 33 (100) 
Table 9.12. Hospital Acquired Infection (HAI) identified 
by Temperature and Treatment Chart 
Surveillance (TeTrCS) 
HAI Number of HAI 
TeTrCS Reference Method 
M llplusll M 
Urinary tract 2 4 
Surgical wound 0 3 
Asymptomatic bacteriuria 2 2 
Pneumonia 2 3 
Oral thrush 1 1 
Septicaemia 3 3 
Skin 1 2 
Other abdominal 1 1 
Systemic Infection 0 1 
Total 12 (60) 20 (100) 
Temperature and treatment chart surveillance identified 
32 of the 46 infected (HAI and CAI) patients, thus the 
sensitivity was 70%. The specificity was 100% (Table 
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9.13. ). One hundred and sixty-five (46%) of the 361 
uninfected patients were identified. 
Table 9.13. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Temperature and Treatment Chart 
Surveillance for Identifying Infected (CAI and 
HAI) Patients 
Temperature and Treatment Reference Method "Plus" 
Chart Surveillance Infected Not Infected 
(CAI and RAI) 
Identified - Infected 32 0 
- Not Infected 0 165 
Not Identified 14 196 
Total 46 361 
Sensitivity = 32/46 x 100 = 70% (95% CI = 54-82%) 
Specificity = 361/361 x 100 = 100% (95% CI = 99-100%) 
Temperature and treatment chart surveillance identified 11 
of the 17 patients with HAI, thus the sensitivity was 65%. 
The specificity was 100% (Table 9.14. ). One hundred and 
eighty-six (48%) of the 390 patients without HAI were 
detected. 
Table 9.14. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Temperature and Treatment Chart 
Surveillance for Identifying Patients with RAI 
Temperature and Treatment 
Chart Surveillance 
Reference Method "Plus" 
Infected Not Infected 
(RAI) 
Identified - Infected (HAI) 11 0 
- Not Infected 0 186 
Not Identified 6 204 
Total 17 390 
Sensitivity 11/17 x 100 65% (95% CI 38-86%) 
Specificity 390/390 x 100 100% (95% CI 99-100%) 
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Infections Missed by Temperature and Treatment Chart 
Surveillance 
Temperature and treatment chart surveillance missed 18 
(34%) of the 53 infections. Ten were CAI and 8 HAI. All 
were missed because patients did not have a pyrexia or 
were not prescribed antibiotics. 
Time to Perform Data Collection and Analyses 
The collection of infection data required 7 hours 56 
minutes/122 beds/week. Full details of the time required 
for the different work elements are shown in Table 9.15. 
The collection of denominator data required 2 hours 15 
minutes/4 weeks and analyses, 33 minutes/ 4 weeks. The 
total time was 8 hours 38 minutes/122 beds/week. 
Table 9.15. Time to Collection Infection Data for 
Temperature and Treatment Chart 
Surveillance 
Work Element Time (per week) 
Hrs: Mins 
Travel between wards and laboratory 
Review of charts for prescription 
of antibiotics 
Review of charts for temperature>/=37.80C 
Review of medical notes 
Review of nursing history sheets 
Review of nursing care plans 
Liaise with nurse in charge 
Travel time to locate information 
Document infections on ward tally sheets 
Time to establish location of patients 
no longer on the ward 
Total 
138 
42 
0: 59 
0: 34 
2: 05 
1 : 15 
1: 03 
0: 25 
0: 24 
0: 03 
0: 26 
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Comparison of Patients Detected by Temperature and 
Treatment Chart Surveillance versus Patients with a 
Pyrexia and or Prescribed Antibiotics Identified in the 
Reference Method 
One hundred and one patients were detected by reference 
method, of which 99 were identified by temperature and 
treatment chart surveillance. Both patients were missed 
due to discharge occurring before data collection. Neither 
were identified as infected by the reference method. Nine 
infected (CAI and HAI) patients were identified by the 
reference method, of which 8 were detected by temperature 
and treatment chart surveillance. Of the 14 (CAI=4, 
HAI=10) infections detected in the reference method, 12 
(CAI=3, HAI=9) were identified by temperature and 
treatment chart surveillance. Two infections had been 
missed due to information being unavailable for review 
during data collection. The mean pair agreement and Kappa 
statistic for identifying infected and uninfected patients 
were 0.99 and 0.94 . 
Discussion 
Temperature and treatment chart surveillance require the 
recording of a pyrexia and the prescription of antibiotics 
to provide the stimulus to select patients for follow-up. 
The former is dependent upon temperature recordings being 
taken and recorded accurately. The latter is dependent 
upon the medical staff prescribing antibiotics for 
treating infections. However, antibiotic prescribing 
practices may vary from one hospital and service to 
another. 
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During the present study, each method and a combination of 
both methods were assessed using data in the reference 
method. To assess the reliability of using this data, the 
selective surveillance methods were performed for two 
weeks, and the patients identified were compared with the 
appropriate subset of patients detected in the reference 
method. The Kappa statistics were high, which suggests 
that using the data from the reference method was 
reliable. 
When the selective surveillance method were compared with 
the total population in reference method "plus",, treatment 
chart surveillance was more effective in detecting CAI 
than HAI. This suggests that CAI are treated more 
frequently with antibiotics than HAI. Medical staff may be 
more aware of CAI than HAI (see chapter 4) and thus a 
higher proportion of CAI compared with HAI are treated. 
Temperature chart surveillance detected a higher 
proportion of HAI than CAI. This suggests that temperature 
recordings of >/= 37.80C are more frequently associated 
with HAI than CAI. This could be due to the nature of the 
infection and antibiotic prescribing. Some CAI are 
localised and may not invoke the physiological changes 
subsequent to pyrexia. The treatment of CAI with 
antibiotics may prevent a pyrexia from developing. 
The methods varied in their effectiveness in detecting 
particular types of HAI, for example, none of the three 
cases of surgical wound infection were detected by any of 
the methods, however, two of the four cases of urinary 
tract infection were identified by temperature chart 
surveillance and temperature and treatment chart 
surveillance. Although it is not possible to generalise 
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from these data as the numbers are small, the differences 
are likely to be due to the frequency with which certain 
infections cause pyrexia and antibiotics are prescribed 
for the treatment of infection. 
Only one study has considered the effectiveness of these 
methods. Wenzel and colleagues (1976) compared them with 
risk factor surveillance for a period of one week. 
However, the study was not a continuous prospective one 
and a reference method was not included. Comparisons with 
the present study are therefore not possible. 
Wenzel and colleagues (1976) also assessed the time for 
collecting infection data (Table 9.16. ). If the times in 
the present study are estimated for 100 beds, the times 
shown in Table 9.16. are obtained. 
Table 9.16. Times for Collecting Infection Data 
Surveillance Method Time (hours/week/100 beds) 
Wenzel et al Present 
1976 Study 
Temperature Chart 
Treatment Chart 
Temperature and 
Treatment Chart 
1.6 3.5 
2.9 4.3 
2.7 6.5 
A longer time was required in the present study and this 
could be due to the geography of the hospital, differences 
in record keeping systems and antibiotic prescribing 
practices. The time observed in the present study for all 
three methods was less than two fifths of the time 
required for the reference method. 
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The time for collecting infection data could be reduced if 
the number of uninfected patients identified was reduced. 
During the assessment of temperature chart surveillance, 
some patients developed a pyrexia during the first day 
post surgery. This pyrexia resolved within 24 hours and 
the patient did not develop infection. The metabolic 
response to injury/surgery often evokes a pyrexia (Frayne, 
1987) and it therefore may be useful to omit patients with 
pyrexia during the first 24 hours following surgery in 
future protocols. 
In the present study, 37.80C was chosen as the "Cut-off" 
point, however, this level is not substantiated by 
research. Analyses at different temperature levels 
indicated that the sensitivity and the proportion of 
patients without HAI identified decreased as the 
temperature "cut-off" point increased. The greatest 
discontinuity was observed between 38.00 and 38.10C. The 
time for collecting infection data would be reduced if the 
level of 38. OOC is used in the future, as less patients 
without HAI would be identified and followed-up. However, 
the sensitivity would decrease and further studies are 
required to assess this. 
During treatment chart surveillance 119/147 (81%) patients 
prescribed antibiotics were not identified as infected. 
This percentage is high, and indicates that antibiotic 
prescribing practices should be reviewed. The 
differentiation between prescribing for the treatment of 
defined infection, and prescribing to prevent a possible 
infection would improve the efficiency of treatment chart 
surveillance. 
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In both temperature chart surveillance and treatment chart 
surveillance, time would be saved for data collection if 
the information on the charts had been computerised. The 
infection control nurse could then receive a list of 
patients with a pyrexia and / or prescribed antibiotics. 
In summary, treatment chart surveillance 
temperature and treatment chart surveillance 
effective in detecting CAI than HAI. In 
temperature chart surveillance identified more 
CAI. All three methods required less than two 
the time of the reference method. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
COMPARISON OF SELECTIVE SURVEILIANCE METHODS 
Introduction 
number of different selective surveillance methods have 
been compared with reference method "plus" in the previous 
chapters. Selective surveillance methods aim to identify a 
subset of patients within a population for follow-up. 
Patients identified are either those at risk or those who 
have developed infection. Patients not detected are 
assumed to be uninfected. This chapter compares the 
different selective surveillance methods with regard to 
the following: 
-proportion of the population identified, 
-proportion of infections identified, 
-sensitivity and specificity 
-proportion of infections missed 
-time for collecting infection and denominator data, and 
performing analyses. 
Proportion of the Population Identified 
The proportion of the population identified is important, 
since it affects the number of infected patients 
identified, and the time required for data collection. A 
large number of uninfected patients identified will 
increase this time. 
The proportion of the total (infected and uninfected) 
population identified by the selective methods ranged from 
8% for laboratory based telephone surveillance to 61% for 
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risk factor surveillance (Table 10-1. ). 
Table 10.1. Proportion of the Population Identified by the 
Selective Surveillance Methods 
Su. rveillance % of Population 
Method Identified 
Laboratory based ward 16 
Laboratory based telephone 8 
Ward liaison 16 
Laboratory based ward liaison 24 
Risk factor 61 
Temperature chart 27 
Treatment chart 36 
Temperature and treatment chart 48 
The proportion of uninfected patients identified ranged 
from 5% for laboratory based telephone surveillance to 57% 
for risk factor surveillance (Table 10.2. ) 
Table 10.2. Proportion of the Uninfected Patients 
Identified by the Selective Surveillance 
Methods 
Surveillance % of Uninfected Patients 
Method Identified 
Laboratory based 
Laboratory based 
Ward liaison 
Laboratory based 
Risk factor 
Temperature chart 
Treatment chart 
ward 
telephone 
8 
5 
10 
14 
57 
25 
33 
46 
ward liaison 
Temperature and treatment chart 
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Proportion of Infections Identified 
The proportions of community acquired infection (CAI) and 
hospital acquired infection (HAI) detected are considered 
separately as some surveillance methods may be more 
effective in detecting particular types of infection. The 
proportion of CAI detected ranged from 15% for laboratory 
based telephone surveillance to 70% for both treatment 
chart surveillance and for temperature and treatment chart 
surveillance (Table 10.3. ) 
Table 10.3. CAI identified by Selective Methods of Surveillance 
CAI LBWS 
No. 
LBTS 
No. 
WLS 
No. 
Number 
LBWLS 
No. 
of CAI 
RFS 
No. 
TeCS 
No. 
TrCS 
No. 
TeTrCS 
No. 
Urinary tract 2/13 2/13 4/11 2/8 8/13 1/7 3/7 3/7 
Oth. abdominal 0/18 1/17 2/6 7/9 8/11 2/5 4/5 4/5 
Skin 4/9 2/6 1/5 3/5 7/11 1/1 1/1 1/1 
Pneumonia 2/17 0/12 517 8/11 7/8 4/9 7/9 7/9 
Asymp. bacter. 0/1 0/1 0/2 3/3 1/4 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Other gen. tract 4/9 2/9 3/3 4/6 3/3 1/2 2/2 2/2 
Septicaemia 3/3 3/3 0/1 1/2 0/0 3/3 3/3 3/3 
Cent. nerv. system 0/0 0/0 1/2 0/0 0/3 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Rectal abcess 2/4 0/4 0/1 2/3 1/2 0/4 1/4 1/4 
Other* 1/8 1/7 2/6 2/4 3/8 1/2 212 2/2 
Total 18/82 11/72 18/44 32/51 38/63 13/33 23/33 23133 
(Z) (22) (15) (41) (63) (60) (39) (70) (70) 
The sites in this category had </=2 infection(s) in reference 
method during all the assessment periods. 
LBWS Laboratory based ward surveillance 
LBTS Laboratory based telephone surveillance 
WLS Ward liaison surveillance 
LBWLS Laboratory based ward liaison surveillance 
RFS Risk factor surveillance 
TeCS Temperature chart surveillance 
TrCS Treatment charts surveillance 
TeTrCS Temperature and treatment chart surveillance 
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The proportion of HAI detected ranged from 30% for 
laboratory based telephone surveillance to 71% for 
laboratory based ward liaison surveillance (Table 10.4. ). 
As the infection control team will be particularly 
concerned with HAI, the proportion of the common types of 
HAI are considered. The proportion of urinary tract 
infection identified ranged from 25% for laboratory based 
telephone surveillance and treatment chart surveillance to 
64% for laboratory based ward surveillance. The proportion 
of surgical wound infections identified ranged from 0% for 
temperature chart and treatment chart methods to 73% for 
laboratory based ward liaison surveillance. The proportion 
of hospital acquired pneumonia identified ranged from 0% 
for ward liaison surveillance to 80% for laboratory based 
ward liaison surveillance. 
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Table 10.4. ELAI identified by Selective Methods of Surveillance 
Number of HAI 
IIAI LBWS LBTS WLS LBWLS RFS TeCS TrCS TeTrCS 
No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. 
Urinary tract 9/14 2/8 0116 7/13 6/16 2/4 1/4 2/4 
Surgical wound 8/20 3/16 6/10 11/15 7/10 0/3 0/3 0/3 
Asymp. bact. 7/9 2/8 0/1 5/6 1/4 1/2 1/2 2/2 
Pneumonia 5/10 4/7 0/2 4/5 1/4 113 2/3 2/3 
Oth. gen. tract 0/1 0/1 2/3 0/0 4/4 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Oral thrush 1/4 0/2 0/0 1/1 0/1 1/1 0/1 1/1 
Septicaemia 2/4 2/4 0/1 3/3 0/2 3/3 2/3 3/3 
Skin 1/4 0/0 2/2 0/0 1/1 1/2 1/2 1/2 
Gastro-intest. 2/2 2/2 2/3 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Other* 1/7 1/5 1/2 1/2 2/3 0/2 1/2 1/2 
Total 36175 16/53 23/40 32/45 22/45 9/20 8/20 12/20 
(Z) (48) (30) (58) (71) (49) (45) (40) (60) 
The sites in this category had </=2 infection(s) in the reference 
method during all the assessment periods. 
LBWS Laboratory based ward surveillance 
LBTS Laboratory based telephone surveillance 
WLS Ward liaison surveillance 
RFS Risk factor surveillance 
LBWLS Laboratory based ward liaison surveillance 
TeCS Temperature chart surveillance 
TrCS Treatment charts surveillance 
TeTrCS Temperature and treatment chart surveillance 
Sensitivity and Specificity 
The sensitivity and specificity of the selective 
surveillance methods were calculated, firstly, for 
identifying infected (CAI and HAI) patients and secondly, 
only for patients with HAI. 
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Infected (CAI and HAI) Patients 
The sensitivity of the selective methods ranged from 23% 
for laboratory based telephone surveillance to 70% for 
laboratory based ward liaison surveillance and temperature 
and treatment chart surveillance. The specificity of the 
selective methods ranged from 99% to 100% (Table 10-5). 
Table 10-5. Sensitivity and Specificity of Selective 
Surveillance Methods for Identifying 
Infected (HAI and CAI) Patients 
Method Sensitivity (%) 
(CI) 
Specificity 
(CI) 
LBWS 36 100 
(28-44) (99-100) 
LBTS 23 100 
(15-31) (99-100) 
WLS 52 100 
(40-63) (99-100) 
LBWLS 70 99 
(58-80) (98-100) 
RFS 58 100 
(47-69) (99-100) 
TeCS 41 100 
(27-57) (99-100) 
TrCS 61 100 
(45-75) (99-100) 
TeTrCS 70 100 
(54-82) (99-100) 
95% Confidence Interval 
Patients with HAI 
The sensitivity of the selective methods ranged from 36% 
for laboratory based telephone surveillance to 76% for 
laboratory based ward liaison surveillance. The 
specificity for the selective methods were approximately 
100% for all methods (Table 10.6). 
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Table 10.6 Sensitivity and Specificity for Selective 
Surveillance Methods for Identifying Patients 
with HAI 
Method Sensitivity Specificity 
(CI) (CI) 
LBWS 51 100 
(38-64) (99-100) 
LBTS 36 100 
(22-52) (99-100) 
WLS 62 100 
(45-78) (99-100) 
LBWLS 76 100 
(60-89) (99-100) 
RFS 50 100 
(33-67) (99-100) 
TeCS 41 100 
(18-67) (99-100) 
TrCS 41 100 
(18-67) (99-100) 
TeTrCS 65 100 
(38-86) (99-100) 
95% Confidence Interval 
Infections missed by the Selective Surveillance Methods 
The proportion of infections missed by the selective 
surveillance methods ranged from 33% for laboratory based 
ward liaison surveillance to 78% for 
telephone surveillance (Table 10.7. ). 
150 
laboratory based 
Table 10.7. Proportion of Infections Missed by the 
Selective surveillance Methods 
Surveillance Percentage of 
Method Infections Missed 
Laboratory based ward 66 
Laboratory based telephone 78 
Ward liaison 51 
Laboratory based ward liaison 33 
Risk factor 44 
Temperature chart 58 
Treatment chart 42 
Temperature and treatment chart 34 
Time to Perform Selective Surveillance Methods 
The time to collect infection data ranged from 1 hours 30 
minutes/122 beds/week for laboratory based telephone 
surveillance to 7 hours 56 minutes/122 beds/week for 
temperature and treatment chart surveillance. (Table 
10.8. ). For all methods, the collection of denominator 
data required 2 hours 15 minutes/4 weeks. The time to 
perform the analyses ranged from 24 minutes/ 4 weeks for 
laboratory based telephone surveillance to 55 minutes/4 
weeks for laboratory based ward liaison surveillance. The 
total time (collection of infection data, denominator data 
and analyses) ranged from 2 hours 10 minutes/122 beds/week 
for laboratory based telephone surveillance to 8 hours 41 
minutes/ 122 beds/ 4 weeks for risk factor surveillance. 
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Table 10-8. Time Required for Performing Selective 
Surveillance Methods 
Method Collection Denol4nator Analyses Tota 
of Ii2fection Data 
Data 
Hrs: Mins Hrs: Mins Hrs: Mins Hrs: Mins 
LBWS 3: 45 2: 15 0: 40 4: 29 
LBTS 1: 30 2: 15 0: 24 2: 10 
WLS 4: 13 2: 15 0: 46 4: 58 
LBWLS 7: 45 2: 15 0: 55 8: 33 
RFS 7: 54 2: 15 0: 51 8: 41 
TeCS 4: 21 2: 15 0: 26 5: 01 
TrCS 5: 20 2: 15 0: 29 6: 01 
TeTrCS 7: 56 2: 15 0: 33 8: 38 
* Time/week ** Time/4 weeks 
Sensitivity and Time for Collecting Infection Data 
Sensitivity plotted against time for data collection 
(Figures 10.1 and 10.2. ) reveals a broadly linear 
relationship between the two variables. 
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Figure 10.1 Sensitivity for Identifying Infected (HAI and CAI) 
Patients and Time for Collecting Infection Data 
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Figure 10.2 Sensitivity for Identifying Patients with HAI and 
Time for Collecting Infection Data 
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Key: 
LBWS Laboratory based ward surveillance 
LBTS Laboratory based telephone surveillance 
WLS Ward liaison surveillance 
LBWLS Laboratory based ward liaison surveillance 
RFS Risk factor surveillance 
TeCS Temperature chart surveillance 
TrCS Treatment chart surveillance 
TeTrCS Temperature and treatment chart surveillance 
RM Reference method 
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Discussion 
Selective surveillance methods use differing stimuli to 
select a subset of patients within a population, who are 
at risk, or who have developed infection. Follow-up occurs 
to determine if the patients have infection which fulfils 
the criteria of definitions and patients not identified 
are assumed to be uninfected. The stimulus to select 
patients varies, for example, laboratory based methods of 
surveillance require the production of a positive 
microbiology report to select patients, and temperature 
chart surveillance requires the patient to have a pyrexia 
(>/=37.80C). The various methods have not been compared 
with a reference method previously, therefore their 
effectiveness in detecting infections and the time 
required for collecting infection data had not been 
determined before the present work. 
The findings demonstrate that the methods varied in their 
effectiveness in detecting CAI, HAI, types of HAI and 
infected patients. Overall, laboratory based ward liaison 
surveillance and temperature and treatment chart 
surveillance were the most effective methods in detecting 
infected (CAI and HAI) patients; for each method the 
sensitivity was 70%. Treatment chart surveillance, 
temperature and treatment chart surveillance and risk 
factor surveillance were more effective in detecting CAI 
than HAI. Treatment chart surveillance and temperature and 
treatment chart surveillance identified the highest 
proportion (70%) of CAI. The findings suggest that the 
stimuli for selecting patients in these methods are more 
likely to identify CAI than HAI. Although it is important 
to have information regarding CAI for planning care and 
preventing cross infection to others, infection control 
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teams are particularly concerned with HAI, since much of 
nursing and medical care aims to prevent its 
development. 
The specificities of the methods were approximately 100% 
and this reflects the fact that the surveyor adhered 
strictly with the definitions for identifying infections. 
Few patients were falsely identified as infected; a review 
of case records of these patients indicated that 
insufficient information was documented to fulfil the 
criteria of the definitions. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 4 not all signs and symptoms are documented in the 
records, and liaison with the ward nursing and medical 
staff could have provided the appropriate information, 
although this was not documented on the data collection 
form. Although the number of patients falsely identified 
as infected was small, it illustrates a potential problem 
of performing data collection. Checks do therefore need to 
be made to ensure the surveyor is adhering to the 
definitions. 
Of the methods assessed, laboratory based ward liaison 
surveillance detected the highest proportion of HAI (71%). 
The sensitivity for identifying patients with HAI was 76%. 
The method was particularly successful because two 
approaches were taken to identify infected patients. In 
addition to following up positive microbiology reports, 
the surveyor also discussed all patients with the ward 
nurses to determine those considered to have infections. 
Therefore, there was the opportunity to identify 
infections which had not been cultured or those which had 
resulted in a negative microbiology report. 
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The different stimuli used to select patients may vary in 
their effectiveness for detecting particular types of HAI. 
The findings support this supposition; for example, 
laboratory based ward liaison surveillance identified the 
highest proportion (73%) of surgical wound infection 
whereas, laboratory based ward surveillance detected the 
highest proportion (64%) of urinary tract infection. 
However, these results should be interpreted with some 
caution as the numbers of infections in the reference 
method were small. Further studies are required to test 
the hypothesis that different surveillance methods are 
more effective in detecting particular types of infection. 
All methods missed some infections due to the 
unavailablility of information during the collection of 
infection data. This could have been prevented if the data 
had been computerised, thus allowing the surveyor rapid 
access to systematically arranged files at all times. 
The time taken to collect infection data is a crucial 
factor when choosing a selective method as it is 
recognised as being the most time consuming element of a 
surveillance programme (Eylenbosch and Noah, 1988; Foege 
et al, 1976). The time for data collection varied from 1 
hour 30 minutes/122 beds/week for laboratory based 
telephone surveillance to 7 hours 56 minutes/122 beds/week 
for temperature and treatment chart surveillance. All 
methods required less than two fifths of the time of the 
reference method. 
The time differences observed between the methods were a 
result of: 1) variation in the selection process for 
identifying patients, 2) proportion of the population 
followed up and 3) frequency of follow-up. The selection 
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process consumed a considerable period of time for some 
methods; for example, risk factor surveillance required 1 
hour 57 minutes/week as both treatment charts and nursing 
notes of all patients were reviewed. This compares with 
the laboratory based methods where the selection process 
consisted of separating relevant positive microbiology 
reports from the remaining, and required considerably less 
time: approximately 4 minutes per week. 
Some methods identified a higher proportion of the 
population than others, for example, risk factor 
surveillance detected 61%, whereas laboratory based ward 
surveillance identified 16%. The frequency of follow-up 
also would have contributed to the differences in time for 
data collection. In risk factor surveillance this occurred 
twice weekly until the patient was discharged. During the 
laboratory based methods follow-up occurred on the one 
occasion after a positive microbiology report had been 
obtained. 
The linear relationship shown in Figures 10.1 and 10.2 
suggests that sensitivity increases as the time increases. 
However, the effectiveness and efficiency of the methods 
could be increased as has been discussed in the previous 
chapters. Ways of improving the methods include 
eliminating clues not found to be significant for 
predicting infected patients in risk factors surveillance, 
and omitting specimens taken for screening purposes in 
laboratory based surveillance. Such changes could 
influence the time for collecting infection data and 
sensitivity, and therefore may affect the relationship 
between these two variables. 
The time for analyses varied little since the same 
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analytic methodology was utilised. The differences 
observed are solely due to the number of infections 
identified by each method. 
In summary, the findings suggest that different selective 
surveillance methods vary in their effectiveness in 
detecting infections and the time required for data 
collection. Laboratory based ward liaison surveillance was 
the most effective method in detecting patients with HAI 
and required a third of the time of the reference method. 
This method was therefore introduced into six district 
general hospitals in the second stage of the project. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
INTRODUCTION OF LABORATORY BASED WARD LIAISON SURVEILLANCE 
INTO SIX HOSPITALS 
Introduction 
The first stage of this project demonstrated that 
laboratory based ward liaison surveillance was the most 
effective of a range of methods and that it required 
approximately a third of the time of the reference method. 
The second stage of the research involved implementing 
laboratory based ward liaison surveillance in six district 
general hospitals and determining the practicalities of 
infection control nurses (ICNs) using the method. 
Chin and Benne (1985) assert that three different 
groups of strategies may be used for introducing and 
implementing a change in practice or behaviour. Empirical- 
rational strategies are based on the assumption that 
individuals are rational, and if presented with facts 
derived from well controlled studies, they will change 
their practice or behaviour. This approach does not 
consider other factors which may influence behaviour, for 
example, limited resources. 
Power-coercive strategies depend on the impetus for change 
coming from sources in authority. Various sanctions may be 
used to ensure these changes occur (Sheehan, 1990). 
Thirdly, the normative-re-educative strategies produce 
change by means of group techniques. The normative aspect 
is a response to social pressures from within the group. 
The re-educative aspect is concerned with the teaching and 
learning aspects of the proposed change. In the present 
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study, empirical-rational and re-educative strategies were 
used to implement laboratory based ward liaison 
surveillance. Five of the six participating ICNs had not 
undertaken any data collection for the production of 
infection rates. Instruction in the method was therefore 
required. The ICNs attended a course, designed and run by 
the author, during which the background to the study was 
discussed. In addition to these strategies, external 
power-coercive strategies could have also influenced the 
enthusiasm of the ICNs to adopt the method for the study 
period. The recommendations of the Government's White 
Paper Working for Patients (Secretaries of State for 
Health, Wales, England, Northern Ireland and Scotland, 
1989) encourages hospitals to undertake medical audit, and 
ICNs are being requested to collect data for the 
production of infection rates. 
Before laboratory based ward liaison surveillance was 
introduced into the six hospitals, the method underwent a 
minor revision to reduce the time for collecting infection 
data. The frequency of ward liaison was reduced from twice 
to once weekly. The effectiveness of this revised method 
therefore needed to be determined. The method was compared 
with the reference method in one hospital, and the results 
were compared with those obtained when the original method 
was assessed (stage 1). Reproducibility is an important 
aspect of any method and to address this laboratory based 
ward liaison surveillance was performed by two ICNs 
concurrently in one hospital. 
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Int. roduction 
Hospi ta 1s 
of Surveillance into Six District General 
ICNs and medical microbiologists working in six hospitals 
(A-F) were contacted and invited to participate in the 
second stage of the research. All agreed to be involved 
and a study day was organised for the microbiologists and 
a three day surveillance course for the ICNs. 
During the course, the concept of surveillance, 
definitions of infection, data collection methods and 
analyses were discussed. Practical sessions on performing 
data collection, analyses and the use of computers were 
included. 
After the course, the ICNs performed revised laboratory 
based ward liaison surveillance using the methods 
described in chapter 7 for approximately 16 weeks. As 
discussed in chapter 3, this time was considered 
sufficient for the ICNs to master the method before 
assessing the time for performing data collection and 
analyses. Four ICNs used computers for analysing the data. 
The ICNs kept a record for four weeks of firstly, the 
number of positive microbiology reports followed up and 
secondly, activities observed during data collection. one 
of the benefits of an ICN performing data collection is 
that there is the opportunity to ask and answer questions, 
and discuss issues related to the prevention and control 
of infection. These were sub-divided into the following 
groups: 
-Questions and issues raised by health care staff. 
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-Questions and issues initiated by the ICN. 
The methods for assessing the time to perform 
collection and analyses were similar to that described 
Appendix D. The ICNs using computers assessed the 
required to enter data. 
data 
in 
time 
Comparison of Revised Laboratoxy Based Ward Liaison 
Surveillance with Reference method 
The reference method and revised laboratory based ward 
liaison surveillance were undertaken in Hospital E using 
methods described in Chapters 4 and 7. Both were performed 
for eight weeks as in the first stage assessment. In the 
revised method, the frequency of liaison with ward nursing 
staff was undertaken once weekly (instead of twice weekly 
in the original method). 
Reproducibility of Revised Laborato-ry Based Ward Liaison 
Surveillance 
Two ICNs performed revised laboratory based ward 
surveillance independently, but concurrently, in 
for 5 weeks. 
Results 
liaison 
Hospital 
Introduction of Surveillance into Six District General 
Hospi ta 1s 
Workload of the ICNs 
The total number of beds covered by the ICNs ranged rom 
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712 to 2372. The number of acute beds ranged from 614 to 
1536. In four of the health authorities a second ICN was 
in post (Table 11.1). Patients occupying between 108 and 
138 beds were studied (Table 11.2). 
Table 11.1. Number of Beds Covered by ICN 
Health Authority Number of beds 
Acute Non-acute Total 
A 1536 836 2372 
B 722 211 933 
c 800 200 1000 
D 1000 780 * 1780 
E 614 917 * 1531 
F 684 28 712 
* Two ICNs in post. 
Table 11.2. Distribution of Beds Surveyed at the Study 
Hospitals 
Hospital 
Surg. 
Number 
Med. 
of beds 
Ortho. Gynae. ITU Total 
A 28 38 29 38 5 138 
B * 66 22 19 0 6 113 
c * 60 30 30 0 5 125 
D 27 25 28 24 4 108 
E 30 32 21 29 5 117 
F 30 30 30 30 5 125 
* includes a urology ward. 
Distribution of infection 
The number of infections identified ranged from 56 to 137. 
The proportion of infections which were CAI ranged from 
32% to 58% and HAI ranged from 42% to 68% (Table 11.3. ). 
The overall HAI rate/ 100 discharges reported by the ICNs 
ranged from 1.5 to 5.7 for the different hospitals (Table 
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11.4. ). 
Table 11.3. Number of H. AI and CAI Identified at Study 
Hospitals 
Hospital Number of 
CAI (%) 
infections 
HAI (%) Total 
A 31 (55) 25 (45) 56 
B 29 (32) 61 (68) 90 
C 34 (47) 39 (53) 73 
D 35 (58) 25 (42) 60 
E 77 (56) 60 (44) 137 
F 27 (42) 38 (58) 65 
Table 11.4. HAI Rates Reported by ICNs at Study Hospitals 
Hospital No. of 
HAI 
No. of 
Discharges 
No. of HAI 
/100 discharges 
A 25 1714 1.5 
B 61 1064 5.7 
C 39 1518 2.6 
D 25 917 2.7 
E 60 1796 3.3 
F 38 1746 2.2 
Positive microbiology reports followed up during data 
collection 
During the four week assessment period, the total number 
of positive microbiology reports followed up ranged from 
42 to 106. The median number per day ranged from 1 to 6 
(Table 11.5. ). 
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Table 11.5. Positive Reports Followed-up in the Study 
Hospitals 
Hospital Total number Mean Median Range 
of positives /day /day /day 
4 weeks 
A 75 4 4 1-17 
B 81 4 4 1-10 
c 50 3 1 0-3 
D 42 2 2 0-5 
E 106 5 6 1-15 
F 87 4 4 1-14 
Time to perform revised laboratozy based ward liaison 
surveillance 
The time to collect infection data ranged from 4 hours 3 
minutes per week for Hospital A to 7 hours 59 minutes for 
Hospital E. (Table 11.6). 
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Table 11.6. 
Laboratory 
Hospitals 
Time to Perform Data Collection for Revised 
Based Ward Liaison Surveillance for Six 
work Element A 
Hrs: Mins 
B 
Hrs: Mins 
Ilospitals 
C 
Hrs: Mins 
(Time/week) 
D 
Hrs: Mins 
E 
Hrs: Mins 
F 
Hrs: Mi-ns 
Segregate mi cro biology 
t 
0: 00 0: 00 0: 00 0: 05 0: 11 0: 21 
repor s 
Note new or different positive 0: 10 0: 55 0: 08 0: 24 0: 35 0: 54 
reports and complete 
surveillance form 
Discuss patients with nurse in 0: 30 0: 23 0: 54 0: 37 0: 52 1: 30 
charge 
I, ocate nursing notes folder 0: 12 0: 11 0: 07 0: 12 0: 44 0: 17 
Review of nursing notes 0: 22 0: 24 0: 33 0: 14 0: 52 0: 42 
Review of medical notes 0: 14 0: 33 0: 43 0: 36 0: 53 0: 31 
Review of temperature charts 0: 06 0: 05 0: 06 0: 02 0: 25 0: 12 
Review of treatment charts 0: 03 0: 16 0: 18 0: 03 0: 29 0: 25 
Travel to locate information 0: 10 0: 09 0: 07 0: 05 0: 15 0: 05 
Travel between wards and 1: 32 1: 04 0: 48 0: 45 1: 01 1: 18 
laboratory 
Document infections on tally 0: 00 0: 06 0: 00 0: 00 0: 00 0: 06 
sheets 
Establish location of patients 0: 08 0: 31 0: 12 0: 14 0: 32 0: 39 
no longer on ward sheets 
Computerise data 0: 36 0: 00 0: 47 0: 35 1: 10 0: 00 
Tbtal 4: 03 4: 37 4: 43 3: 52 7: 59 7: 00 
The time to collect denominator data (for a four week 
period) ranged from 0 minutes for Hospital C to 1 hour 58 
minutes for Hospital E (Table 11-7). The time to perform 
the analyses (for a four week period) ranged from 4 
minutes for Hospital C to 53 minutes for Hospital B. The 
total time (collection of infection and denominator data 
and perform analyses) ranged from 4 hours 24 minutes per 
week for Hospital A to 8 hours 38 minutes for Hospital E. 
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Table 11.7. Summary of Times Required for Performing 
Surveillance in Six Hospitals 
Hospital Collection of DenoT4nator Analyses ** Total 
Infection Data* Data 
Hrs: Mins Hrs: Mins Hrs: Mins Hrs: Mins 
A 4 03 
B 437 
c 443 
D 3: 52 
E 7: 59 
F 7: 00 
*= Time per week 
0: 45 0: 39 4: 24 
1: 15 0: 53 5: 09 
0: 0 0: 04 4: 44 
1: 10 0: 39 4 : 19 
1: 58 0: 39 8: 38 
0: 10 0: 27 7: 09 
** = Time per four weeks 
Activities observed and issues raised by health care 
staff while ICN was performing data collection 
Issues Raised By Health Care Workers 
Various health care workers asked for advice concerning 
the care of patients with infectious conditions, or ways 
of handling equipment. On occasions specific questions 
were raised for example "What is Acinetobacter? " and 
general discussion concerning various policies was 
initiated by health care workers. (Full details are shown 
in Table 11.8. ) 
167 
0% 
Table 11-8. Questions and Issues Initiated by Health Care 
Staff 
Health Care Worker 
Community liaison nurse 
Staff nurse 
Sister 
Doctor 
Staff nurse 
Senior nurse 
Staff nurse 
Auxiliary nurse 
Staff nurse 
Staff nurse 
Sister 
Staff nurse 
(ITU) 
Staff nurse 
Senior Nurse (ITU) 
Staff nurse 
Senior nurse (surgical) 
Sister 
Auxiliary Nurse 
Questions/ Issues 
Care of patient with tracheo- 
ostomy in the community. 
Blood spillage policy. 
How to deal with poor Intra- 
venous additive technique of a 
doctor. 
Policy concerning HIV testing 
and consent. 
Frequency of changing urethral 
catheters 
Decontamination of equipment 
in ITU. 
Isolation of patients suffering 
from tuberculosis and hepatitis 
B. 
Laundry policy, categories of 
linen. 
What is acinetobacter? 
Can a sharps box be placed in 
preparation room? 
Is it necessary to clean the 
bath between all patients? 
Total parenteral nutrition 
policy. 
Use of povidone iodine solution. 
Care of Hepatitis B and HIV 
positive patients in ITU. 
Sharps disposal. 
Infection control policies and 
procedures. 
Bacterial monitoring of wards. 
New trial of disinfectant 
Observations by ICN while performing surveillance data 
collection 
The observations can be divided into two categories: 
potential cross infection problems and general discussion. 
Some examples of potential cross infection problems are: 
1) patients being isolated with inadequate or 
inappropriate precautions and 2) a bag of fluid for total 
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parenteral nutrition observed unrefridgerated on a window 
sill. On some occasions an ICN initiated general 
discussion concerning aspects of infection control, for 
example, the importance of handwashing before and after 
caring for patients. (Further details are in Table 11.9. ). 
Table 11.9 Questions and Issues Initiated by Infection 
Control Nurse 
Potential Cross Infection Problems 
Patient isolated with inadequate precautions 
Single use equipment found soaking in solution. 
Total parenteral nutrition bag found unrefridgerated on 
window sill. 
Liquid soap unavailable at sink. 
Observed non-adherence to apron policy. 
Medical staff observed not adhering to protective clothing 
policy. 
Instigating staphylococcal screening from staff and 
patients. 
General Discussion 
Isolation of patients with infectious conditions. 
Care and dressing of Hickman lines. 
The sending of routine specimens, are they necessary? 
The importance of handwashing before and after caring for 
patients (with doctors). 
Visit to ITU-reinforcing isolation policy. 
State monitoring Statistics. 
Training for support workers in infection control 
practices. 
Cleaning and maintenance of ward kitchens. 
Matters relating to the Control of Substances Hazardous to 
Health 
Comparison 
Su. rveillance 
of Revised Laboratoxy Based Ward Liaison 
wi th Reference Method 
Reference Method 
Of the 590 discharges, 58% were female and 26% 
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were aged 
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greater than 65 years (Table 11-10. ). 
Table 11.10. Distribution of Patients by Age and Sex in 
Reference Method 
Age Sex 
Male Female Total 
No. No. (%) No. 
<18 4 17 21 (4 
18-34 62 126 188 (32 
35-49 53 70 123 (21ý 
50-64 51 51 102 (17ý 
65-74 36 37 73 (12ý 
75-84 27 28 55 (9 
85- 16 12 28 (5 
Total 249 (42) 341 (58) 590 (100) 
Of the 81 infections, 40 (49%) were CAI and 41 (51%) were 
HAI. The HAI rate was 6.9 per 100 discharges and ranged 
from 2.1 for the medical service to 11.6 for the 
surgical service (Table 11.11. ). Forty patients developed 
one or more HAI. This gives a hospital acquired patient 
infection rate of 6.8 per 100 discharges. 
Table 11.11. Hospital Acquired Infection Rates by Service 
Service No. of No. of Rate/100 No. of Rate/100 
HAI discharg. discharg. patient patient 
(% of days days 
total) 
Gen. Surg. 17 147 (25) 11.6 1180 1.4 
Gynaecol. 11 192 (33) 5.7 873 1.3 
Gen. Med. 3 140 (24) 2.1 779 0.4 
Orthopaed. 10 ill (19) 9.0 988 1.0 
Total 41 590 6.9 3820 1.1 
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Of the 40 CAI, pneumonia (10) followed by urinary tract 
infection (6) and skin (5) were most frequently identified 
(Table 11.12. ). Forty-eight per cent of CAI had a positive 
microbiology report, 5% had a negative culture and for the 
remaining 48% no specimens were taken. 
Table 11.12. Conununity Acquired Infections in the 
Reference Method 
CAI Culture 
Positive 
No. 
undertaken 
Negative 
No. 
No 
Culture 
No. 
Total 
Pneumonia 4 2 4 10 
Urinary tract 5 0 1 6 
Skin 0 0 5 5 
Other abdominal 1 0 3 4 
Other genital tract 2 0 1 3 
Rectal abscess 2 0 1 3 
Septicaemia 2 0 0 2 
Pressure sore 2 0 0 2 
Upper respiratory 
tract and ear 0 0 2 2 
Asymp. bacteriuria 1 0 0 1 
Gastro-intestinal 0 0 1 1 
Bone and joint 0 0 1 1 
Total 19 (48) 2 (5) 19 (48) 40 
Of the 41 HAI, surgical wound infection (20), followed by 
urinary tract infection (8) and asymptomatic bacteriuria 
(7) were most frequently identified (Table 11.13. ). 
Sixty-six per cent of HAI had a positive microbiology 
report, 12% had a negative culture and for the remaining 
22% no specimens were taken. 
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Table 11.13. Hospital Acquired Infections in the Reference 
Method 
HAI Culture 
Positive 
No. 
undertaken 
Negative 
No. 
No Culture 
No. 
Total 
Surgical wound 10 4 6 20 
Urinary tract 5 0 3 8 
Asymp. bacter. 7 0 0 7 
Pneumonia 1 1 0 2 
Other gen. tract 2 0 0 2 
Skin 1 0 0 1 
Oral thrush 1 0 0 1 
Total 27 (66) 5 (12) 9 (22) 41 
During the study, 2 patients (0.3% of the total 
population) were missed by the reference method but were 
identified by revised laboratory based ward liaison 
surveillance. Neither were found to be infected. Three 
infections (3.6% of the total) were missed by the 
reference method; two were HAI (oral thrush and skin) and 
1 was a CAI (pneumonia). All met the criteria of the 
definitions. The infections were missed due to appropriate 
information being unavailable for review. These patients 
and infections were added to the reference method to form 
reference method "plus". 
Revised Laboratory Based Ward Liaison Surveillance 
Revised labor 
identified 136 
uninfected) in 
the 41 CAI and 
different sites 
and 11.15. 
atory based ward liaison 
(23%) of the 592 patients 
reference method "plus". Fi 
30 (70%) of the 43 HAI were 
of CAI and HAI are shown in 
surveillance 
(infected and 
fteen (37%) of 
detected. The 
Tables 11.14. 
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Table 11.14. Types of CAI identified by Revised 
Laboratory Based Ward Liaison Surveillance 
(LBWLS) 
Type of CAI Number of CAI 
LBWLS Reference Method 
M "Plus" M 
Pneumonia 6 11 
Urinary tract 1 6 
Skin 2 5 
other abdominal 1 4 
Other genital tract 2 3 
Rectal abscess 0 3 
Septicaemia 1 2 
Pressure sore 0 2 
Upper respiratory tract 
and ear 0 2 
Gastro-intestinal 0 1 
Asymptomatic bacteriuria 1 1 
Bone and joint 1 1 
Total 15 (37) 41 (100) 
Table 11.15. Types of HAI identified by Revised Laboratory 
Based Ward Liaison Surveillance (LBWLS) 
HAI Number of HAI 
LBWLS Reference Method 
M 11plusel M 
Surgical Wound 14 20 
Urinary tract 68 
Asymptomatic bacteriuria 47 
Pneumonia 22 
Oral thrush 12 
Skin 22 
Other genital tract 12 
Total 30 (70) 43 (100) 
Revised laboratory based ward liaison surveillance 
identified 40 of the 77 infected (CAI and HAI) patients, 
thus the sensitivity was 52%. The specificity was 100% 
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(Table 11.16). Seventy-seven (15%) of the 515 
patients were identified. 
uninfected 
Table 11.16. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Revised Laboratory Based Ward 
Liaison Surveillance for Identifying Infected 
(CAI and HAI) Patients 
Revised Laboratory Based 
Ward Liaison Surveillance 
Reference Method "Plus" 
Infected Not Infected 
(CAI and HAI) 
Identified - Infected 
- Not Infected 
Not Identified 
Total 
40 
19 
18 
77 
Sensitivity 40/77 x 100 = 52% 
Specificity 515/515 x 100 = 100% 
Revised laboratory based ward 
0 
77 
438 
515 
(95% CI = 40-64%) 
(95% CI = 99-100%) 
liaison surveillance 
identified 26 of the 40 patients with HAI, thus the 
sensitivity was 65%. The specificity was 100% (Table 
11.17. ). One hundred and four (19%) of the 552 patients 
without HAI were detected. 
Table 11.17. Values for Calculating Sensitivity and 
Specificity of Revised Laboratory Based Ward 
Liaison Surveillance for Identifying Patients 
with HAI 
Revised Laboratory Based 
Ward Liaison Surveillance 
Identified - Infected (HAI) 
- Not Infected 
Not Identified 
Total 
26 0 
6 104 
8 448 
40 552 
Sensitivity 26/40 x 100 65% (95% CI = 48-79%) 
Specificity 552/552 x 100 100% (95% CI = 99-100%) 
Reference Method "Plus" 
Infected No Infection 
(HAI) Detected 
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The revised laboratory based ward liaison surveillance 
missed 39 (46%) of the 84 infections. Twenty-six were CAI 
and 13 HAI. of these, 18 infections were associated with 
18 patients not identified by the method. Patients with 
the remaining infections were identified, however, the 
infections themselves were missed. This was due to follow- 
up occurring after the patient had been discharged (10), 
appropriate information being unavailable for review at 
the time of data collection (7), specimens not associated 
with infection being followed-up and verbal liaison with 
ward nursing and medical staff not indicating the presence 
of an infection (4). 
Comparison of Revised Laboratory Based Ward Liaison 
Surveillance with the Original Method 
The factors listed in Table 11-18 have been used for 
making comparisons between the revised and original 
laboratory based ward liaison surveillance. The proportion 
of CAI (37%) identified by the revised method was 
significantly less (p=0.02) than that (63%) detected by 
the original method. Also the sensitivity of the revised 
method for identifying infected (HAI and CAI) patients was 
significantly less (p=0.04) than that observed for the 
original method. None of the other differences observed 
when comparing revised laboratory based ward liaison 
surveillance with the original method were significant 
(p>0.05). 
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Table 11.18 Factors Considered for Comparing Revised 
Laboratory Based Ward Liaison Surveillance (LBWLS) with 
the Original Method 
Factor LBWLS Significance 
Revised Original Level 
%%p value 
% of population identified 23 24 0.78 
Infected (CAI and HAI) 
Patients 
Sensitivity 52 70 0.04 
Specificity 100 100 0.11 
HA Infected Patients 
Sensitivity 65 76 0.40 
Specificity 100 100 0.24 
Proportion of CAI Detected 37 63 0.02 
Proportion of HAI Detected 70 71 0.92 
Proportion of Uninfected 
Patients Detected 19 15 0.10 
Assessing the Reproducibility of Laboratoxy Based Ward 
Liaison Surveillance 
Each ICN identified 75 patients of which 72 were detected 
by the other ICN. The extra patients detected had been 
identified during ward liaison surveillance. None were 
found to be infected. Of the 72 patients identified by 
both ICNs, 26 were found to be infected (HAI and CAI) by 
one ICN and 21 by the other. Both ICNs agreed that 19 
patients were infected (HAI and CAI) and 44 patients were 
uninfected. The mean pair agreement and Kappa statistic 
were 0.88 and 0.72. 
A total of 26 (CAI=8, HAI=18) infections were identified. 
Of these, one ICN identified 23 (CAI=6, HAI=17) and the 
other 21 (CAI=61 HAI=15). Each ICN missed 2 CAI. In both 
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instances follow-up of a positive microbiology report 
occurred after the patient had been discharged. One ICN 
missed one HAI; this was due to information being 
unavailable for review at the time of data collection. The 
other ICN missed 3 HAI; two of these were not reported 
during liaison with nursing staff. The other HAI was 
missed due to follow up of the positive microbiology 
report occurring after the patient had been discharged. 
Discussion 
The findings demonstrate that laboratory based ward 
liaison surveillance was feasible in six district general 
hospitals. It was possible to teach ICNs the method, they 
had the enthusiasm to undertake data collection for 16 
weeks and produce infection rates. The collection of 
infection data required between 4-8 hours per week which 
was considered to be acceptable by the ICNs. The time for 
performing surveillance will vary for a number of reasons. 
The number of positive microbiology reports followed up 
will influence the time for collecting infection data. 
This ranged from 42/4 weeks for Hospital D to 106/4 weeks 
for Hospital E. Also the geography of the hospital will 
affect the time for data collection. Where microbiology 
departments are distant from wards a computerised link 
would greatly enhance the efficiency of any laboratory 
based surveillance method. 
Organisational arrangements will affect the time required 
of an ICN for collecting denominator data and performing 
analyses. If the denominator data were sent to the ICN 
(which occurred at Hospital C), little time is required by 
the ICN for this activity and therefore should be 
177 
ýk 
recommended. computerisation will decrease the time 
required for analyses, however, the ICN does need to be 
able to undertake other aspects of work while the analyses 
are being produced. 
If the times obtained in the present study are used to 
estimate the time required for collecting and analysing 
data for the acute beds in the six health authorities 
studied, the number of hours per week would range from 30 
to 48 hours per week (Table 11.19) 
Table 11.19 Estimated Time for Laboratory Based Ward 
Liaison Surveillance for Acute Beds in 
Health Authorities 
Health Authority Number of Time (Hours 
Acute Beds per week) 
A 1536 48 
B 722 33 
C 800 30 
* D 1000 40 
E 614 45 
684 39 
* Health authorities where two ICNs are in post. 
Using the above estimates, it is possible to collect 
infection data for patients occupying acute beds in some 
health authorities. However, as more than half of the 
ICN's working time would be spent on this activity, this 
leaves less time for other aspects of the role. Instead of 
performing total surveillance on acute beds, it may be 
more valuable to undertake surveillance to meet specific 
objectives which would change with time. 
One of the benefits of active surveillance is the 
opportunity to observe for potential cross infection 
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hazards and answer questions relating to the control and 
prevention of infection. This was apparent in the present 
study; a number of potential cross infection hazards were 
documented when the ICNs were asked to keep a record of 
such activities during surveillance. Raven and Haley 
(1982) have examined the social influence variables which 
affect the behaviour of staff nurses, particularly in 
their interaction with the ICN. They interviewed 347 ICNs 
in hospitals included in the SENIC (Study on the Efficacy 
of Nosocomial Infection Control) project and gave 
questionnaires to a randomly selected sample of staff 
nurses in the same hospitals. The findings of this study 
indicated that the degree to which the ICN was available 
to the staff nurses was an important factor for achieving 
compliance with infection control policy. 
Raven and Haley (1982) also examined the type of power 
which influenced compliance of nurses to infection control 
recommendations and found information and expert power 
were the most important. These findings were supported by 
Seto and colleagues (1990) who reported that professional- 
resources were the most important influencing tactics in 
relation to infection control policy implementation. An 
"active" surveillance programme allows for information and 
expert power and professional-resource tactics to be 
utilised to influence practice. 
However, the studies by Raven and Haley, (1982) and Seto 
and colleagues (1990) are limited, since self completed 
questionnaires were used. Factors which influence 
individual behaviour may not always be apparent to the 
individual. It would be useful to observe nurses on the 
ward to determine the important factors for influencing 
adherence to policy, and adoption of practices that are 
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likely to reduce hospital infection. This could involve 
investigating the decision making processes nurses use to 
decide the care to give and the practices to adopt. Bauman 
and Deber (1989) describe decision making as the situation 
in which a choice is made among a number of possible 
alternatives, often involving trade-offs among the values 
given to different outcomes. There is a paucity of 
research which investigates this in relation to infection 
control. 
Another important aspect of infection control is 
implementing change, whether it be practice on the ward, 
or surveillance strategies of hospital infection. Gillies 
(1982) asserts that any planned change must proceed 
through three stages: 1) unfreezing the forces that 
preserve the status quo, 2) implementing the change 
process by which the present system is converted to a 
future system, and 3) refreezing the forces that will 
stabilise the new system by integrating it into 
organisational routines. Lewin (1953) theorises that any 
present state is a dynamic equilibrium of simultaneously 
operating driving and restraining forces. Therefore, to 
unfreeze the status quo, the change agent must either 
increase the driving forces or decrease the restraining 
forces in the situation. For example, the introduction of 
a new surveillance programme, could have driving forces 
from management who ask the infection control team to 
produce infection rates. However, to implement the change 
some of the restraining forces, such as a lack of 
personnel to perform data collection and computers to 
analyse data, need to be reduced. With any change, the 
important factors present in the work situation which 
might hinder the change process need to be identified. 
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During the second stage of the research, laboratory based 
ward liaison surveillance was revised; the frequency of 
liaison was reduced in an attempt to reduce the time 
required for data collection. The method was compared with 
the reference method. Before making comparisons with the 
original method, it is important to establish whether the 
types of HAI and CAI detected in the reference method are 
similar to those identified in the first stage. The 
proportions of infections which were community and 
hospital acquired in the reference method were similar to 
those reported in Chapter 4 and the national prevalence 
survey (Meers et al, 1981). Also the same predominant 
types of CAI and HAI were observed. The proportions of CAI 
and HAI with positive microbiology in the reference method 
were also similar to those reported in Chapter 4. 
The proportion of HAI detected by revised laboratory based 
ward liaison surveillance was similar to that observed 
when the original method was assessed. However, the 
proportion of CAI detected was significantly less. As a 
higher proportion of the patients identified by the 
revised method were uninfected, this suggests that the 
modification had made the method less efficient, 
therefore, other ways of improving efficiency, for 
example, omitting positive microbiology reports not 
associated with infection need to be explored. 
When assessing surveillance methods it is essential to 
determine reproducibility. The reproducibility of revised 
laboratory based ward liaison surveillance was high; the 
Kappa statistic was 0.72. Although complete agreement was 
not achieved (value of +1), the Kappa statistic result 
implies that the agreement was considerably better than 
expected by chance. Some patients and infections were 
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missed by each ICN and this was due to ward liaison 
occurring with differing personnel. The findings suggest 
that this component of the method will vary and result in 
differing infections and patients being identified. 
In summary, all six ICNs were able to undertake laboratory 
based ward liaison surveillance, but the time for data 
collection and analyses did vary in the different 
hospitals. The minor revision to the method did not affect 
the proportion of HAI detected, however, the reduction in 
CAI detected was found to be significant. The 
reproducibility of the method was high, although not all 
patients and infections were identified by both surveyors. 
The liaison component will vary with different surveyors. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
CONCLUSIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF FINDINGS TO PRACTICE 
A number of different selective surveillance methods have 
been described by other workers, however, their 
effectiveness in detecting infections had not been 
rigorously assessed. Also the time for data collection, 
the most time consuming element of a surveillance 
programme, had not been determined. Furthermore, there 
were few reports to suggest that such surveillance methods 
are being used in the United Kingdom. The literature 
review in Chapter 2 highlighted the need to assess 
selective surveillance methods and the study was 
established to meet this. 
The results demonstrate that the mechanisms and 
information systems exist to implement a number of 
selective surveillance methods in a district general 
hospital, however, their effectiveness in detecting 
infection and time for collecting infection data varied. 
Laboratory based ward liaison surveillance was the most 
effective method for detecting patients with hospital 
acquired infection (HAI) and required approximately a 
third of the time of the reference method. This method was 
introduced into six district general hospitals, and 
considered to be a practical method, although the time for 
collecting infection data did vary. This was due to 
geographical and organisational factors within the 
hospital, which could be amenable to change. 
The study provides useful information which will assist 
infection control teams to make an objective and rational 
choice of methods to adopt for the surveillance of 
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hospital infections. Surveillance is essential for 
evaluating practice and establishing the most effective 
ways of preventing and controlling infection- As was 
discussed in Chapter 1, the efficacy of much nursing and 
medical care has not been determined. One contributing 
factor is the lack of a feasible method of recording 
infections. Laboratory based ward liaison surveillance is 
one tool that could be used, or alternatively, hospitals 
with limited resources could adopt other methods which 
require less time. 
In health authorities, the infection control nurse 
performs data collection for surveillance and has an 
infection control responsibility for approximately 1300 
beds (Howard, 1988). With these resources, it would be 
impossible to produce hospital-wide rates for all types of 
infection. Infection control teams and managers will need 
to consider whether further resources are required, or 
whether surveillance should be targeted to meet specific 
objectives within available resources. 
Surveillance methods can also be used to collect data for 
studying the epidemiology of HAI. The literature review in 
Chapter 1 has demonstrated that the problem of hospital 
infection has changed with time, for example, the frequent 
post-operative suppuration observed in the nineteenth 
century is no longer seen today. It is likely that the 
nature of hospital infection will continue to alter as 
medicine becomes more complex, and surveillance methods 
can be utilised to establish those patients who are 
particularly at risk, so that prevention can then be 
directed to these patients. 
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Another important area which has been neglected is the 
cost of HAI and preventive measures. Although the 
prevention of HAI should be considered important in good 
nursing and medical practice, inevitably infection control 
programmes will be particularly attractive to managers, if 
there is an overall cost saving to health authorities. The 
costs associated with HAI are difficult to determine but 
estimates suggest it is substantial (Kereslidze and 
Maglacas, 1984; Daschner and Frank, 1987; Department of 
Health and Social Security, 1988; Coello et al, 1991). 
In the United Kingdom, information has been lacking 
regarding the total costs of HAI. A major reason for this 
is the unavailability of information required for the 
costing of individual infections and an efficient method 
for identifying infections. The costs will include the 
health sector costs (hospitals, general practices and 
community services) and those to the patient in terms of 
health status and financial burden. With resource 
management, and advances in information technology in the 
health service, it should be possible to assess the cost 
of care for patients and determine the hospital costs of 
HAI. Resources could then be directed to prevent HAI which 
overall have the greatest cost implications. 
The importance of methodological differences in the 
determination of HAI rates has been highlighted by the 
current work. Rates are often produced using the number of 
admissions or discharges as the sole denominator. Such 
rates do not consider the structure or case-mix of the 
population which is not uniform. Some patients are at 
greater risk of developing infection others. The 
contribution of such factors in developing HAI is yet to 
be established fully and infection rates have not been 
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weighted to reflect this. This is an area for further 
development and study and until this has been undertaken, 
the weaknesses of making comparisons between hospitals and 
studies should be remembered; furthermore, some HAI will 
develop after the patient has been discharged. For rates 
to include these infections a surveillance method to 
detect such infections needs to be established. 
The identification of infections during data collection is 
dependent upon symptoms and signs being recognised and 
documented. In the present study, few infections were 
identified from the nursing notes or from the laboratory 
request forms. Community acquired infections were 
identified from the medical notes more frequently than 
hospital acquired infection. The effectiveness of all 
methods could be improved if the symptoms and signs were 
documented and ways of improving this is an area for 
further study. The findings raise issues for other systems 
which rely on the documentation of information in nursing 
and medical notes. The accuracy of such records must be 
determined if correct management decisions are to be 
taken. 
The methodology used in the present study could be adapted 
to evaluate other information systems and surveillance 
methods used in the health service. With the introduction 
of clinical audit, it is likely that various information 
systems will be developed. Some may be "short-cut" or 
selective methods and aim to reduce the time required for 
data collection by detecting a subset of the population. 
An example is the surveillance of pressure sores by 
regular liaison with ward nursing staff. The effectiveness 
of methods could be assessed by comparison with a 
reference method. 
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The effectiveness and efficiency of all the surveillance 
methods assessed in the present study could be improved if 
various strategies are adopted. In particular, the 
computerisation of records would prevent infections being 
missed due to the surveyor not having access to records. 
The use of an integrated record containing information 
from various health care disciplines would minimise the 
time for collecting infection data. 
The efficiency of the selective surveillance methods could 
be improved if the numbers of uninfected patients selected 
for further follow-up were reduced. In risk factor 
surveillance, this involves omitting risk factors not 
found to be important for predicting patients with 
infection. In laboratory based ward surveillance the 
positive microbiology reports not frequently associated 
with infection could be omitted. Further work is required 
to assess the methods after changes have been made. 
This study has provided the evidence by which the 
effectiveness and efficiency of selective surveillance 
methods may be judged. The value of a feasible and 
reliable method of surveillance extends well beyond the 
production of routine statistics. Such methods can be used 
to evaluate practice, and to determine effective and 
efficient strategies for preventing and controlling 
hospital infection. Valid and reliable tools are essential 
for considering the quality of health care which includes 
practice and procedures, the use of resources and the 
resulting outcomes of care experienced by the patient. 
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APPENDIX A 
DEFINITIONS OF INFECTIONS 
Definitions for different sites of infection were 
developed for the present research. Eight drafts were 
produced based on published definitions and discussed with 
Consultant Medical Microbiologists and Epidemiologist, and 
Infection Control Nurses until a consensus was reached. 
The definitions are described below. 
1. Hospital acquired infection (HAI) 
An infection found to be active (or under active treatment 
at the time of survey) which was not present or incubating 
on admission to hospital (Meers, et al., 1981). Where 
doubt exists, infections appearing at 72 hours or more 
after admission should be classified as HAI (Adler and 
Shulman, 1970; Hughes and Jarvis, 1985). A patient 
readmitted with established infection resulting from an 
earlier admission is recorded as having HAI (Centers for 
Disease Control, 1972). Transfers admitted from another 
hospital with a nosocomial infection acquired there will 
be coded separately. 
2. Community acquired infections 
An infection found to be active (or under active 
treatment) at the time of survey which was present 
incubating on admission to hospital (Latham, et 
1981). 
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3. Criteria for diagnosing the presence of infection 
There must be clinical evidence of infection except in the 
case of central nervous system infections where laboratory 
evidence may suffice. Colonisation should be excluded. 
Clinical evidence includes the cardinal signs and symptoms 
as defined in this document which are presented or have 
been present during the patient's stay in hospital. Some 
signs and symptoms may include fever >/=37.80C (Wenzel, et 
al., 1976) where infection is the only known cause, 
inflammation (i. e. redness, swelling, pain, heat) and the 
production of pus. 
Labo. rato. ry evidence is present if the results of specimens 
meet the criteria defined in this document. 
With some infections, a clinician's diagnosis of infection 
based on clinical signs and symptoms with or without 
laboratory evidence will be accepted. 
4. Date of infection onset 
This is the date the first clinical evidence of infection 
appeared, or if no signs and symptoms are present, the 
date the specimen used to make or confirm the diagnosis 
was collected, whichever comes first. 
5. Survey population 
For the patient to be included in the survey, the patients 
date of admission and date of discharge must be on 
different calendar days. Patients admitted for routine 
dilation of the cervix and curettage of the uterus cavity, 
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uterine laparoscopy and termination of pregnancy will not 
be included in the survey unless the patient's admission 
is prolonged (more than two days). 
Urinary tract infection 
An urinary tract infection must meet the following 
criteria: 
Patient has at least two of the following signs or 
symptoms: fever >/=37.80C (Wenzel, et al., 1976) with no 
other recognised cause, urgency, frequency or dysuria 
(Garner, et al., 1988), 
with or without 
a positive urine culture, that has >/=105 colonies per ml 
of urine with no more than two species of micro-organisms 
(Garner, et al., 1988). 
or 
a positive urine culture that has <105 colonies per ml of 
urine of a single micro-organism in the presence of an 
antibiotic being given to treat an urinary tract 
infection, 
or 
a positive urine culture with more than 2 species of 
micro-organisms identified and the presence of 10 white 
blood cells or more seen on high power film. 
Note 
1. A clinician's diagnosis of urinary tract infection will 
suffice if the patient is unable to communicate the above 
signs and symptoms. 
2. Surveyor should note whether clinical or clinical with 
laboratory evidence is used to determine the presence of 
infection. 
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3. Infection of the urethra occurring at the insertion 
site of a catheter should be included as an urinary tract 
infection. The presence of the device, i. e. catheter 
should be noted. 
4. Infections of organs of the urinary tract (kidney, 
ureter, bladder or urethra) following surgery to that area 
should be recorded as surgical wound infection. 
7. Asymptomatic bacteriuria 
Patients with asymptomatic bacteriuria should have no 
clinical signs of an urinary tract infection, i. e. no 
fever (<37.80C), urgency, frequency or dysuria. 
with 
two positive urine cultures that have >/=105 colonies per 
ml of urine with repeated isolation of the same micro- 
organism and no more than 2 species of micro-organisms. 
8. Infections of upper respiratory tract and ear 
Clinician's diagnosis of one or more of the following with 
or without microbiological evidence of infection 
a) Furuncle 
b) Rhinitis (infective) 
C) Sinusitis 
d) Pharyngitis 
e) Epiglottitis 
f) Tonsillitis 
g) Otitis media 
Note 
1. Infection of the anterior nares surrounding the 
insertion site of a nasogastric tube should be included as 
upper respiratory tract infection. The presence of the 
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nasogastric tube should be noted. 
2. Infections of the upper respiratory tract (ear, nose or 
throat) following surgery to that area should be recorded 
as surgical wound infection. 
9. Pneumonia 
New or increased production of sputum and/or fever 
(>/=37.80C) with appropriate chest signs including 
consolidation and/or x-ray changes showing new or 
progressive infiltrate. To include clinician's diagnosis 
of pneumonia. 
10. Other lower respiratory tract infections 
Clinician's diagnosis of one or more of the following: 
a) empyema 
b) lung abscess 
c) tracheitis 
d) bronchitis 
e) mediastinitis 
Note 
1. Infections of any one area of the lower respiratory 
tract (trachea, bronchus, lung, mediastinum) following 
surgery to that area should be recorded as surgical wound 
infection. 
11. Wound infection 
A wound is defined as a break in the epithelial surface 
(skin or mucous membrane) and the underlying tissue made 
by some positive act such as an accident or surgical 
incision. Burns should be excluded. An ulcer or pressure 
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sore is not a wound for the purposes of this definition. 
All wound infections must have purulent discharge in or 
exuding from a wound or seen on direct examination at the 
operative site (Cruse, 1977) 
11.1 Major infection is present when the wound is broken 
down, gaping or completely dehisced or there is evidence 
of septicaemia, spreading cellulitis and lymphangitis. 
11.2 Minor infection is present when the wound is not 
broken down, gaping or completely dehisced and there is no 
evidence of septicaemia, spreading cellulitis and 
lymphangitis. 
i. Surgical wound infection 
Infection occurs at the incision site or operative site 
(including drains) within 30 days after surgical operation 
if no implant is left in place or within one year if an 
implant is in place. The infection must appear to be 
related to the surgical procedure (Garner, et al., 1988). 
ii. Accidental wound infection 
Infection occurs at or in the accidental wound site. 
Note 
1. Infections occurring at the entry site of a device 
which has required an incision for insertion should be 
noted as surgical wound infection (e. g. tracheostomy, 
intravascular catheters, renal dialysis catheters, 
suprapubic catheter). The presence of the device should be 
noted. 
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12. Skin infection 
A skin infection is considered to be present if there 
inflammation where infection is the only known cause 
with or without 
the production of pus on the skin. 
Note 
1. Ulcers, 
excluded. 
is 
pressure sores and otitis externa should be 
13. Burn infection 
An infection is considered to be present if one or both of 
the following are present: 
i. discharge of purulent material (Garner, et al., 1988) 
ii. graft rejection with clinical (i. e. inflammation 
and/or pus) evidence of infection. 
14. Septicaemia 
Septicaemia must meet the following criteria: 
Patient has at least one of the following signs or 
symptoms: fever (>/=37.80C) with no other recognised 
cause, chills or hypotension 
and 
micro-organisms are isolated from one or more blood 
cultures taken on the same occasion. 
15. Bacteraemia 
Bacteraemia must meet the following criteria: 
Patient has no clinical signs or symptoms of infection, 
i. e. there is no fever (<37.80C), chills or hypotension 
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and 
micro-organisms are isolated from one or more blood 
cultures taken on the one occasion except in the isolation 
of a skin contaminant (e. g. diptheroids, coagulase 
negative staphylococci or micrococci) when two or more 
positive blood cultures drawn on separate occasions should 
be obtained (Garner, et al., 1988). 
16. Eye infection 
An eye infection is considered to be present if there is 
new purulent discharge or pus (Meers, et al., 1981) within 
or on the surface of the eye. 
Note 
1. Infections of the skin surrounding the eye, e. g. stye, 
should be noted as skin infections. 
2. Infection of the eye following surgery should be noted 
as a surgical wound infection. 
17. Central nervous system infection 
A central nervous system infection must meet at least one 
of the following criteria: 
1. Micro-organisms in cerebro-spinal fluid (CSF), but 
excluding contaminants, with or without white blood 
cells, 
2. White blood cells in CSF in the absence of micro- 
organisms if the patient is receiving antibiotics, 
3. White blood cells in the CSF in the absence of micro- 
organisms if there is no other obvious cause for their 
presence. 
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18. Genital tract infection 
Genital tract infections can be divided into post-partum 
and other genital tract infections. 
18.1 Post-Partum infection requires systemic evidence of 
infection with a new purulent discharge (Kislak, et al., 
1964). 
18.2 Other genital infection is present if there is new 
purulent discharge with or without microbiological 
evidence of infection. 
Note 
1. Episiotomy should be classified as a surgical wound and 
a perineal tear classified as an accidental wound. 
2. Infection of any one area of the genital tract 
following surgery to that area should be recorded as wound 
infection. 
19. Gastrointestinal infection 
A gastrointestinal infection is present if diarrhoea 
and/or vomiting occurs which is not as a result of any of 
the following: 
diagnostic tests 
therapeutic regimens 
other underlying non-infectious causes. 
Note 
1. The presence of a gastro-intestinal infection should be 
supported whenever possible by microbiological evidence. 
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20. Other abdominal infection 
Clinician's diagnosis of intra-abdominal abscess formation 
and peritonitis should be included as other abdominal 
infections with or without microbiological evidence. 
Appendicitis, cholecystitis, pancreatitis and 
diverticulitis should not be noted as infections unless 
the presence of pus is noted (Centers for Disease Control, 
1972). 
Note 
1. Infections within the abdomen following surgery to the 
affected area should be recorded as surgical wound 
infection. 
21. Bone and joint infection 
Clinician's diagnosis of septic arthritis or osteomyelitis 
with or without microbiological evidence. 
22. Systemic infection 
Clinician's diagnosis with or without laboratory evidence 
(including serology) of generalised bacterial, viral, 
fungal or parasitic infection without a definable single 
site of infection (e. g. measles, mumps, Herpes varicella). 
23. Other infections 
Clinicians diagnosis with or without microbiological 
evidence of infection which does not fall into the above 
categories e. g. varicose ulcers, rectal abscesses pressure 
sores, otitis externa, oral thrush and non-therapeutic 
related hepatitis. Include clinical symptoms of infectious 
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hepatitis (A, Bf Non A and Non B) and serum positive for 
hepatitis B antigen without symptoms. 
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APPENDIX B 
SURVEILLANCE PROjECT 
PATIENT FORM 
REFERENCE METHOD 
Data Entry: Fý r 
OP1 OP2 
Study/ Serial No- 
Hospital Number Name ...................................... Surname Forename 
Date of Birth /19 Age Sex Ward 
DMy 
Service F-I 1 -1 Consultant Admission 
Transfer 1 Ward 
Dmy 
Operation (1) 
Operation (2) 
Operation (3) 
1F= 
Discharge 
DmyDmy 
Transfer 2 
-/ 
/ Ward 
DMy 
1-1 El Fý II 
Fý Fý F-I 7 
El 71 r-I r-I 
Date 
Dmy 
Date 
Dmy 
Date 
DMy 
Visit 
No. 
Date of 
Surveillance 
Information Surveyed 
NMT Tx Li Lab 
Ne,, q Infection 
(Rank I'lo. ) 
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INFECTIONS 
Infection I 
Site of Infection 
Device F-1 
HAI/CAI 
Infection 2 
Site of Infection 
Device 
1-1 El 1: 1 
HAI/CAI 
Infection 3 
Site of Infection 
F] F-1 
Device OF-] 0 
HAI/CAI 
Infection 4 
Site of Infection 
Device 
1-1 
HAI/CAI 
LRJ I 
Name ................................... Surname Forename 
Date of Onset 
-/-/ 
Ward 
Dmy 
PathogenF] 
1-1 D F-I Ll 
123 
Date of Onset Ward 
Dmy 
Pathogen Ell-I FIFI F-I II 
123 
Date of Onset _/_/ 
Ward F] 
Dmy 
Pathogen 1--IF-f F1 FI 
123 
Date of Onset 
-/-/ 
Ward F-] 
Dmy 
Pathogen 
FI 1-1 EIF] 1-1 FI 
123 
I 
Infection 5 
Site of Infection 
Device 
E] 
HAI/CAI 
Date of Onset Ward 
DMy 
PathoQen F-I El 17 [-1 F] F-I 
123 
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Infection 6 
Site of Infection 
Device Lj" 
HAI/CAI 
Infection 7 
Site of Infection 
Dev i ce F-] F] 
HAI/CAI 
Infection 8 
Site of Infection 
Device F] [--] 1: 1 
HAI/CAI 
Infection 9 
Site of Infection 
Device F-1 El 1: 1 
HAI/CAI 
Date of Onset Ward 
L_ý L] 
Dmy 
Pathogen 1-10 00 1 11 1 
123 
Date of Onset Ward 
Dmy 
Pathogen 
Fj r 11 
23 
Date of Onset Ward 
Dmy 
Pathogen 
23 
Date of Onset 
-/-/ 
Ward 
Dmy 
Pathogen 
1-11: 1 F] 01 0 El 
123 
Infection 10 
Site of Infection 
Device 
HAI/CAI 
Date of Onset Ward 
r 
Dmy 
Pathogen F-I F1 F] F-I 
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DATA SOURCES: 
LRJ I 
Infection 1 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 2 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 3 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 4 
N .................................................... 
m ................................................... 
T ................... i 0.0 0 ........... 0.0 ........... 
Tx..... o............................... oo----oo0........... oo 
Li................................. oooo-oo---o........... 
Lab.. o.. ooo--ooo...................... ooo............. 
Infection 5 
N ........................................................................... 
m ............................................................................. 
T ....................................................................... 
Tx ....................................................................... 
Li ..................................................... * ........... 
Lab ........................................................................... 
--, \\ 20 
DATA SOURCES: 
Infection 6 
N ................................................... ! ............................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 7 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................. 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 8 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 9 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T .............................................. .................................. 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 10 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
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SURVEILLANCE PROJECT 
PATIENT FORM 
Fý 
I 
Consultant 
Discharge // 
DMy 
Wa rd 
1-1 Fý 
LABORATORY BASED WARD SURVEILLANCE I 
Hospital Number Name ...................................... Surname Forename 
Date of Birth /19 Age Sex Ward 
7 Fý El FI El F-I I 
DMyM=1F=2 
Service 
Admission / /_ 
DMY 
Transfer 1 
my 
Transfer 
Operation (1) 
Operation (2) 
Operation (3) 
Date of surveillance 
New or Diff. Pos. 
Spec Type of Y=I Date of 
No Spec. N=0 collection 
1-11 
Fi ý 
FA- 
// 
// 
/___/ 
Ward 
1-1 
F7 - Fý 7 El 
[-I -7 F1 F7 
F7 -77 Fý 
Y 
Data Entry: 
[7 [] 
OPI OP2 
Study/ Serial No. 
Date 
Dmy 
Date 
Dmy 
Date 
Dmy 
Pathogen I Pathogen 2 Pathogen 3 
name/code Alert 
Y=I N=0 
name/code Alert 
Y=I N=O 
name/code Alert 
Y=I N=O- 
Deci- 
sion 
F7 [--1 1: 1 E 1: 1 F-I F-I D 7 El 
7 [--1 1117 F7 77 El El Fý El 
HLD El F-I F 1: 1 El - Lý El 
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Spec 
o 
N 
Type of 
Spec 
or DIFF. Pos. 
Y=j Date of 
Pi =0 co ec LI ()I I 
I 
1ý / 
/__ 
Pathogen 
n, inic/cude 
I 
Alert 
Pathogen 
name/code 
2 
Alert 
Pathogen 
name/code 
3 
Alert Deci- 
Y=I Y=I N=0 Y=1 N=O sion 
LJ Li F-7 D D F] 
11 F El F-I 1-1 E F-I 1-1 1: 1 
11 EI r-I El F-ý D D El 
1. L, " 
1-1 Ei l// 
206 
ID El F7 El Fý 
Infection Rank 
F-I 
notified dur ing fol low-up 
arne .................................... 
Infection 1 
Site of infection F] El Date of Onset 
Ward Dev ice 
Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen 1 F-I 
Pathogen 2 Pathogen 3 
Infection 2 
Site of infection 
DD 
Date of Onset 
Ward 
El F] 
Device 
Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen 
Pathogen 2- El El Pathogen 3 
Infection 3 
Site of infection El 1-1 Date of Onset _/_/ 
Ward 
-1 
Device 
El 01 
Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen I LI 
Pathogen 2 Pathogen 3 
El 11 
Infection 4 
Site of infection F-I F-I Date of Onset 
Ward El Fý Device 17 1: 1 
Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen I 
Pathogen 
Infection 5 
Site of infection 
F-I 
7] 
El Date of Onset -/-/ 
Ward El 1: 1 Device El 1-1 
Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen 1LL 
Pathogen 2 1: 1 El Pathogen 3 EIEI 
Pathogen 3 
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DATA SoUrZCE-S: 
-k 
Infection 1 
N ............................................. 
................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Decision .......................................................................... 
Infection 2 
N ................................................................................. 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ................................................................................ 
Decision ........................................................................... 
Infection 3 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Decision .......................................................................... 
Infection 4 
N ................................................................................. 
M ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Decision .......................................................................... 
Infection 5 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ..................................................................... 
Decision .......................................................................... 
SURVEILLANCE PROJECT 
PATIENT FORM 
LABORATORY BASED TELEPHONE SURVEILLANCE 
.. I.. . 
F--i Ii 
// 
D MY 
Hospitai Number "II Name ...................................... 
Date of Birth 
_/_/Jg Dmy 
Serv i ce 
Admission 
y 
Transfer I 
Dy 
Transfer 2 
D 
Surname Forename 
Age F] Sex F Ward 
M=1F2 
Consultant F1 F 
Discharge /-/ 
DMy 
Ward F-I F71 
Ward RFI 
Operation (1) F-1 1-1 El F-1 Date _/_/ DMY 
Operation (2) F-1 F-1 1-1 F1 Date 
Operation (3) F-1 171171 F1 Date 
DMY 
Date of Su rveillance 
DMY 
Spec. /No. Type of Date of Pathogen 1 Pathogen 2 Pathogen 3 Infection 
Init. specimen collection name / code name / code name / code Rank 
0 
DMY 
r-1 r-1 F] 
0 El 
_____ 
_I 
I_ 
D MY 
F-I Ej 
Data Entry: F IF I 
OP1 OP2 
I IT 
Study/ Serial No. 
1: 1 1: 1 
El El F] [71 El [I 
DMY 
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D---1, 
Study/ Serial No. 
INFECTIONS Name .................................... 
Infection 1. i 
Site of infection F-I F] Date of Onset 
Ward 
El 1: 1 Device 
Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen 1 DFI 
Pathogen 201: 
1 
Pathogen 3F IE] 
Infection 2 
Site of infection F-I El Date of Onset _/ 
Ward OF] Device El 1-1 
-1 El 
Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen 1F 
Pathogen 2 RF-I Pathogen 3 E] 1: 1 
Infection 3 
Site of infection 
0 1: 1 Date of Onset 
Ward 
El 1-1 
Device 
Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen 1 
El 
r- I 
Pathogen 2 
1-111 Pathogen 3 Dl 0 
Infection 4 
Site of infection 
Ward 
El 0 
Date of Onset 
F1 F1 Device Elo 
// 
// 
Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen 1 
1: 111 
Pathogen 2 El F-I Pathogen 3 El 11 
Infection 5 
Site of infection El El Date of Onset _/_/ 
Ward EIR Device 1: 1 El 
Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen I F-I El 
Pathogen 2 F-I El Pathogen 3 
-E] 
El 
-- 
DATA SOURCES: 
Infection 
N 
T ................................................................................. 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Decision .......................................................................... 
Infection 2 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab .................. ............................................................. 
Decision ........................................................................... 
Infection 3 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Decision .......................................................................... 
Infection 4 
N ................................................................................ 
M ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx 
................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Decision 
.......................................................................... 
Infection 5 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T 
................................................................................ 
Tx 
................................................................................ 
Li 
................................................................................ 
Lab 
............................................................................... 
Decision 
.......................................................................... 
SURVEILLANCE PROJECT 
PATIENT FORM 
i 
WARD LIAISON SURVEILLANCE 
Hospital. Number 
r-] I 
Data Entry: F- j 117 
OP1 OP2 
ww 
Study/ Serial No. 
Name ...................................... Surname Forename 
Sex Date of Birth /19 Age Ward EIr I 
Service Consultant 
Admission Discharge 
_/_/ DMYDMy 
Transfer I-/- Ward 
-1-IHTransfer 
2 Ward [I F 
DMYDMy 
Operation F-FF 1-1 Date 
DMy 
Operation (2) 
- El El 
Date 
DMy 
Operation (3) 1-1 
- F-I El I 
Date 
_/_/ DMy 
Reported Infection 
Date of Type of 
No onset infection Code 
Date of 
Surveillance 
Information Surveyed 
NMT Tx Li Lab, 
New 
Infect. 
-S) 
Ewl 
Study/ Serial No. 
INFECTIONS 
Infection I 
Site of infection 
Ward F-I F] 
Hospital/Community Acquired 
Pathogen 2 
Infection 2 
Site of infection 
Ward FIM 
Name .................................... 
El r-I 
Device 
0 F-I 
Date of Onset 
Device 
Pathogen 1 
F-I F-I 
El 
F] Pathogen 311 
/_/_____ 
Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen 1 
Pathogen 2 Pathogen 3 
Infection 3 
Site of infection 
[111 
Ward 
01-1 
Device 
// 
Hosoital/Community 'Acquired Pathoqen 1 Fý 1-1 
Pathogen 2 
Infection 4 
Site of infection 
Ward 
F-] 1-1 
Hospital/Community Acquired 
Pathogen 2 
0 
F-I 
Dev i ce 
Date of Onset 
F-I R 
Date of Onset 
Fý LJ 
Date of Onset 
F) 7 
Pathogen 1 
Pathogen 3 F-I 
Infection 5 
Site of infection El F] Date of Onset 
Ward Device F-I EI 
Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen I Fý 01 
Pathogen 2 F-J Ii Pathogen 3 1: 1 El 
Pathogen 3 
1-1 F] 
'g13 
DATA SOURCES: 
_H Study/ Serial No. Infection 1 
N ..................................................... I ........................... 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 2 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 3 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 4 
................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 5 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
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SURVEILLANCE PROJECT 
PATIENT FORM 
LABORATORY BASED WARD LIAISON SURVEILLANCE 
Hospital Number Name ...................................... Surname Forename 
Date of Birth 
_/_ 
/19 Age F Sex Lj Ward 
DMyM=1F=2 
Service Consultant 
Admission Discharge // 
DMyDMy 
F-7 r--i 
Data Entry: Lj FI 
OPI OP2 jz 
__j Study/ Serial No. 
Transfer 1 Ward Tran sf er 2 
DmyD 
operation (1) 
1-1 
- F-I F-I 17 
Operation (2) F-I - F-I F-I F-I 
Operation (3) 
n-11nn 
Ward 
my 
Date 
LI EI 
F-I 0 
/ /__ 
DMY 
Date 
_/_/ Dmy 
Date 
_/_/ Dmy 
? 15 
SECTION I (Follow-up of new or different positives) 
C* Visit Date of )pec. 
No 
ISurveillance I 
No. 
Sec. Type Pathogen 1 
Name lCodej Name iCode 
Pathogen 2 Pathogen 3 
Name lCode Name iCode 
tk 16 
SECTION I Continued 
Visit 
No 
Date of 
surveillance 
Spec. 
No. 
Information surveyed 
NMT Tx Li Lab 
New 
Infection 
217 
SECTION 2 (Ward Liaison) 
Reported Infection i 
Date of Type of Date of Information Surveyed New 
NO onset infection Code Surveillance NMT Tx Li Lab Infect. 
1000"- 
11 1 
Study/ Serial No. 
INFECTIONS 
Infection I 
Site of infection 
Ward 1-1 F-I 
Hospital/Community Acquired 
Pathogen 2 
Dev i ce 
F-I F-I 
Name .................................... 
I--] F] 
Date of Onset 
_/ 
Pathogen 1' 
1-1171 
Pathogen 3 F1 Li 
Infection 2 
Site of infection Date of Onset 
Ward 
1-11: 1 
Device 
Hospital/Community Acquired 
Pathogen 2 Fý El 
Infection 3 
Site of infection 
F-I El 
// 
Pathogen 10 
171 
Pathogen 3n 
171 
1: 11-1 
Date of Onset 
_/ 
Ward 
F] F] 
Device F-1 F-I 
Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen 1 
Pathogen 2 Pathogen 3 FI F-I 
Infection 4 
Site of infection F1 F-1 Date of Onset 
Ward Fý 171 Device F-1 7 
Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen 1 
El 1: 1 
Pathogen 2 
El 1-1 Pathogen 3 F-1 1-1 
Infection 5 
Site of infection F-I El Date of Onset -/ 
Ward 
1-1 Fý Device 
Hospital/Community Acquired 
Pathogen 2 
71 F-I 
r7 F1 
Pathogen 1 
El L 
Pathogen 3 
19 
DATA SOURCES: 
Infection 1 
LZ 
Study/ Serial I'llo. 
................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................. 
Lab ..................................................... o ......................... 
Infection 2 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 3 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 4 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 5 
N ................................................................................ 
M ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
13 13 rl 
RISK FACTOR SURVEILLANCE 
SURVEILLANCE PROJECT 
PATIENT FORM 
Data Entry: 
71 1: 1 
Opi OP2 
I 
Study/Serial No. 
....... ........ 
Hospital Number Name . 
Surname ................. Forename 
Date of Birth 
D 
Age F] F1 F1 Sex Ward F1 E 
M=I F=2 
Service F1 F1 Consultant 
Admission 
-/ -- 
Discharge 
D R-- -Y Dy 
Transfer IDMy Ward F1 1-1 Transfer 2D Ward 
Operation (1) Date 
_/_/ DM 
Operation (1) Fl- Flnn Date _/_/ DMY 
Operation (1) Fl- IýFIFI Date _/_/ D 
DIAGNOSIS OR CONDITIONS 
01 Leukaemia 01 
02 Lymphoma 02 
03 Cancer/Karcinoma 03 
04 Granulocytopaenia 04 
05 Collagen Vascular Diseases 05 
06 Sarcoid 06 
07 Widespread dermatoses 07 
08 Burns 08 
09 Organ Transplantation 09 
10 Hepatitis 10 
II Diabetes 11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Cystic fibrosis 12 
Sickle Cell Disease 13 
Hypogammaglobulinaemia 14 
Alcoholism is 
Paraplegia 16 
Leukocytopaeniae 17 
Hospitalisation for more 18 
than 3 weeks 
Patient in ITU/CCU 19 
Patients receiving 20 
radiation Lherapy 
Patients receving steroids 21 
or immunosuppresive drugs 
Patients receiving antibiotics 
= 
22 
11 1 
OPERATIOýIS OR PROCEDURýLS 
01 Two dates or more fol lowing surgical procedure 
requiring general anaesthetic 
ED 
01 
02 Trachaeostomy 02 
03 CNS Shunt/Tap 03 
04 Bladder catheterisation 04 
05 Hyperalimentation = 05 
06 Respiratory assistance (artificial ventilation 06 
07 Renal dialysis 07 
03 Nasogastric tube 08 
09 IV/IA Catheterisation 09 
isit Date of Information Surveyed New Infection 
No. 
I 
Surveillance NMITI Tx I Li Lab 
I 
(Rank No. ) 
-. 
__ 
"1 
____ 
"I 
" I> 
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Study/ Serial No. 
INFECTIONS 
Infection 1 
Site of infection 
Ward II 
El 
Hospital/Community Acquired 
Pathogen 2 
Infection 2 
Site of infection 
Name .................................... 
OF-I 
Date of Onset 
F17 
// 
Device 
Pathogen 111 F] 
Pathogen 3 
F-I F-I 
F-I F-I Date of Onset 
Fj-I I-A Ward Device 
Hospital/Community Acquired 
Pathogen 2 
Infection 3 
Site of infection 
Ward Li 
Ii 
Hospital/Community Acquired 
Pathogen 2 
Infection 4 
Site of infection 
Pathogen 1 
Pathogen 3 
El Fl Date of Onset 
F-I 
// 
Ward 
0 F-I Device 
Hospital/Community Acquired 
Pathogen 2 
-- 
0 F-I 
Infection 5 
Pathogen I F-I F] 
Pathogen 3 17 
F] 
Site of infection F] Fý Date of Onset 
Ward Device 
El 17 
j L] Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen I F- 
Pathogen 2 Pathogen 3 El Li 
Pathogen 100 
Pathogen 3 
r-I 1: 1 
r-I F-I Date of Onset 
F-I 0 
// 
Device 
DATA SOURCE-): 
lRi 
Study/ Serial No. 
Infection 1r 
................................................................................ 
................................................................................ 
................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Decision ........................................................................... 
Infection 2 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................. 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Decision .......................................................................... 
Infection 3 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Decision .......................................................................... 
Infection 4 
N ................................................................................ 
................................................................................ 
................................................................................ 'm 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Decision .......................................................................... 
Infqction 5 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Decision .......................................................................... 
--4 
SURVEILLANCE PROJECT Data Entry: j iII 
PATIENT FORM OPI OP2 
ETP 
TEMPERATURE CliART SURVEILLANCE 
Study/ Serial No. 
Hospital Number N ame ...................................... Surname Forename 
Date of Birth /19 Age S, exLjW ar d 
L7 F] 
DMYM=1F2 
Service 1 
-1 F-I Consultant 7 
Admission Discharge // 
DMYDMY 
Transfer 1 Ward Transfer 2 Ward Fý 
DMYDMY 
Operation (1) Date 
DMY 
Operation (2) H 11-i Date 
DMY 
Operation (3) Date 
DMY 
Visit 
No. 
Date of 
Surveillance 
Information Surveyed 
NMT Tx Li Lab 
Ne,, -j Infection 
(Rank No. ) 
225 
I 
INFECTIONS 
Infection 1 
Site of infection 
1 
1; TPi! 
Study/ Serial i, ýIo. 
ame .................................... I 
1-1 F-I 
Ward 1-1 Device 
Hospital/Community Acquired 
Pathogen 2 
Infection 2 
Site of infection 
Ward F-I F-I 
Hospital/Community Acquired 
Pathogen 2 
Infection 3 
Site of infection 
Ward F-I 1: 1 
Hospital/Community Acquired 
Pathogen 2 
Infection 4 
Date of Onset 
Pathogen 1 
Pathogen 3 
F-I [71 
/ 
1-11 1 
F-I F-I 
Date of Onset 
11: 1 Device 
E] 
Pathogen I 
Pathogen 3 
1: 1 F7i 
Deli i ce 
31 L: ý 
Lj [1 
Date of Onset 
00 
Pathogen 1 
Pathogen LJ 
Site of infection Date of Onset 
Ward LI Device F-I E 
Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen 1 
El 
Pathogen 2 Pathogen 3 
Infection 5 
Site of infection 
Ward Device 
Date of Onset 
Hospital/Community Acquired II Pathogen I 
Pathogen 2 Fj H Pathogen 3 
_/ 
/____ 
__ 
[L 
226 
DATA SOURCES: 
Infection 1 
N ........ 
T Tp p 
Study/Serial tic. 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 2 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx 
Li................................................................................ 
Lab 
Infection 3 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 4 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 5 
N ............................................. 
M ...................................................... 
T .............................................................. 
Tx .................................................................. 
Li .................................................................. 
Lab ............................................... * 
.7 
SURVEILLANCE PROJECT 
PATIENT FORM 
TREATMENT CHART SURVEILLANCE 
Data Entry: 
OPI OP2 
ITX 
S 1- Ludy/ Serial No. 
Hospital Number N, a r-,, 2 ....................................... 
Date of Birth 
-/-/19 Dmy 
Service 
Admission 
DMy 
Transfer I Ward 
DMy 
Operation (1) 
Operation (2) 
Operation (3) 
m 
Surname Forename 
Age 
F-ý 
Sex F71 Ward 
M=1F=2 
El F-I Consultant 
Discharge // 
DMy 
F-ý [] 
Transfer 2 Ward 
DMy 
F7 -D El L 
Date 
DMy 
Date 
-1 F- El [I [I 
DMY 
11 F7 1: 1 
Date 
DMy 
VisIt 
No. 
Date of 
Surveillance 
Information Surveyed Ne,. -i Infection 
NMT Tx Li Lab R an kNo 
-1 
LT 
x 
Study/ Seria] , 'c. 
INFECTIONS 
Infection 1 
Site of infection 
Ward F F-I 
Hospital /Ccrnmun i ty Acquired 
Pathogen 2 
Namp . .................................... 
F 1-7 
De, / i -3 
r--1 
Date ol Onset I/I-/! 
Pathocen I10 
pa -t'- hoc eq 3 
FI 17 
Infection 2 
Site of infection 1 117 Date of Onset 
Ward Device 
Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen I 
Pathogen 2 Pathogen 3 
Infection 3 
Site of infection 
Fl 
Ward 
1-1 Fý 
Dev i ce 
- 
Fý Ei 
Hospital /Ccmmuni ty Acquired Pathogen 1 
1-1 
Pathocen 2 Pathogen 3 
Infection 4 
-ion it -2 ofinf -- -- '. 
Ward 77 
Hospital /Com-mun ity Acquired 
Pathocen 2 
F117 F-I -. 
Date of Onset 
17 Fý 
Date of Onset 
7 F-I D ev ic2 
F-7 7--11 ii Pathocien 1 
Pathooan 3 
Infection 5 
Site of infection flH 
Ward Dem i ce 
Hospital/Co7ý, nunity Acquired 
Pathocen 2 
Date of Onset 
-7 
1 -j 
/ 
Pathocen IF IF I 
Patýogen 3 F-I F-1, 
229 
-MRCES: 
Study/Serial No. 
Infection 1 
N ................................................................................ 
m ....................................................... I .......................... 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ................................ ................................................ 
Infection 2 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx 
Li................................................................................ 
Lab 
Infection 3 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 4 
N 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab 
............................................................................... 
Infection 5 
N ................................................................................ 
M ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................... ............................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab 
230 
SURVEILLANCE PROJECT Data Entry: 
PATIENT FORM OP1 OP2 
I 
il 
TEMPERATURE AND TREATMENT CHART SURVEILLANCE 
Study/ Serial No. 
Hospital Number Name ...................................... 
Date of Birth /19 
Dmy 
Service 
Admission 
_/_/ DMy 
Transfer I 
_/_/ 
Ward 
DMy 
Operation (1) 
Operation (2) 
Operation (3) 
Surname Forename 
Age Sex Ward 
F] 
M=1F2 
F] 1-1 Consultant 
Discharge 
-/ DMy 
Transfer 2 Ward 
_F] DMY 
Date 
DMy 
0- [71 F-I 1-1 Date -/- DMY 
- 
1-10 F] 
Date 
DMy 
Visit 
No. 
Date of 
Surveillance 
Information Surveyed 
NMT Tx Li Lab 
New Infection 
(Rank No. ) 
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-TT F- 
Study/ Serial No. 
INFECTIONS 
Infection 1 
Site of infection 
Ward 
1-1 El 
Hospital/Community Acquired 
Pathogen 2 
Infection 2 
Site of infection 
Ward 
1-1 F] 
Device 
Hospital/Community Acquired 
Pathogen 2 
1-1 F] 
Infection 3 
Site of infection 
Ward 
01-1 
Hospital/Community Acquired 
Pathogen 2 
Dev i ce 
El 
Device 
Ll 1 -1 
Name .................................... 
I 
El F-I ' Date of Onset 
I -il u 
Pathogen 1 
Pathogen 3 
1:: 11-3 Date of Onset 
El 1-1 
Pathogen 1 
Pathogen 3 
OF] Date of Onset 
F-I Fý 
// 
// 
// 
EIE] 
U-1 13 
F-I 0 
F] El 
Pathogen 1 
Pathogen 3 
Infection 4 
Site of infection Fý F-1 Date of Onset 
Ward Device 
Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen 1 
Pathogen 2 F] H Pathogen 3 LJ 
Infection 5 
Site of infection RF] Date of Onset 
Ward 
--1 F1 Device 10 
Hospital/Community Acquired Pathogen 1 
El F] 
Pathogen 2 Pathogen 3 El FI 
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DATA SOURCES: TIT] 
Study/Serial No. 
Infection 1 
N ................................................................................ 
m ..................................................... I ........................... 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 2 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 3 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 4 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
7 Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
Infection 5 
N ................................................................................ 
m ................................................................................ 
T ................................................................................ 
Tx ................................................................................ 
Li ................................................................................ 
Lab ............................................................................... 
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APPENDIX C 
CODES FOR COMPLETING SURVEILLANCE FORMS 
1) Hospital number 
2) Name (Surname followed by forename) 
3) Date of birth - (Days/Month/Year) 
4) Age - Age in years (y), months (m) or days (d). ) 
5) Sex -1= Male 
2= Female 
6) Service - 01 - Acute medical general 
02 - Acute medical dermatology 
03 - Acute surgical general 
04 - Acute surgical urology 
05 - Orthopaedic 
06 - Intensive therapy unit 
07 - Gynaecology 
08 - Paediatrics - medical 
09 - Paediatrics - surgical 
10 - Ear, nose and throat - adults 
11 - Ear, nose and throat - children 
12 - Acute geriatric 
7) Ward 00 06 12 Codes for confidential 
01 07 13 information held 
02 08 14 securely at DHI, 
03 09 15 Colindale. 
04 10 16 
05 11 
8) Consultant 00 10 20 Codes for confidential 
01 11 21 information held 
02 12 22 securely at DHI, 
03 13 23 Colindale. 
04 14 24 
05 15 25 
06 16 26 
07 17 27 
08 18 
09 19 
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9) Date of admission 
DMY 
10) Date of transfer (1) 
11) Ward 
12) Date of transfer (2) 
13) Ward 
14) Date of discharge 
DMY 
15) Operation (1) Code using International 
Classification of 
Procedures in Medicine. 
16) Date of operation (2) 
17) Operation see above 
18) Date of operation (2) 
19) Operation see above 
20) Date of operation (3) 
21) Visit number 
22) Date of surveillance 
DMY 
23) Review of nursing notes (N) 
not examined 
examined, no information to indicate new infection 
examined, information present to indicate new 
infection 
examined, information used to determine a new 
infection 
24) Review of medical notes (M) 
0- not examined 
1- examined, no information to indicate new infection 
2- examined, information present to indicate new 
infection 
5- examined, information used to determine a new 
infection 
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25) Review of Temperature Charts (T) 
0- not examined 
1- examined temperature <37.50C 
Temperature noted =/>37.50C 
26) Review of treatment charts (Tx) 
0 not examined 
1 examined, no new antibiotics prescribed 
2 examined, new antibiotics prescribed 
5 examined, presence of antibiotics used 
to determine an infection 
3 examined, patient no longer prescribed 
antibiotics 
(additional code used from 12th December 1988) 
27) Liaising verbally with Nursing Staff (Li) 
0- not undertaken 
1- undertaken, no information given to determine a 
new infection 
2- undertaken, some information given to determine a 
new infection 
5- undertaken, information used to determine a new 
infection 
28) Laboratory information (Lab) 
0- not undertaken 
1- culture done, negative result 
2- culture done, positive result 
5- culture done, positive result, information used 
to determine an infection 
29) Type of infections 
01 - Urinary tract infection determined using clinical 
information 
02 - Urinary Tract Infection determined using clinical 
information and laboratory information 
03 - Asymptomatic bacteriuria 
04 - Upper Respiratory Tract and Ear Infection 
05 - Pneumonia 
06 - Other lower respiratory tract infection 
07 - Major Surgical Wound Infection 
08 - Minor Surgical Wound Infection 
09 - Major Accidental Wound Infection 
10 - Minor Accidental Wound Infection 
11 - Skin Infection 
12 - Burn Infection 
13 - Septicaemia 
14 - Bacteraemia 
15 - Eye Infection 
16 - Central Nervous System Infection 
17 - Post-partum genital tract infection 
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18 - Other genital tract infection 
19 - Gastro intestinal infection 
20 - Other abdominal Infection 
21 - Bone and Joint Infection 
22 - Systemic Infection 
Other infections 
23 - Pericarditis 
24 - Otitis externa 
25 - Oral thrush 
26 - Hepatitis A 
27 - Hepatitis B 
28 - Hepatitis non-A non-B 
29 - Human immunodeficiency virus 
30 - Skin ulcers 
31 - Pressure sores 
32 - Rectal abscess 
33 - Gas gangrene 
34 - Mastitis 
35 - Mouth 
36 - Epididymitis/orchiditis 
37 - Otitis externa 
38 - Vaginal thrush 
39 - Sub-acute bacterial endocarditis 
40 - Throat 
30) Date of onset (if community acquired infection leave 
date blank) 
31) Ward 
32) Hospital/Community acquired infection 
1- community acquired infection 
2- hospital acquired infection (study hospital) 
3- hospital acquired infection (other hospital) 
4- hospital acquired infection (other ward) 
33) Device (if infection occurred around device site) 
01 
- Urethral catheter 
02 - Suprapubic catheter 
03 - Nasogastric tube 
04 - Gastrostomy 
05 - Cerebro-nervous system tap 
06 - Intra vascular catheter 
07 - Intra-arterial catheter 
08 - Renal dialysis catheter 
09 - Sub-cutaneous catheter 
10 - Tracheostomy 
11 - Endo-tracheal tube 
12 - Orthopaedic pin 
13 - Chest drain 
14 - Abdominal drain 
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34) Pathogens 
00 No pathogens isolated 
01 - Staphylococcus aureus 
02 - Other Staphylococcus 
03 - Streptococcus pneumoniae 
04 - Streptococcus, group A 
05 - Streptococcus, other groups 
06 - Faecal-type streptococci 
07 - Viridans-type streptococci 
08 - Salmonella spp. 
09 - Shigella spp. 
10 - Coliforms (NLF) 
11 - Coliforms (LF) 
12 - Coliforms 
13 - Proteus spp. 
14 - Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
15 - Klebsiella spp. 
16 - Serratia spp. 
17 - Enterobacter spp. 
18 - Haemophilus influenzae 
19 - Clostridium spp. 
20 - Bacteroides spp. 
21 - Other anaerobes 
22 - Mycobacterium, tuberculosis 
23 - Hepatitis A 
24 - Hepatitis B 
25 - Human Immunodeficiency virus 
26 - Chlamydia 
27 - Candida spp. 
28 - Fungi 
29 - Pneumocystis carinii 
30 - Alpha haemolytic streptococcus 
31 - Gardnerella vaginalis 
32 - Other mycobacteria 
33 - Yeasts 
34 - Herpes simplex 
35 - Neisseria pharyngitis 
36 - Mixed growth 
37 - Trichomonas vaginalis 
38 - Providencia spp. 
39 - Acinetobacter spp. 
40 - Falciparum, malaria 
41 - Enterobacter cloace 
42 - Cryptosporidium. spp. 
43 - Escherichia coli 
44 - Citrobacter freundii 
45 - Serratia spp. 
46 - Diphtheroids 
47 - Listeria monocytogenes 
Blank - Culture not undertaken 
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Additional codes for laboratory based ward surveillance 
35) Type of specimen 
01 skin swab 
02 umbilical swab 
03 sacral sore swab 
04 eye swab 
15 wound swab 
16 pus 
17 drain swab 
18 abcess fluid 
20 mouth 
21 nose 
23 - long biopsy 
25 - sputum 
26 - tracheostomy 
secretion 
27 - tracheostomy 
swab 
29 - chest drain 
30 - stool 
31 - perianal 
32 - vaginal 
33 - penile 
34 - higher vaginal swab 
35 - urine 
36 - MSU 
37 - CSU 
38 - gastric aspirate 
39 - suprapubic catheter 
urine specimen 
41 - vulval swab 
42 - groin swab 
45 - endocervical swab 
80 - Blood specimen 91 - Swab unspecified 
81 - Disc aspirate 92 - Lymph node 
85 - Tip of intravenous catheter 99 - Unknown 
00 - No specimen 
36) New or different positive 0= No 
1= Yes 
37) Alert organism 0= No 
1= Yes 
38) Decision (referring to clinical and laboratory information on report form). 
1= examined, 
2= examined, 
infection. 
5= examined, 
infection. 
39) Specimen Number 
no information to indicate an infection. 
information present to indicate an 
information present to determine an 
00 = report infection 
01 = first specimen 
02 = second specimen 
Additional codes for laboratory based telephone surveillance 
40) Specimen Number 
prefix 9 reported infection during microbiologist - 
initiated telephone call 
prefix 8 reported infection during ward staff - 
initiated telephone call. 
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Additional codes for risk factor surveillance 
41) Diagnoses or conditions 
Source of information to identify risk factor. 
1= nursing history sheets 
2= nursing care plans 
3= treatment charts 
4= other means 
42) Operations or procedures 
Source of information to identify risk factor. 
1= nursing history sheets 
2= nursing care plans 
3= treatment charts 
4= other means 
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APPENDIX D 
METHODS FOR ASSESSING THE TIME TO PER-FORM DATA COLLECTION 
AND ANALYSES 
The surveillance methods were sub-divided into work 
elements with breakpoints to enable the time to be 
assessed. These are described below. 
1. Reference Method 
1.1. Pime to liaise with nurse in charge regarding 
patients with possible infections 
The stop-watch was started when the nursing staff or 
medical staff were approached and the surveyor initiated a 
conversation regarding patients with suspected infections. 
The stop-watch was stopped when the conversation was 
terminated. 
1.2. Time to review nursing notes 
1.2.1. Nursing history sheets 
The stop-watch was started when the folder of nursing 
history sheets had been obtained and stopped when the last 
history sheet had been reviewed. The time included the 
completion of the surveillance form. 
1.2.2. Nursing care plans 
Nursing care plans were located in a folder at the foot 
end of each bed. The stop-watch was started when the 
surveyor had arrived at the end of the bed and was about 
to take the folder. The surveyor reviewed the care plan 
(if present), completed the surveillance form and replaced 
the folder to the foot of the bed. The stop-watch was 
stopped when the folder had been returned to the foot of 
the bed. This was repeated for all patients on the ward. 
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1-3. Time to revi ew medi ca 1 no tes 
The stop-watch was started when the surveyor was 
positioned by the trolley and about to review the notes. 
The stop-watch was stopped when the details of the medical 
notes had been documented on the surveillance form. 
1.4. Time to review temperature charts 
The stop-watch was started when the surveyor was 
positioned at the foot end of the bed and was about to 
pick up the clipboard. The surveyor reviewed the 
temperature chart (if present), noted relevant details on 
the surveillance form and replaced the clipboard. The 
stop-watch was stopped when the clipboard had been 
replaced. This was repeated for all the patients on the 
ward. 
1.5. Time to review treatment charts 
The stop-watch was started when the surveyor was 
positioned at the foot of the bed and was about to locate 
the treatment chart. The surveyor reviewed the treatment 
chart (if present), noted relevant details on the 
surveillance form and replaced the clipboard. The stop- 
watch was stopped when the treatment chart had been 
replaced. This was repeated for all patients on the ward. 
1.6. Travel time from nurses station to beds and to 
locate information 
The stop-watch was commenced when the surveyor left the 
nurses station and stopped when the surveyor arrived at 
the first destination. The stop-watch was recommenced when 
the surveyor left for second destination. The final time 
was for the surveyor to return to the nurses station. 
242 
i 
1-7. Time to review laboratory information 
The time for listing incoming specimens and noting 
outgoing reports from the survey areas was assessed. The 
StOp-watch was started when the surveyor commenced this 
work and stopped when surveillance forms had been 
completed. 
1.8. Time to separate outgoing laboratory reports of the 
su. rvey areas from other outgoing reports 
The medical microbiologist signed outgoing reports and 
segregated microbiology reports from the survey areas 
daily. The time to sign out all outgoing reports without 
segregation was assessed. The stop-watch was started when 
the medical staff commenced the signing of laboratory 
reports and stopped when the last report had been signed. 
This exercise was repeated for the microbiologist signing 
microbiology reports and segregating the relevant reports. 
The differences between the two times was noted. 
1.9. Time to note infections on ward tally sheets 
The stop-watch was started when the surveyor was about to 
open the folder to note an infection on the ward tally 
sheet and stopped when the infection had been documented. 
1.10. Travel time from the laboratoxy to the ward, between 
wards and ward to laboratoxy 
The stop-watch was commenced when the surveyor left the 
microbiology department for the first ward and stopped 
when the surveyor had arrived at the nurses' station of 
the first ward. On leaving the nurses' station for the 
second ward the stop-watch was recommenced. The final time 
involved the surveyor walking from the nurses' station of 
the last ward to the laboratory. 
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1.11. Time to establish the location of patients who were 
no longer resident on the ward 
The stop-watch was commenced when the surveyor started 
reviewing the admission book, care plan or conversed with 
the nurses on the ward and stopped when the surveillance 
form had been completed. 
1.12 Follow-up of discharged patients 
Follow-up of discharged patients was required when the 
last date of surveillance was more than one day less than 
the date of discharge. The time to review nursing and 
medical notes was assessed. 
1.13. Time to undertake analyses 
At the end of a four week period, the surveyor performed 
selective surveillance analyses. To perform this, the 
collection of denominator data was required. 
1.13.1. Time to collect denominator data 
The number of discharges and surgical operations for a 
four week period of study formed the denominator data. 
The stop-watch was started when the surveyor left the 
laboratory to acquire the denominator data. The 
denominator data was noted and the surveyor returned to 
the laboratory, before the stop-watch was stopped. 
1.13.2. Time to undertake analyses 
The stop-watch was started when analyses were commenced 
and stopped when forms were complete. 
2. Laboratory Based Ward Surveillance 
2.1. Time to note whether the positive microbiology 
. reports are new or different. 
The stop-watch started when the binder containing tally 
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sheets of infections was opened to determine whether the 
positive microbiology reports were new or different. These 
were separated from the remainder. The stop-watch was 
stopped when the last report had been examined and 
segregated. 
2.2. Time to complete surveillance farms for new or 
different positive microbiology reports 
The stop-watch was started when the surveyor commenced the 
completion of surveillance forms and stopped when details 
of the last positive microbiology report had been noted. 
The time to undertake the following was assessed using the 
methods described above. 
-Time to separate positive outgoing laboratory reports of 
the survey areas from other outgoing reports 
-Travel time from the laboratory to the ward, between 
wards and ward to the laboratory. 
-Liaison with nurse in charge regarding patients with 
possible infections. 
-Travel time from nurses station to beds to locate 
information. 
-Time to review nursing history sheets 
-Time to review nursing care plans 
-Time to review medical notes 
-Time to review temperature charts 
-Time to review treatment charts 
-Time to transfer details of infections to tally sheets. 
-Time to undertake analyses. 
-Time to locate patients no longer resident on the ward. 
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3. Laboratory Based Telephone Surveillance 
Time to sign laboratory reports and separate the 
reports to be phoned to the medical or nursing 
staff of the survey areas. 
This was assessed using the method described above in 1.8. 
Instead of all microbiology reports from the survey areas 
being segregated, those meeting the criteria described in 
Appendix E were separated. 
3.2. Time to note details on surveillance forms for 
positive microbiology reports to be telephoned 
The stop-watch was started when the microbiologist 
commenced completing the surveillance forms and stopped 
when details of the last report had been noted. 
3.3. Time to telephone the nursinglmedical staff regarding 
positive microbiology reports and whether patients 
previously noted were still in-patients 
The stop-watch started when the medical microbiologist 
picked up the telephone receiver to make the call to the 
nursing/medical staff. The stop-watch was stopped when the 
telephone conversation was terminated or the conversation 
changed to matters not related to the survey. During the 
telephone call the remaining sections of the surveillance 
form were completed. Also the location of previously noted 
patients were noted. 
The time to undertake the following was assessed using the 
methods described above. 
-Time to transfer details of infections to tally sheets. 
-Time to undertake analyses. 
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Ward Liaison Surveillance 
4-1. Time to locate nurse and folder 
The stop-watch was started when the surveyor arrived at 
the nurses station and began to locate a trained member of 
the nursing staff and history sheet folder. The stop-watch 
was stopped when the folder and nurse had been located. 
4.2. Time to discuss the patients on the ward with nursing 
staff 
The stop-watch was started when the nurse and surveyor 
started discussing the patients and stopped when the 
conversation concerning the last patient had been 
terminated. 
The time to undertake the following was assessed using the 
methods described above. 
-Time to transfer details of infections to ward tally 
ward to laboratory. 
-Time to review medical notes 
-Time to review nursing history sheets 
-Time to review nursing care plans 
-Time to review temperature charts 
-Time to review treatment charts 
-Travel time between beds to locate information. 
-Traup-1 time from lahnratorv to ward. hetween wards and 
sheets. 
-Time to establish the location of patients who 
longer resident on the ward. 
-Time to undertake analyses. 
247 
are no 
OýL 
5. Laboratory Based Ward Liaison Surveillance 
The time to undertake the following was assessed using 
methods described above. 
-Time to separate reports from the survey areas from the 
other outgoing reports 
-Time to complete surveillance forms for new or different 
positive reports 
-Travel time from the laboratory to the ward, between 
wards and ward to laboratory 
-Time to locate nurse and folder for ward liaison 
surveillance 
-Time to discuss patients on the ward with nurse in 
charge. (This time includes discussions regarding patients 
with reported infections during ward liaison sur veillance 
and the follow-up of patients from whom positive results 
have been obtained. ) 
-Time to review medical notes 
-Time to review nursing history sheets 
-Time to review nursing care plans 
-Time to review temperature charts 
-Time to review treatment charts 
-Travel time between beds to locate information. 
-Time to transfer details of infections to wa rd tally 
sheets. 
-Time to establish the location of patients who are no 
longer resident on the ward. 
-Time to undertake analyses. 
6. Risk Factor Surveillance 
6.1. Review of nursing history sheets for "clues" 
The stop-watch was started when the surveyor opened the 
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folder of nursing history sheets and stopped when the last 
history sheet had been reviewed. 
6.2. Time to review nursing care plans for "clues" 
The stop-watch was started when the surveyor had arrived 
at the foot of the bed and was about to take the care plan 
folder. The surveyor reviewed the care plan (if present) 
completed the surveillance form (if appropriate) and 
replaced the folder. The stop-watch stopped when the 
folder had been replaced to the foot of the bed. The above 
was repeated for all the patients on the ward. 
6.3. Time to -review treatment charts for "clues" 
The stop-watch was started when the surveyor had arrived 
at the end of the bed and was about to take the treatment 
chart from the folder. The surveyor reviewed the treatment 
chart (if present), completed the surveillance form and 
replaced the treatment chart. The stop-watch was stopped 
when the treatment chart had been returned to the foot of 
the bed. The above was repeated for all the patients on 
the ward. 
The time to undertake the following was assessed using the 
methods described above. 
-Travel time from laboratory to ward, between wards and 
ward to laboratory. 
-Time to review medical notes 
-Time to review nursing care plans (for evidence 
of infection) 
-Time to review temperature charts 
-Time to review treatment charts (for evidence of 
infection) 
-Time to liaise with nurse in charge regarding patients 
249 
DL 
with possible infections 
-Travel time between beds to locate information. 
-Time to transfer details of infections to ward tally 
sheets. 
-Time to establish the location of patients who are no 
longer resident on the ward. 
-Time to undertake analyses. 
7. Temperature Chart Surveillance 
7.1. Time to review temperature charts for temperatures 
>1=3 7.80C 
The stop-watch was started when the surveyor was 
positioned at the foot end of the bed and was about to 
pick up the clipboard. The surveyor reviewed the 
temperature chart (if present), noted relevant details on 
the surveillance form and replaced the clipboard. The 
stop-watch was stopped when the clipboard had been 
replaced. This was repeated for all patients on the ward. 
Case records were then reviewed for all patients with a 
temperature >/= 37-80C. 
The time to undertake the following was assessed using 
methods described above. 
-Travel time from the laboratorv to the ward, between 
wards and ward to laboratory 
-Time to liaise with nurse in charge about patients 
possible infections. 
-Time to review medical notes 
-Time to review nursing history sheets 
-Time to review nursing care plans 
-Time to review treatment charts 
-Travel time between beds to locate information. 
with 
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-Time to transfer details of infections to ward tally 
sheets. 
-Time to establish the location of patients who are no 
longer resident on the ward. 
-Time to undertake analyses. 
8. Treatment Chart Surveillance 
8.1 Time to review treatment charts for the prescription 
of antibiotics 
The stop-watch was started when the surveyor was 
positioned at the foot of the bed and was about to locate 
the treatment chart. The surveyor reviewed the treatment 
chart (if present), noted relevant details on the 
surveillance form and replaced the clipboard. The stop- 
watch was stopped when the treatment chart had been 
replaced. This was repeated for all patients on the ward. 
Case records were then reviewed for all patients 
prescribed antibiotics. 
The time to undertake the following was assessed using 
methods described above. 
-Travel time from the laboratorv to the ward, between 
wards and ward to laboratory 
-Time to liaise with nurse in charge about patients 
possible infections. 
-Time to review medical notes 
-Time to review nursing history sheets 
-Time to review nursing care plans 
-Time to review temperature charts 
-Travel time between beds to locate information. 
-Time to transfer details of infections to ward 
with 
tally 
251 
sheets. 
-Time to establish the location of patients who are no 
longer resident on the ward. 
-Time to undertake analyses. 
Temperature and Treatment Chart Surveillance 
The time to undertake the following was assessed using 
methods described above. 
-Travel time from the laboratory to the ward, between 
wards and ward to laboratory 
-Time to review treatment charts for the prescription of 
antibiotics. 
-Time to review temperature charts for temperatures 
>/=37.80C. 
-Time to liaise with nurse in charge about patients with 
possible infections. 
-Time to review medical notes 
-Time to review nursing history sheets 
-Time to review nursing care plans 
-Travel time between beds to locate information. 
-Time to transfer details of infections to ward tally 
sheets. 
-Time to establish the location of patients who are no 
longer resident on the ward. 
-Time to undertake analyses. 
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APPENDIX E 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR SELECTIVE SURVEILLANCE METHODS 
1. Hospital Alerts 
- Streptococci, group A from wound and high vaginal swabs 
- Streptococci, group B in special care baby unit and 
maternity department 
- Staphylococcus aureus resistant to three or more 
antibiotics and/or resistant to methicillin 
- Gentamicin resistant micro-organi sms 
- Shigella species 
- Salmonella species 
- Clostridium, difficile 
- Clostridium perfringens 
- Mycobacterium tuberculosis 
- All mycobacterium positive films 
- Hepatitis B 
- Hepatitis A 
- Human immunodeficiency virus 
- Infective meningitis for example caused by: 
Neisseria meningitidis 
Haemophilus influenzae 
Streptococcus pneumoniae 
- Measles 
- Rubella 
Mump S 
Herpes varicella 
Herpes zoster 
Other infectious agents causing notifiable infectious 
diseases or food poisoning. 
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2. Criteria For Telephoning Positive Results 
- All micro-organisms included in list of Hospital 
Alerts. 
- Laboratory form indicates that the patient is receiving 
inappropriate antibiotics for the positive result that 
has been obtained. 
- All positive blood cultures. 
All positive cerebo-spinal, joint and pleural fluids, 
If clinical details on the form indicate that the 
patient is "seriously" ill. 
- All "significant" isolates from special care baby unit, 
intensive therapy unit and leukaemic patients. These are 
detailed below: 
*Positive reports from mid-stream urine specimens, 
catheter urine specimens, sputums and intravascular 
catheter tips. 
*Positive serology. 
*Positive Klebsiella species and Streptococci, group B 
reports. 
*Positive Beta haemolytic St-reptococci reports from 
intensive therapy unit. 
*Positive Staphylococcus aureus reports from intensive 
therapy unit and special care baby unit. 
"Clues" for Risk Factor Surveillance 
Dlagnoses ar conditions 
Leukaemia (Wenzel et al, 1976; Sharbaugh, 1981) 
Lymphoma (Wenzel et al, 1976; Sharbaugh, 1981) 
Cancer/carcinoma (Wenzel et al, 1976; Sharbaugh, 1981) 
Granulocytopaenia (Wenzel et al, 1976) 
Collagen Vascular Disease (Wenz el et al, 1976) 
Sarcoid (Wenzel et al , 197 6) 
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Widespread dermatoses (Wenzel et al, 1976) 
Burns (Wenzel et al, 1976) 
Organ transplantation (Wenzel et al, 1976) 
Hepatitis (Wenzel et al, 1976) 
Diabetes (Sharbaugh, 1981) 
Cystic fibrosis (Sharbaugh, 1981) 
Sickle Cell Disease (Sharbaugh, 1981) 
Hypogammaglobulinaemia (Sharbaugh, 1981) 
Alcoholism (Sharbaugh, 1981) 
Paraplegia (Sharbaugh, 1981) 
Leukocytopaenia (Sharbaugh, 1981) 
Patients receiving steroids an d/or immunosuppressive 
therapy (Sharbaugh, 1981) 
Patients receiving radiation thera py (Sharbaugh, 1981) 
Patients receiving antibiotics (Sharbaugh, 1981) 
(Antibiotics prescribed with pre-o perative medication were 
not included. ) 
All patients hospitalised for thre e weeks or more (Wenzel 
et al, 1976). 
All patients in Intensive care uni t and coronary care unit 
(Wenzel et al, 1976). 
Ope. rations or p-rocedares 
Any surgical procedure requiring general anaesthetic 
(Sharbaugh, 1981) 
Tracheostomies (Wenzel et al, 1976; Sharbaugh, 1981) 
CNS shunt (Wenzel et al, 1976) 
Bladder catheterisation (Wenzel et al, 1976; Sharbaugh, 
1981) 
Hyperalimentation (Wenzel et al, 1976) 
Respiratory assistance (Wenzel et al, 1976; Sharbaugh, 
1981) 
Renal dialysis (Sharbaugh, 1981) 
Nasogastric tube (Sharbaugh, 1981) 
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IV/IA catheterisation (Sharbaugh, 1981) 
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